Dimock v. Revere Copper Co of Boston, Massachusetts

• Decision Date: 05 April 1886
• Citation: 6 S.Ct. 855,29 L.Ed. 994,117 U.S. 559
• Parties: DIMOCK v. REVERE COPPER CO. OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS. Filed
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

6 S.Ct. 855

117 U.S. 559

29 L.Ed. 994

DIMOCK v. REVERE COPPER CO. OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS.

Filed April 5, 1886.

This case comes here by a writ of error to the supreme court of New York, having been decided in the court of appeals and the record remitted to the supreme court, that judgment might be finally entered there. The action was brought in that court on a judgment in favor of the Revere Copper Company, plaintiff, against Anthony W. Dimock, rendered in the superior court of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, for the county of Suffolk, on the first day of April, 1875.

The defendant, Dimock, pleaded, in bar of this action, a discharge in bankruptcy, by the district court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, rendered on the twenty-sixth day of March, 1875, five days before judgment in the state court. The case being submitted to the New York supreme court in special term, without a jury, that court found the following facts, and conclusions of law thereon:

'AS FINDINGS OF FACT.

'First. That the plaintiff is, and at the times hereinafter mentioned was, a corporation, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the common wealth of Massachusetts.

'Second. That on or about the thirteenth day of January, 1874, the Revere Copper Company of Boston, Massachusetts, the plaintiff herein, commenced an action in the superior court of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, within and for the county of Suffolk, a court of general jurisdiction, against Anthony W. Dimock, the defendant herein, by the issue of a writ of attachment against the goods, estate, and body of the said defendant, and which said writ was duly served on said defendant, and the summons to appear in said action was duly served upon him personally, and that the said defendant thereafter duly appeared in said action by attorney; that the cause of action was an indorsement of said Dimock of two promissory notes made in the city of New York to the order of plaintiff by the Atlantic Mail Steam-ship Company, and dated December 19, 1872.

'Third. That on or about June 23, 1874, the said defendant, Anthony W. Dimock, filed a petition in bankruptcy, and was duly adjudicated a bankrupt in the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, and that such pro- ceedings were thereafter had that on or about March 26, 1875, the said Dimock was discharged from all debts and claims provable against his estate, and which existed on the twenty-third day of June, 1874.

'Fourth. That such proceedings were had in the aforesaid action in the superior court of the commonwealth of Massachusetts that on or about April 1, 1875, the plaintiff duly recovered judgment in said action against the defendant for the sum of three thousand five hundred and ninety-five 15-100 dollars, ($3,595.15,) and that said judgment was upon that day duly entered.

'Fifth. That no part of said judgment has been paid, and the whole thereof is now due and payable to the plaintiff.

'AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

'1. That the said proceedings in bankruptcy are no bar to the present action, and constitute no defense herein.

'2. That the plaintiff should have judgment against the defendant for the sum of three thousand five hundred and ninety-five 15-100 dollars, ($3,595.15,) with interest from April 1, 1875, amounting to one thousand one hundred and forty-two 96-100 dollars, ($1,142.96,) making in all four thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight 11-100 dollars, ($4,738.11,) together with the costs of this action, to be taxed, and an allowance, in addition to costs, amounting to the sum of seventy-five dollars.'

The judgment rendered on these findings was reversed by the supreme court in general term, and that judgment was in turn reversed by the court of appeals, which restored the judgment of the special term. 90 N. Y. 33.

Geo. Putnam Smith, for plaintiff in error.

Wm. S. Opdyke, for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 561-563 intentionally omitted] Mr. David Willcox for defendant in error.

MILLER, J.

The only question considered at all these trials was whether the discharge of the defendant in the bankruptcy proceeding is, under the facts found by the court, a bar to the present action; and, as the decision by the New York court against the plaintiff in error, as to the effect of that order of discharge, is to refuse to him a right claimed under the laws of the United States, this court has jurisdiction to review the decision.

The superior court of Massachusetts had jurisdiction of the suit of the copper company against Dimock, both as regards the subject-matter and the parties. This jurisdiction was rendered complete by service of process, and by the appearance of the defendant. All this was before the beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding. Nothing was done to oust this jurisdiction, and the case accordingly proceeded, in due order, to the rendition of the judgment which is the foundation of this action. It is not argued that this judgment was void, or that the court was ousted of its jurisdiction by anything done in the bankruptcy court. No such argument could be sustained if it were made. In the case of Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 521, which was very similar to this on the point now before the court, it was said: 'The court in that case had acquired jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter of the suit. It was competent to administer full justice, and was...