Clark v. Rockwell
Decision Date | 11 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 21613,21613 |
Parties | Steven G. CLARK, Plaintiff Below, v. Robert A. ROCKWELL, Jeanette R. Imler and Randolph Imler, Defendants Below. |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Syllabus Point 2, Gonzalez Perez v. Romney Orchards, Inc., 184 W.Va. 20, 399 S.E.2d 50 (1990).
2. Syllabus Point 5, Paull v. Cook, 135 W.Va. 833, 65 S.E.2d 750 (1951).
Jeffrey T. Jones, Hunt, Lee, Farrell & Kessler, Charleston, for appellant.
William Richard McCune, Jr., Tammy Mitchell Bittorf, Jackson & Kelly, Charleston, for appellees.
In these certified questions, we are asked to consider whether a judgment of the Circuit Court of Allegheny County, Maryland, is so contrary to our public policy that we should not enforce it in a suit pending in the Circuit Court of Hampshire County.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, Steven G. Clark, was injured in an automobile accident in Hampshire County on March 10, 1989. He was a passenger in a vehicle owned by Jeanette and Randolph Imler and driven by Robert A. Rockwell. The Imler vehicle was insured with a liability policy limit of $50,000, which was paid to the plaintiff. The driver of the Imler vehicle, Mr. Rockwell, had a separate liability policy for $100,000 and it also was paid to the plaintiff.
Mr. Clark's mother had an insurance policy issued by Aetna with an underinsured motorist coverage of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. The Aetna policy was issued in Maryland by a Maryland insurance agent. Mr. Clark, who resided with his mother in Maryland, sought to take advantage of this coverage.
Under Maryland law, there was no underinsured motorist coverage because the liability coverage could be used as an offset to the underinsured motorist coverage. Aetna filed a motion for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of Allegheny County in Cumberland, Maryland, asking that the court declare Maryland law to control the underinsured motorist payments.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Clark filed suit for his personal injuries in the Circuit Court of Hampshire County. The Circuit Court of Allegheny County, Maryland, determined that Maryland law governed the case. A copy of its order to that effect was filed with the Circuit Court of Hampshire County along with a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's suit. The Circuit Court of Hampshire County declined to enforce the Maryland judgment, finding that it was against our public policy. It then certified the issue to this Court. 1
We address initially Certified Question No. 2 relating to full faith and credit. In our interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause found in Section 1 of Article IV of the United States Constitution, 2 we have followed applicable United States Supreme Court cases. In its more recent cases, the Supreme Court rarely attempts to give a full summary of the scope of that clause. The following passage from Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 1188, 59 L.Ed.2d 416, 425 (1979), is a typical expression of the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of that clause: 3
Our traditional statement on the extent of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is reflected in Syllabus Point 2 of Gonzalez Perez v. Romney Orchards, Inc., 184 W.Va. 20, 399 S.E.2d 50 (1990):
More to the point of this case is whether the enforcement of a judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause can be precluded in a sister state on the basis that the judgment rests upon law that is contrary to the forum state's public policy. There are some earlier United States Supreme Court cases in which it appears that public policy considerations might be relevant if the public policy differential between the two states is substantial. See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 S.Ct. 589, 79 L.Ed. 1100 (1935); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 56 S.Ct. 229, 80 L.Ed. 220 (1935). However, later cases appear to hold that the forum state's public policy cannot override the enforcement of a valid judgment rendered in a sister state. See, e.g., Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 67 S.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488 (1947); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942), citing Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. 290, 5 Wall. 290, 18 L.Ed. 475 (1866); Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 62 S.Ct. 608, 86 L.Ed. 885 (1942); Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 59 S.Ct. 557, 83 L.Ed. 653 (1939). See also Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411, 40 S.Ct. 371, 64 L.Ed. 638 (1920). We recognized the latter principle in Syllabus Point 5 of Paull v. Cook, 135 W.Va. 833, 65 S.E.2d 750 (1951):
Therefore, based on an assumption that the Maryland court's decision on the insurance policy violates our public policy, such judgment still will be entitled to full faith and credit in our courts. Thus, we find the circuit court should have answered the second certified question in the affirmative and granted full faith and credit to the Maryland judgment.
With regard to the first certified question relating to whether our public policy on underinsured motorist coverage is violated by Maryland's limited determination, we are controlled by Nadler v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 188 W.Va. 329, 424 S.E.2d 256 (1992). There, we considered the issue of whether residents of Ohio injured in an automobile accident in West Virginia could have the benefit of our underinsured motorist law based on our public policy even though their insurance policy was issued in Ohio. Their automobile was involved in an accident when a tractor-trailer truck crossed the centerline and struck them on U.S. Route 60 in Greenbrier County. The parties agreed that under Ohio law, where the policy was issued, the underinsured motorist coverage was offset by the amount recovered under applicable liability policies. This same offset exists under Maryland law. The liability payments in Nadler exceeded the underinsured coverage limits and, if Ohio law applied, there could be no recovery. The same factual situation exists in this case.
In Nadler, we began our analysis of the public policy issue by referring to Lee v. Saliga, 179 W.Va. 762, 373 S.E.2d 345 (1988), where we dealt with our conflict of laws rule on interpreting underinsured motorist coverage. In Syllabus Point 2 of Nadler, we quoted the conflict of laws rule regarding contracts developed in Lee v. Saliga, supra:
4
Although neither Nadler nor Lee involved the enforcement of a judgment, in Nadler we discussed the relevant public policy issue. This issue was whether the uninsured motorist coverage law of another state could be deemed so foreign to our public policy principles that we would refuse to enforce it in a lawsuit brought as a result of an automobile accident occurring in this State.
The foregoing issue is essentially the public policy defense presented in this case. In Nadler, we gave the following analysis of our public policy with regard to uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage:
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