Dinkins v. Robbins
| Decision Date | 26 June 1942 |
| Docket Number | 15434. |
| Parties | DINKINS v. ROBBINS et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
DuRant & DuRant, of Manning, for appellants.
Davis & McFaddin and J. G. Dinkins, all of Manning, for respondent.
This action in claim and delivery was instituted by Mrs. Frances M. Dinkins for the recovery of possession of a certain described LaSalle automobile or its value; and also sought judgment against the defendant, S. L. Robbins, for $10,000 actual and punitive damages .
The complaint alleged that on August 16, 1941, a deputy from the office of the defendant, J. E. Gamble, Sheriff, took possession of plaintiff's above described property for and on behalf of the defendant, S. L. Robbins, while the automobile was parked in the town of Manning, South Carolina and that the defendant, J. E. Gamble, refused to surrender the vehicle to plaintiff despite evidence submitted to him as to her ownership thereof; and that the unlawful and willful seizure and retention of said property had damaged her in the above sum.
The defendants, by way of answer, alleged that the defendant, J E. Gamble, as Sheriff of Clarendon County, levied upon and took possession of the said automobile as the property of V. R. Dinkins husband of plaintiff, pursuant to a judgment in favor of S. L. Robbins, dated March 25, 1941, and execution thereon (dated May 20, 1941) against the said V. R. Dinkins, who had recently purchased the automobile and used it daily in his business, and that a license for it had been issued to him. The defendants alleged further that after the execution had been issued in favor of S. L. Robbins, Mr. and Mrs. Dinkins had collusively conspired and schemed to prevent the Sheriff from levying upon the property of V. R. Dinkins, thus preventing S. L. Robbins from collecting his judgment, and that in pursuance of such conspiracy, the registration of the State Highway Department was surreptitiously procured to be unlawfully changed, and that efforts were made to get the dealer of said automobile to change his records, and that as a part of such scheme, the plaintiff filed a deed conveying to her the land upon which her husband's saw mill and planing mill were located, and that she has now filed a claim to practically all of the machinery and appliances upon said premises, with the claim that they are fixtures attached to the freehold. Defendants further alleged that if the said automobile was transferred from the husband to his wife, such act was done for the purpose of enabling him to evade the collection of the judgment against him.
At the trial of the case before the Honorable Samuel Want, Special Judge, presiding, and a jury, the plaintiff, a school teacher, testified that she rode to her work in a school bus, but that an automobile was indispensable to her husband in his work; that she purchased this automobile from her husband, prior to which time he had owned a car himself all of the time, that after she bought the car from her husband, "he used it maybe a little over fifty per cent of the time" and that "in the morning if I wanted his--the other car I would tell him I wanted it." The plaintiff's husband testified that he drove back and forth from his home to his place of business (a distance of twenty or twenty-five miles) practically every day, that after he transferred the car to his wife he continued to drive it, although not every day; that prior to June 9, 1941, he owned an unincumbered 1937 La Salle automobile which, on said date, he traded to the Boyle Motor Company, of Sumter, in return for the 1939 model LaSalle automobile in dispute, the car which he purchased being valued at $900. On this purchase he was allowed about $400 on his old car, it being undisputed that such allowance represented his own property. In addition, he paid $200 by check and, on the above date, gave a chattel mortgage, due ten days thereafter, for $300. This trade was made less than three weeks after the date of the issuance of the above named execution against him.
The record in the case reveals that on June 13, four days after his trade with the motor company, Mr. Dinkins was served with a notice of the appointment of homestead appraisers in connection with the judgment against him in favor of S. L. Robbins. Ten days thereafter, on June 23, as shown by the plaintiff's exhibits, the chattel mortgage was transferred to Mrs. Dinkins, the plaintiff in this action, by the Boyle Motor Company, and on June 27, four days thereafter, the motor vehicle license for the disputed automobile was likewise transferred to plaintiff. The public records reveal that V. R. Dinkins had given a purchase money mortgage on the disputed automobile, which was registered in his name prior to its transfer to his wife. The plaintiff testified upon cross examination that she bought the car from her husband about ten days after he bought it.
In addition to the disputed automobile, the plaintiff also testified that she owns a Cadillac automobile. Her testimony also disclosed that her husband was in possession of the LaSalle automobile when it was levied upon, although he no longer owned an automobile in his own name. Upon cross examination, plaintiff's husband testified:
The homestead was set off on August 6, 1941, and the property at the plant which Mr. Dinkins operated was levied upon on the same day. Claims to this property were filed by various creditors and by Mrs. Dinkins as landlord entitled to fixtures attached to realty under an unrecorded deed, with reference to which the following colloquy took place during the trial upon cross examination of V. R. Dinkins:
Throughout the trial, the presiding Judge strictly limited the testimony to transactions and instruments relating to the disputed automobile, while the appellants attempted to introduce testimony that the insolvent debtor, V. R. Dinkins, shortly befor the rendition of the judgment against him, had committed other acts designed to defeat the judgment, and that in the proceeding brought to determine the priorities of the various claims to the machinery, Mrs. Dinkins had claimed a part, and finally had attempted to amend her answer setting up a claim to all of the machinery and property at the plant. Testimony not directly connected with the disputed automobile was excluded, among other grounds, as being related only to collateral matters.
The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the return of the said automobile, or its value of $750, and against S. L. Robbins for $100 actual damages, and $200 punitive damages. A motion for a new trial, upon six grounds, was made by the defendants, and in due time was refused by an order of the trial Judge. The case comes to this Court upon the exceptions of the defendants, the pertinent ones of which make two questions for our determination:
(1) Did the trial Judge err in excluding testimony as to other transactions between plaintiff and her husband?
(2) Did the trial Judge err in refusing to charge the jury as to badges of fraud?
The consideration of these questions is attended by certain difficulties which, fortunately, are seldom encountered by this Court in its efforts to effect a thorough consideration of all questions involved in the cases before it. The first of these difficulties in the present case is that the transcript of record does not contain "a concise narrative of the facts or evidence as agreed upon or settled," as required by Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, nor are the undisputed facts stated without the testimony, as is required by Section 4 of the same rule. Furthermore, although appellants have filed fifteen exceptions, a number of these cannot be considered here for the reason that they specify as error certain charges made, and the refusal of certain requests to charge, despite the fact that such commissions and omissions were not included among the grounds of the motion for a new trial. Furthermore, several proffered exhibits which were offered in evidence by the appellants, and excluded by the Court, are listed in the transcript of record, but of the eleven papers mentioned therein, the contents of only one are given. It is impossible for the Court to ascertain what was sought to be shown by documents whose contents are not revealed, for it is only by a study of the rejected papers that they could cast any light upon the questions here involved and their pertinency made to appear. In discussing a like situation, this Court, in the case of LeGrande v. LeGrande, 178 S.C. 230, at page 239, 182 S.E. 432, at page 436, 102 A.L.R. 582, said:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial