Diocese of Providence v. Vaz

• Decision Date: 22 July 1996
• Docket Number: Nos. 94-757-M,s. 94-757-M
• Citation: 679 A.2d 879
• Parties: The DIOCESE OF PROVIDENCE et al. v. Maria C. VAZ v. CARTER DAY NURSERY et al. P., 94-760-M.P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 879

679 A.2d 879

The DIOCESE OF PROVIDENCE et al. v. Maria C. VAZ v. CARTER DAY NURSERY et al.

Nos. 94-757-M.P., 94-760-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 22, 1996.

Lauren Jones, Robert Smith Thurston, George Salem, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Michael Farley, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

BOURCIER, Justice.

This matter comes before us on a petition for certiorari filed by the Diocese of Providence (Diocese) and the Carter Day Nursery following a decision by the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court, finding that the respondent, Maria C. Vaz (Vaz), was totally disabled owing to a psychic injury flowing from a work-related physical injury. Also before us is Vaz's petition for certiorari alleging that the trial justice's finding that Vaz's original work-related physical disability had ended and the subsequent decision of the Appellate Division affirming that determination were both erroneously decided. We grant the Diocese's petition and deny Vaz's petition.

On May 8, 1992, Vaz asserts that she injured her back while lifting a tub of water during the course of her employment at the Carter Day Nursery, a day-care facility run by the Diocese. She was awarded partial-disability workers' compensation benefits for her back injury commencing on June 16, 1992. On January 13, 1993, the Diocese petitioned to review the back injury compensation award, WCC 93-482, alleging therein that Vaz's physical incapacity had ended. A hearing on that petition began and concluded on June 7, 1993. Vaz, however, on August 2, 1993, moved to reopen the hearing proceedings so as to permit her to assert a claim for psychic disability allegedly resulting from the physical back injury for which she was then receiving workers' compensation benefits, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 28-35-45(c). ¹ Vaz's motion to reopen was granted. At the reopened hearing on January 21, 1994, John Ruggiano, M.D. (Dr. Ruggiano), testified that, on June 10, 1993, the one and only time on which he had occasion to examine Vaz, she was totally disabled owing to an adjustment disorder with depression that flowed from her original work-related back injury. That single visit with Dr. Ruggiano was, as previously noted, the full extent of Vaz's treatment for her alleged psychic disorder. The trial judge, in a bench decision, on January 31, 1994, found that Vaz had recovered from her work-related back strain physical incapacity. He also found that Vaz was totally disabled as the result of a psychic flow-through injury as of June 10, 1993, but that there was no evidence from Dr. Ruggiano to indicate that the psychic incapacity continued beyond June 10. The trial judge therefore terminated Vaz's compensation benefits. Vaz appealed.

The Workers' Compensation Court Appellate Division, acting on Vaz's appeal, in a decision entered December 2, 1994, affirmed the trial judge's decision in regard to Vaz's recovery from her work-related physical back injury disability, but it reversed the trial judge's finding concerning Vaz's psychic flow-through disability. The Appellate Division found Vaz to be totally incapacitated as a result of the psychic flow-through disability. However, the Appellate Division also found that disability to be of a continuing nature, contrary to the finding of the trial judge. The Appellate Division entered its final decree embodying those findings on December 12, 1994. Petitions for certiorari by the Diocese and Vaz followed therefrom.

During the pendency of the Appellate Division's consideration of the Diocese's appeal of WCC 93-482, Vaz filed a separate and original petition to review, alleging therein that her psychic injury had returned or increased as of February 17, 1994, which date coincided with the date of the trial judge's decision denying her benefits on the Diocese's petition to review. Vaz's petition was WCC 94-5392. In that petition she alleged her injury to be the psychic flow-through injury that she had previously raised in defense to the Diocese's petition, WCC 93-482. Vaz's petition to review due to her alleged return of disability from her psychic injury was denied at pretrial on July 28, 1994. She thereafter filed her claim for trial, but that claim was withdrawn shortly after filing, on August 15, 1994.

The Diocese asserts, in its petition for certiorari, that the Appellate Division erroneously employed the de novo standard of review in its examination of the trial judge's decision on WCC 93-482. We agree. Pursuant to G.L.1956 § 28-35-28(b) a trial judge's findings on factual matters are final unless "clearly erroneous." In this case the trial judge's finding that Vaz's flow-through injury was not of a continuing nature was a factual matter to be determined by the trial judge on the basis of the medical evidence presented to him. We acknowledge that § 28-35-28(a) permits a de novo standard of review. Davol, Inc. v. Aguiar, 463 A.2d 170 (R.I.1983). However, the Appellate Division, in employing that standard of review, is limited to the record made at the trial before the trial judge, Whittaker v. Health-Tex, Inc., 440 A.2d 122 (R.I.1982), and may not undertake a de novo review of conflicting medical testimony and reject the trial judge's finding thereon, as it did in this case, without first making a finding that the trial judge was clearly wrong. Section 28-35-28(b); Grimes Box Co. v. Miguel, 509 A.2d 1002 (R.I.1986).

The Appellate Division's reliance upon Bottiglieri v. Caldarone, 486 A.2d 1085, 1087 (R.I.1985) and Moretti v. Turin, Inc., 112 R.I. 220, 223, 308 A.2d 500, 502 (1973), is misplaced. In 1986 this Court stated in Grimes:

"Finally, the employee contends that the commission must independently weigh the entire record before filing its decision. We strongly disagree. As this court stated in Davol, Inc., 463 A.2d at 174, the commission exceeds its scope of review when it undertakes a de novo review of conflicting medical testimony without first finding that the trial commissioner was clearly...