Dionne v. State, A-2486

• Decision Date: 06 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. A-2486,A-2486
• Citation: 766 P.2d 1181
• Parties: Michael J. DIONNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Court of Appeals

Page 1181

766 P.2d 1181

Michael J. DIONNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. A-2486.

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

Jan. 6, 1989.

Catherine M. Easter, Asst. Public Defender, and Dana Fabe, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.

James E. Torgerson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dwayne W. McConnell, Dist. Atty., Anchorage, and Grace Berg Schaible, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

OPINION

Before BRYNER, C.J., and SINGLETON, J.

SINGLETON, Judge.

Michael J. Dionne pled no contest to driving while intoxicated (DWI), AS 28.35.030, and driving with license suspended (DWLS), AS 28.15.291(a), while preserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of an alleged improper stop. Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974). We affirm.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Airport Police Officer Janice Jones testified that while she was patrolling the upper ramp of the domestic terminal of the Anchorage International Airport, an individual informed her that the driver of a Ford station wagon, which was located approximately ten feet away, was "possibly intoxicated." The informant indicated that he had reached this conclusion after observing the driver for "some time now." When oncoming traffic prevented the vehicle in question from entering the stream of departing traffic, Jones decided to approach the vehicle to investigate. As Jones walked in front of the car, she observed that its headlights were not on. Jones contacted the driver, confirmed that the headlights were working, and asked the driver to identify himself. In conversing with Dionne, Jones noticed that Dionne's speech was slow and slurred. Another officer who had recently arrived on the scene administered field sobriety tests, which Dionne failed. Dionne was subsequently arrested.

Dionne moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop on the grounds that the state failed to demonstrate the reliability of the citizen informant and failed to show that the citizen's tip was based on personal knowledge, as required under Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1967). Dionne points out that Alaska has adopted the two-part Aguilar- Spinelli test. See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985). Dionne raises the same arguments on appeal. ¹

An investigatory stop in Alaska may only be conducted where there are specific and articulable facts which create a "reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists, or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred." Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698, 700 (Alaska 1978); Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976). It is not necessary that the officer observe someone do something dangerous; it is enough that the officer have reason to suspect that the person to be stopped is dangerous. We have previously held that the danger created by one who drives while intoxicated is sufficient to satisfy the imminent public danger requirement. State v Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735 (Alaska App.1983). Consequently, a reasonable suspicion that a person is intoxicated and in control of a vehicle will authorize an investigatory stop.

Reasonable suspicion may be based on an informant's tip. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). The underlying circumstances known to the officer should show reason to believe that the informant is a credible person, and should reveal to the officer the basis for the conclusions reached by the informant. Effenbeck v. State, 700 P.2d 811, 813 (Alaska App.1985) (relying in part on Aguilar ). In Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 517 (Alaska 1973), the Alaska Supreme Court indicated that when a citizen provides information, there is less need for establishing the credibility of the informant. In their reasoning, the court pointed out that citizen informants generally contact the police out of a concern for society and the safety of its members:

A different rationale exists for establishing the reliability of named "citizen informers" as opposed to the traditional idea of unnamed police contacts or informers who usually themselves are criminals. Information supplied to officers by the traditional police informer is not given in the spirit of a concerned citizen, but often is given in exchange for some concession, payment, or simply out of revenge against the subject. The nature of these persons and the information which they supply convey a certain impression of unreliability, and it is proper to demand that some evidence of their credibility and reliability be shown. One practical way of making such a showing is to point to accurate information which they have supplied in the past.

An ordinary citizen who reports a crime stands on a much different footing. He acts with an intent to aid the police in law enforcement because of a concern for society or his own safety. Since the citizen informer often provides information only once, there is little opportunity to establish credibility or reliability in the most common manner--comparison with accurate information provided in the past.

We hold that a valid arrest may be made on information provided by a "citizen informer" and that the informer's prior reliability need not be established before the arrest. The only caveat placed on such a rule is that some of the details...