Dior v. Milton

• Decision Date: 27 July 1956
• Citation: 9 Misc.2d 425,155 N.Y.S.2d 443
• Parties: , 110 U.S.P.Q. 563 Christian DIOR, Societe a Responsabilite Limitee; Jacques F. Fath & Cie, Societe Anonyme; Jeanne Lanvin, Societe Anonyme; and Jean Patou, Societe Anonyme, Plaintiffs, v. Frederick L. MILTON, Merit Studios, Inc., Adams Photoprint Co., Inc., John Doe, and Richard Roe, the said names John Doe and Richard Roe being fictitious, the true names of such defendants being presently unknown, the persons intended being co-conspirators of defendants Frederick L. Milton, Merit Studios, Inc., and Adams Photoprint Co., Inc., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 443

155 N.Y.S.2d 443

9 Misc.2d 425, 110 U.S.P.Q. 563

Christian DIOR, Societe a Responsabilite Limitee; Jacques F Fath & Cie, Societe Anonyme; Jeanne Lanvin Societe Anonyme; and Jean Patou, Societe Anonyme, Plaintiffs, v. Frederick L. MILTON, Merit Studios, Inc., Adams Photoprint Co., Inc., John Doe, and Richard Roe, the said names John Doe and Richard Roe being fictitious, the true names of such defendants being presently unknown, the persons intended being co-conspirators of defendants Frederick L. Milton Merit Studios, Inc., and Adams Photoprint Co., Inc., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County, Part III.

July 27, 1956.

Order Affirmed Nov. 7, 1956. See 156 N.Y.S.2d 996.

Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly & Hamilton, for plaintiffs (Thomas J. Kiernan, James G. Johnson, Jr., Edwin L. Gasperini, New York City, Richard L. Ottinger, Scarsdale, of counsel).

Jacob H. Gilbert, New York City, for defendant Milton.

Pokart & Pokart, New York City, for defendant Merit Studios, Inc.

Coudert Bros., New York City, for defendant Adams Photoprint Co., Inc.

GREENBERG, Justice.

The picture which is portrayed by this motion to dismiss the amended complaint for insufficiency, or alternatively for other relief, is of far reaching importance to 'Fashion Houses' and to the dress and allied trades generally. In legal contemplation the situation is of equal moment. The specific question posed is whether piracy of style is to receive the imprimatur of law in a case where there has been a disclosure of the style and design to a limited group of people under an agreement that they would not reveal or copy such styles and design.

This court has had occasion in Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc., v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, affirmed 279 App.Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795, to write on a very closely related issue. The challenge to its authority by the moving defendant, or rather the vigorous attempt to distinguish it in principle from the instant case, requires a re-marshalling of the applicable rules of equity.

Plaintiffs are well known Parisian fashion houses. The defendants in New York, two of them corporations, publish a 'sketch service' through which there is produced reproductions of plaintiffs' original designs and sketches, and these are sold to subscribers to the service conducted by the defendants. Such acts are sought to be restrained by the plaintiffs who claim that they have certain property rights in the designs of great commercial value which, through an unlawful conspiracy, have been appropriated by the defendants.

The individual defendant moves to dismiss the amended complaint on the following grounds:

(1) That it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action;

(2) That the plaintiffs did not follow the direction of the court heretofore made that they separately state and number each cause of action in an amended complaint (3) That it does not comply with the requirements of section 241 of the Civil Practice Act.

Additionally, defendant seeks to have certain paragraphs of the amended complaint stricken out, pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Civil Practice, as irrelevant, redundant, conclusory and evidentiary.

It is well in the beginning to dispose of that branch of the motion seeking relief under items 2 and 3 thereof. With respect to the former, defendant Milton previously moved to require plaintiffs separately to state and number causes of action and this court granted the motion, in a memorandum decision which stated 'The plaintiffs have pleaded in one cause of action unfair competition and infringement of registered names and trade marks'. These, it was directed, should be separately stated and numbered. Plaintiffs thereupon served the amended complaint here assailed and in it omitted completely the cause of action for 'infringement of registered names and trade marks' and there, therefore, remains a single cause of action sounding solely in unfair competition. Allegations in the complaint that the defendants have misappropriated and wrongfully traded on the plaintiffs' names and reputations are clearly proper. They are elements of plaintiffs' cause of action for unfair competition.

Also, the fact that specifications of the various unlawful acts and conduct by the defendants are set forth in the complaint does not import that each wrongful act alleged constitutes a separate and distinct cause of action. The complaint postures a single actionable wrong to the plaintiffs giving them a single primary rights. Accordingly, that branch of the motion stated under item 2 is denied.

In so far as the defendant seeks relief under section 241 of the Civil Practice Act and to have certain allegations in the complaint stricken out, it is denied. The amended complaint sets forth a clear and concise statement of the facts upon which plaintiffs relied. The allegations which it is claimed will prove harmful will not be removed from the complaint unless it can be shown that they have no reasonable or probable bearing on the controversy or that they will prejudice the party seeking to have them stricken out. On this score there has been a complete failure.

We come now to the allegations of the complaint and the heart of the controversy. The plaintiff Christian Dior, etc., is, and, for many years, has been known and esteemed throughout the world as an outstanding, leading and famous haute couture house. Christian Dior has been recognized as a leading and famous designer of dresses and accessories and other items of women's apparel. He is a principal executive of the plaintiff and has designed exclusively for plaintiff dresses and accessories and other items of women's apparel which are unique, exclusive and original and represent the product of his special skill and genius.

Dior's commercial activity and reputation depend on the excellence of the designs created by him. In the exploitation of such designs plaintiff has incurred great expense, has acquired a reputation and good will of value and has acquired valuable property rights in its good will and reputation, and its names 'Christian Dior' and 'Dior' have become well and favorably known in France, the United States and throughout the world.

The complaint alleges matter in regard to the other three plaintiffs of a similar character which need not be repeated here.

It is then alleged that each of the plaintiffs in order to further the exploitation of its unique, exclusive and original designs and to protect its valuable and recognized property rights therein, uses and for many years has used an elaborate and extensive system of displaying and showing the unique, exclusive and original dresses and accessories and other items of women's apparel manufactured by it under such conditions as to make certain that the designs are never published, and the models are never revealed to any person or persons other than those who are legally bound not to make or divulge any reproduction of any or all of the models shown, or any details thereof, whether by photographs, sketches, detailed descriptions or otherwise, unless and until specifically authorized by each of the plaintiffs respectively.

Pursuant to the established and existing system set forth above the wearing apparel designed by the plaintiffs are displayed and shown at the establishments of each of the plaintiffs in Paris, France, at showings held throughout the year, and in addition at two major semi-annual displays of the collections commencing in or about February and August of each year. Such unique, exclusive and original models as created by each of the plaintiffs are thereafter displayed by them individually to a restricted and exclusive group which includes respresentatives of the press agencies, representatives of manufacturers, buyers and retailers in the dress and women's apparel industry, and other individuals who are admitted to the displays only at the express invitation of plaintiffs and only after they are fully aware of, assent to, and agree to be bound by the conditions of admission to the displays and agree to observe and abide by the conditions.

According to the plaintiffs, unauthorized and premature disclosure of information and knowledge relating to the designs and models manufactured by them, and each of them, greatly affects and destroys the demand for the designs and models and greatly interferes with and hinders the profitable exploitation of designs and models, all to the great injury and detriment of the pPlaintiffs. The conditions above mentioned include an agreement by the viewers not to infringe said rights nor to make or divulge any reproductions of any of the models, whether by photographs or sketches, or to transmit them to third persons for the purpose of permitting such persons to make or divulge any such reproduction.

The complaint further alleges that the defendants conspiring together and having full knowledge of the extensive steps taken by the plaintiffs to protect their specific property rights in the designs and models, and to prevent the unauthorized copying and reproduction, and with full knowledge of the conditions which cover the displays, presentations and showings, and also with knowledge of the terms and provisions of the contract used in connection with sales by each of the plaintiffs of models, continuously in use from about 1948, falsely represented to plaintiffs and each of them that they were acting for persons other than the defendants; that they concealed from plaintiffs that they were acting for the defendants; that they fraudulently promised and represented that they would not disclose or divulge knowledge and information obtained at said displays; that they gained admittance to the showings and presentations by means of false representations, fraudulent concealment and fraudulent promises; that the defendants fraudulently, wrongfully and willfully induced employees of plai...