Direct Auto Ins. Co. v. Merx
| Decision Date | 22 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-19-0050,2-19-0050 |
| Citation | 161 N.E.3d 1140,443 Ill.Dec. 488,2020 IL App (2d) 190050 |
| Parties | DIRECT AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roycelynne MERX, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
William H. Ransom, of Newman Ransom LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.
Michael Silverman, of Horwitz, Horwitz & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee.
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Direct Auto Insurance Company (Direct Auto), appeals the circuit court's orders denying its motion for summary judgment and granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by defendant, Roycelynne Merx.1 Direct Auto argues on appeal that (1) the plain and unambiguous language of the vehicle insurance policy it issued to Merx provides uninsured-motorist coverage only when the insured is an occupant in her own vehicle covered under the policy and (2) the circuit court erred in concluding that Illinois's public policy as reflected in section 143a of the Illinois Insurance Code ( 215 ILCS 5/143a (West 2014) ) mandated uninsured-motorist coverage for the insured stemming from the accident in this case. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 On June 18, 2015, Merx was injured when she was a passenger in a 2013 Chevrolet Cruze that was owned and operated by Brandon Motley and Motley struck another vehicle while attempting to cross an intersection in Evanston. Motley was both an uninsured motorist and at fault for the accident. Merx filed a claim for uninsured-motorist coverage under her personal automobile insurance policy with Direct Auto, the insurer of her 2012 Chevrolet Sonic. Her vehicle was not involved in the collision. Merx's policy provided for automobile liability coverage and uninsured-motorist coverage for the period of January 15, 2015, to July 15, 2015, and each coverage type provided $25,000 in coverage for bodily injury or death per person and a maximum of $50,000 per accident.
¶ 4 On July 21, 2017, Direct Auto filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, arguing that there was no uninsured-motorist coverage for the accident because, at the time of the accident, Merx was not an occupant in an "insured automobile" as that term is defined in the policy. Specifically, it argued that there was no uninsured-motorist coverage because Merx did not occupy the 2012 Chevrolet Sonic covered by her policy at the time of the accident. Direct Auto attached to the complaint a copy of the policy, which pertinently provides as follows:
Part I of the policy, in turn, defines "owned automobile" as "a private passenger, farm, or utility automobile described in this policy."
¶ 5 Merx answered the complaint for declaratory judgment on April 16, 2018, admitting that she was a passenger in the 2013 Chevrolet Cruze driven by Motley during the accident but denying Direct Auto's assertion that there was no uninsured-motorist coverage.
¶ 6 Direct Auto moved for summary judgment on May 21, 2018, arguing that the plain and unambiguous language of the policy provided uninsured-motorist coverage only if the insured occupied an "insured vehicle," here, the 2012 Chevrolet Sonic, at the time of the accident. Because there was no dispute that Merx did not occupy the 2012 Chevrolet Sonic at the time of the accident, Direct Auto argued that there was no uninsured-motorist coverage and thus Direct Auto was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
¶ 7 Merx responded to the motion for summary judgment on September 6, 2018. She asserted that the terms of the uninsured-motorist provision were contrary to section 143a of the Insurance Code and violated Illinois public policy, because the provision would leave her with no remedy for her injuries, even though she had paid for uninsured-motorist coverage. She stressed that, because Motley was both at fault for the accident and uninsured, she could look only to her own insurer for coverage. In reply, Direct Auto argued that, following the 1995 amendment to section 143, uninsured-motorist coverage is not absolute and parties to an insurance contract may agree to reasonable limits on such coverage.
¶ 8 On October 18, 2018, the circuit court denied Direct Auto's motion for summary judgment. Pertinently, the order provided as follows:
"The court having determined the 1995 amendment to [section 143a of the Insurance Code] applied to owned vehicles, not listed in the policy, and the statute and public policy preclude denial of uninsured coverage for an insured (Merx) when she is a passenger in an uninsured vehicle, involved in a collision, and the driver of the uninsured vehicle is at-fault."
¶ 9 On October 30, 2018, Merx filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to section 2-615(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 2018)). She argued that the legislative intent and purpose behind section 143a of the Insurance Code required coverage for the accident, that the terms of the policy directly conflicted with said section, and that the 1995 amendment thereto did not apply to the facts of the case, because the 2013 Chevrolet Cruze was not owned by, furnished, or available for Merx's regular use and Motley was not a resident relative or resident spouse. Direct Auto adopted its motion for summary judgment and its response to Merx's reply to stand as its response. The circuit court granted Merx's motion for judgment on the pleadings on December 18, 2018, and found that Merx was entitled to uninsured-motorist coverage. Direct Auto timely appealed.
¶ 11 This appeal comes before us following the circuit court's entry of judgment on the parties' motions seeking a judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment. "Either a judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hess v. Estate of Klamm , 2020 IL 124649, ¶ 14, 443 Ill.Dec. 59, 161 N.E.3d 183. A motion for a judgment on the pleadings is like a motion for summary judgment, but it is limited to the pleadings. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Trujillo , 2014 IL App (1st) 123419, ¶ 15, 379 Ill.Dec. 684, 7 N.E.3d 110. The standard of review is de novo under either type of motion. Id.
¶ 12 Direct Auto's argument on appeal is twofold. First, it argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment, because the plain and unambiguous language of the insurance policy provides uninsured-motorist coverage only for accidents that occur while the insured is an occupant in the vehicle covered under the policy for which a specific premium charge for uninsured-motorist coverage has been paid. In other words, it asserts that the policy provides uninsured-motorist coverage to Merx only for injuries sustained while occupying the 2012 Chevrolet Sonic (the only vehicle for which Merx was paying a specific premium for insured-motorist coverage under the policy). Because it is undisputed that she did not occupy the 2012 Chevrolet Sonic at the time of the accident, Direct Auto maintains that summary judgment should have been entered in its favor. Second, it asserts that neither public policy nor the Insurance Code precludes the denial of coverage to Merx, because section 143a of the Insurance Code was amended in 1995 such that, in Direct Auto's view, limitations on uninsured-motorist coverage do not violate public policy. Merx counters that Illinois law mandates that she be entitled to uninsured-motorist coverage, and she points to a string of cases that predate the 1995 amendment to section 143a.
¶ 13 We begin by examining the terms of the insurance policy, the construction of which presents a question of law, which we review de novo . See Shefner v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. , 243 Ill. App. 3d 683, 183 Ill.Dec. 363, 611 N.E.2d 626 (1993). Our primary objective in construing the language of an insurance policy is to ascertain and give effect to the parties' intentions as set forth in their agreement. Rosenberg v. Zurich American Insurance Co. , 312 Ill. App. 3d 97, 101, 244 Ill.Dec. 433, 726 N.E.2d 29 (2000). In interpreting the meaning of provisions in an insurance policy, we construe the policy as a whole, keeping in mind the risk undertaken, the subject matter that is insured, and the purpose of the contract. Id. Where the policy language is clear and unambiguous, the language must be given its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Id. If, however, the terms are ambiguous, they are construed strictly against the insurer who drafted the policy and in favor of the insured. Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. , 78 Ill. 2d 420, 423, 36 Ill.Dec. 698, 401 N.E.2d 539 (1980).
¶ 14 As noted, Direct Auto maintains that summary judgment should have been...
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