Shefner v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 2-92-0461,2-92-0461
• Citation: 243 Ill.App.3d 683,611 N.E.2d 626,183 Ill.Dec. 363
• Parties: , 183 Ill.Dec. 363 Sarah SHEFNER and Mark Brodie, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 626

611 N.E.2d 626

243 Ill.App.3d 683, 183 Ill.Dec. 363

Sarah SHEFNER and Mark Brodie, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2-92-0461.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

April 8, 1993.

Patrick A. Salvi, Megan E. Chadwick, Law Offices of Patrick A. Salvi, Waukegan, for Sarah Shefner & Mark Brodie.

Glen E. Amundsen, Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Waukegan, Michael Resis, Mary T. Nagel, Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Chicago, for Illinois Farmers Ins. Co.

Justice DOYLE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Sarah Shefner and Mark Brodie, appeal from a judgment declaring Sarah Shefner's rights to uninsured motorist coverage under two automobile insurance policies issued by defendant, Illinois Farmers Insurance Company. The trial court held that Shefner was entitled to coverage under the policy issued for the car in which she was riding at the time of her collision with a vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist, but that she was not entitled to coverage under a second policy insuring another car plaintiffs own. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that Shefner is entitled to collect under the second policy either in addition to or alternatively to the first policy.

Shefner was injured when the 1987 Buick Skylark in which she and Brodie, her husband, were riding collided with a motorcycle driven by an uninsured motorist, James Staton, and owned by another uninsured motorist, John Sistrunk. Plaintiffs sought a declaration of Shefner's rights under (1) the policy insuring the 1987 Buick Skylark (the Skylark policy) and (2) the policy insuring plaintiffs' 1990 Chevrolet Corsica (the Corsica policy). The trial court held that Shefner is entitled to up to $50,000 uninsured motorist coverage under the Skylark policy but that she is not entitled to any uninsured motorist coverage under the Corsica policy.

On appeal, plaintiffs maintain that Shefner is entitled to collect uninsured motorist coverage (limited to $100,000) under the Corsica policy either in addition to or as an alternative to the uninsured motorist coverage (limited to $50,000) which defendant concedes she may collect under the Skylark policy. We disagree, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Most of the relevant facts are undisputed. The parties disagree primarily over the meaning of policy provisions. Brodie purchased the Skylark policy; Shefner purchased the Corsica policy. Each policy insures both plaintiffs. Each policy cost a separate premium. The policies have identical "uninsured motorist" clauses and identical "other insurance" clauses. Each policy states:

"DEFINITIONS

Your insured car means:

1. The vehicle described in the Declarations of this policy or any private passenger car or utility car with which you replace it.

2. Any additional private passenger car or utility car of which you acquire ownership during the policy period. Provided that:

a. You notify us within 30 days of its acquisition, and

b. As of the date of acquisition, all private passenger and utility cars you own are insured with a member company of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies.

* * * * * *

PART II--UNINSURED MOTORIST

Coverage C--Uninsured Motorist Coverage

(Including Underinsured Motorist Coverage)

We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured person. The bodily injury must be caused by accident and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle.

* * * * * *

Other Insurance

* * * * * * 4. We will not provide insurance for a vehicle other than your insured car, unless the owner of that vehicle has no other insurance applicable to this part.

5. If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member company of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such policies shall not exceed the limits provided by the single policy with the highest limits of liability."

The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant. The court held that the unambiguous language of the policies entitled plaintiffs only to the uninsured motorist coverage provided by the Skylark policy. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

The parties agree that Shefner is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under the Skylark policy, as she was an insured party under that policy and was riding in the Skylark at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs argue further that the Corsica policy also applies to the accident even though Shefner was not using the Corsica at the time. Plaintiffs argue that to deny Shefner coverage under both policies would violate section 143a(2) of the Illinois Insurance Code (section 143a(2)) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 73, par. 755a(2)), which establishes a minimum level of uninsured motorist coverage to which a policyholder is entitled. Defendant replies that the plain language of paragraph No. 4 limits recovery under the Corsica policy to accidents involving the Corsica. Defendant maintains that this limitation does not violate public policy, as the Skylark policy provides Shefner with coverage above the statutory minimum. Defendant insists that the coverages of the policies "follow the vehicle" and do not "follow the person."

We begin with general principles. The construction of insurance policies is a question of law that this court determines de novo. (Armstrong v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1992), 229 Ill.App.3d 971, 975, 172 Ill.Dec. 109, 595 N.E.2d 172.) Our overriding purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the parties. (Kaufmann v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1979), 76 Ill.2d 11, 16, 27 Ill.Dec. 742, 389 N.E.2d 1150; Monsalud v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1991), 210 Ill.App.3d 102, 106, 154 Ill.Dec. 748, 568 N.E.2d 969.) Where policy language is unambiguous, we must glean the parties' intent directly from that language, without resort to rules of construction, unless to do so would violate public policy. (Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill.2d 420, 423, 36 Ill.Dec. 698, 401 N.E.2d 539; Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1992), 232 Ill.App.3d 221, 224, 173 Ill.Dec. 251, 596 N.E.2d 875.) A court should give words in the policy their plain and ordinary meaning and should not search for an ambiguity where none exists. (United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Schnackenberg (1981), 88 Ill.2d 1, 5, 57 Ill.Dec. 840, 429 N.E.2d 1203.) However, ambiguities must be construed in favor of the insured. ( Menke, 78 Ill.2d at 423, 36 Ill.Dec. 698, 401 N.E.2d 539.) A provision is ambiguous if it can reasonably be read to have more than one meaning. (Milwaukee Guardian Insurance, Inc. v. Taraska (1992), 236 Ill.App.3d 973, 974, 176 Ill.Dec. 763, 602 N.E.2d 70.) In determining whether a policy is ambiguous in a certain regard, a court should consider the policy as a whole. Great Central Insurance Co. v. Wascomat of America (1992), 234 Ill.App.3d 150, 153-54, 175 Ill.Dec. 428, 600 N.E.2d 51.

Plaintiffs make three attacks on the trial court's judgment. First, they argue that paragraph No. 5 of the policies does not prevent plaintiffs from electing the $100,000 uninsured motorist coverage of the Corsica policy over the $50,000 uninsured motorist coverage of the Skylark policy. Second, plaintiffs argue that section 143a(2), as interpreted by Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1977), 69 Ill.2d 167, 13 Ill.Dec. 17, 370 N.E.2d 1044, prevents defendant from limiting Shefner's recovery to that provided by the Skylark policy. Third, plaintiffs argue that Shefner is entitled both to uninsured motorist benefits under the Skylark policy and to underinsured motorist coverage under the Corsica policy.

Plaintiffs' first argument is valid but inconclusive. Paragraph No. 5 limits plaintiffs' recovery to the highest amount provided by any applicable insurance policies defendant issued plaintiffs. Thus, if both policies apply to the accident, plaintiffs may elect the $100,000 coverage of the Corsica policy. Plaintiffs' argument begs the question central to this case--whether the Corsica policy is "applicable" here. The issue is not whether plaintiffs may stack two applicable policies, but whether both policies are applicable. To answer this question, we must consider both the policy language and the requirements of section 143a(2).

The plain language of paragraph No. 4 is that the Corsica policy does not apply to this accident because plaintiff was not riding in the Corsica at the time of the accident. Paragraph No. 4 of the Corsica policy states straightforwardly that defendant will not pay uninsured motorist coverage for a vehicle "other than your insured car" unless the owner of that other vehicle has no other uninsured motorist coverage. Under the facts of this case, the Skylark is a vehicle "other than your insured car" under the Corsica policy. The qualification at the end of paragraph No. 4 does not help plaintiffs, as the owner of the Skylark has uninsured motorist coverage under the Skylark policy (as defendant has always conceded).

Plaintiffs argue, however, that we ought not read paragraph No. 4 of the Corsica policy literally. They maintain that under section 143a(2) and Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1977), 69 Ill.2d 167, 13 Ill.Dec. 17, 370 N.E.2d 1044, paragraph No. 4 does not deny Shefner uninsured motorist coverage under the Corsica policy merely because she was not riding in that car when she was injured. Defendant replies that here, unlike in Squire, the exclusion at issue does not violate public policy because, even with full effect given to paragraph No. 4, Shefner would still be able to collect uninsured motorist coverage (under the Skylark policy) in excess of the minimum set forth in section 143a(2).

Section 143a(2) provides, as pertinent here:

"No policy [of automobile insurance] *...