Directors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 27 January 1966
• Citation: 409 P.2d 934,64 Cal.2d 42,48 Cal.Rptr. 710
• Parties: , 409 P.2d 934, 61 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2255, 53 Lab.Cas. P 11,029 DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; Joseph P. BYRNE, Real Party in Interest. L. A. 28579
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 710

48 Cal.Rptr. 710

64 Cal.2d 42, 409 P.2d 934, 61 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2255,

53 Lab.Cas. P 11,029

DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent Joseph P. BYRNE, Real Party in Interest.

L. A. 28579.

Jan. 27, 1966.

Youngman, Hungate & Leopold, Richard Hungate and David E. Lindgren, Los Angeles, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Richard W. Lund and John S. Welch, Los Angeles, for real party in interest.

TOBRINER, Justice.

Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition to restrain further prosecution of a pending superior court action in which plaintiff (real party in interest) sought relief by way of damages and injunction on the ground that a labor union arbitrarily excluded him from membership and discriminatorily barred him from employment which he would have otherwise obtained. Since plaintiff's action raises the issue of whether federal labor legislation preempts the state jurisdiction, we must, pursuant to United States Supreme Court decisions, decide whether or not the action essentially turns upon conduct arguably subject to the federal statute.

We shall point out that the uncertain course of decision of the United States Supreme Court as to federal preemption in labor relations finally led to the rule that the state could not exercise jurisdiction in matters which were arguably subject to the protections or the prohibitions of the National Labor Relations Act as amended (61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.), hereinafter called the Act. Indeed the California courts have recognized that the federal enactment preempts the cause of action founded upon discrimination at the employment level. But the truly difficult question appears in the complaint, such as the instant one, that alleges that plaintiff suffered both job discrimination by the union and arbitrary exclusion from the union. In such event, as we explain, the Supreme Court holds that the issue of preemption depends on the 'crux' of the cause of action: if the cause centers upon job discrimination, the state court may not proceed; if it turns upon acquisition or restoration of union membership, the state court may act. We shall show that the instant complaint speaks in the language of discrimination, alleging that the employer's refusal of employment emanated from union control of the job. Since the complaint pivots on job discrimination the federal statute preempts the state jurisdiction.

We point out, further, that plaintiff, in the absence of an allegation of employment, cannot prevail upon the alternative theory that he is entitled to union membership even if the union did not have a union shop contract. Plaintiff cannot compel union membership unless the union arbitrarily denies him membership despite his employment or unless the union, exercising control over the job, discriminatorily prevents his employment. As we have seen, the Act exclusively covers the union's discriminatory interference with employment; the cause as to the union's arbitrary exclusion of employed applicants fails here because the employee does not allege his employment.

The complaint sets forth that in August 1964 a motion picture production company, Stage Five Productions, determined to employ plaintiff in the capacity of second assistant director for the filming of the television series 'Ozzie and Harriet.' In September 1964 plaintiff applied for admission into membership in the defendant Directors Guild of America, Inc. (hereinafter called Guild), a labor organization representing directors, assistant directors, and other production personnel in the motion picture and related industries. Although plaintiff tendered the requisite initiation fee and dues and otherwise fulfilled all the formal requirements for membership prescribed in the Guild constitution and bylaws, defendants refused to admit him. Such arbitrary refusal resulted from the Guild's practice of refusing membership to any person not a relative of an existing member unless the defendant officers chose to admit him for reasons of personal friendship or favoritism.

According to plaintiff, the Guild maintains closed shop conditions in the industry both by means of oral agreements with many producers that they will employ only Guild members as well as by means of threats to the remaining producers that they will encounter labor difficulties if they do not employ Guild members. The Guild's bylaws likewise obligate the Guild members to refuse to work with an employee who is not a member of the Guild.

Plaintiff alleges that in order to coerce Stage Five not to employ him defendants notified it that if it used plaintiff as a second assistant director the Guild would call the first assistant director off the job. The Guild also wrote to the Guild members then employed by Stage Five informing them that Stage Five proposed to employ plaintiff in the stated capacity and that, since he was not a member of the Guild, the above-mentioned provision of the bylaws applied. As a result of these pressures Stage Five refused to employ plaintiff as second assistant director.

The complaint purports to set forth two causes of action. The first in substance alleges that 'although Stage Five did * * * want to use plaintiff in the capacity of Second Assistant Director' it did, because of the Guild's arbitrary rejection of plaintiff from membership and because of its coercive tactics, 'refuse, and has continuously refused to employ plaintiff in such capacity.' The first cause further states that 'as declared by the California Supreme Court in James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 731 (155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900) (1945), the maintenance of a closed shop industry by a union that also maintains a closed union is contrary to the public policy of the State of California.' The second cause alleges that by such conduct it 'tortiously interfered with and prevented plaintiff from being able to enter into such advantageous employment contract.'

Subsequent to the date of filing the superior court action, plaintiff brought charges before the National Labor Relations Board alleging that defendants committed unfair labor practices under section 8 of the Act. No question arises here but that the involved employment affects interstate commerce.

Defendants rest their request for a writ of prohibition upon a claimed federal preemption on the ground that plaintiff's maintenance of a closed shop in conjunction with a closed union composes conduct condemned by the Act. Our task narrows to a determination of whether plaintiff's asserted state relief turns upon conduct arguably regulated by the Act. To resolve that issue we first briefly survey the bramblebush filed of federal preemption.

After a tortuous course in evolving a definition of the permissible scope of state jurisdiction in the filed of labor relations, the United States Supreme Court has now held that except in cases involving the preservation of the domestic peace the state jurisdiction succumbs to the federal in matters arguably subject to the protections of section 7 or the prohibition of section 8 of the Act. In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236, 244, 79 S.Ct. 773, 779, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, the Supreme Court ruled that: 'When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.' The court held that, '(S)ince the National Labor Relations Board has not adjudicated the status of the conduct for which the State of California seeks to give a remedy in damages, and since such activity is arguably within the compass of § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the State's jurisdiction is displaced.' (P. 246, 79 S.Ct. p. 780.)

Section 8(a)(3) of the Act declares in substance that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization, provided that an employer may enter into an agreement, requiring membership in a union as a condition of employment, with a labor organization which is the collective bargaining agent of its employees. Section 8(b)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee to whom membership in the union has been denied on grounds other than failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fee uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.

This court has acknowledged that the federal act would foreclose the state in a case involving interstate commerce which turned upon union discrimination that prevented the complainant's employment. In Thorman v. International Alliance etc. Employees (1958) 49 Cal.2d 629, 320 P.2d 494, the applicant for membership prayed both for admission to the union, which had arbitrarily rejected his application, and for a prohibition of discrimination by the union, which had prevented his employment upon the job. The court granted relief but noted that it could not do so 'in controversies involving commerce between the states,' (p. 632, 320 P.2d p. 496) and held that the record before it failed 'to suggest that the employment from which the plaintiff was deprived was one which affected interstate commerce.' (P. 633, 320 P.2d p. 497.)

Justice Traynor, dissenting upon the ground that the record did disclose an involvement with interstate commerce, concluded that the matter was preempted. He stated '* * * the Board could order the Union to terminate the unfair labor practice. If the Union did so by admitting plaintiff to membership, he would receive the very relief requested. If the Union did so by...