Directv, Inc. v. Karpinsky, 02-CV-73929.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-CV-73929.,02-CV-73929.
• Citation: 269 F.Supp.2d 918
• Parties: DIRECTV, INC., a California corporation, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, and Hughes Electronics, Corp., a California corporation, Counter-Defendant, v. Eugene KARPINSKY, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

269 F.Supp.2d 918

DIRECTV, INC., a California corporation, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, and Hughes Electronics, Corp., a California corporation, Counter-Defendant, v. Eugene KARPINSKY, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.

No. 02-CV-73929.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

June 17, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Norman C. Ankers, Bradley H. Darling, Honigman, Miller, for Directv.

John T. Hermann, Berkley, for Eugene Karpinsky.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT KARPINSKY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING COUNTERDEFENDANTS DIRECTV'S AND HUGHES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING KARPINSKY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIMS; AND DENYING KARPINSKY'S MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS

STEEH, District Judge.

Eugene Karpinsky moves for summary judgment of DirecTV's claims of: unauthorized reception of satellite signals in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a); unauthorized interception of satellite communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); possession of pirate access devices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b); and conversion. DirecTV and Hughes Electronics, Corp., move for summary judgment of Eugene Karpinsky's counterclaims of: extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 876; conspiracy to commit extortion; violations of the federal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and Michigan's Fair Collection Practices Act ("FCPA"), M.C.L. § 339.901; civil liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962; violations of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"), M.C.L. § 445.911 et seq.; fraud and misrepresentation; and defamation. A hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment was held on May 28, 2003. On May 14, 2003, Karpinsky filed two additional motions: a motion for leave to file amended counterclaims; and a motion for imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Oral argument on the May 14, 2003 motions would not significantly aid the decisional process, and it is thus ORDERED that these two motions be resolved without oral argument. See E.D. Mich. Local R. 7.1(e)(2). For the reasons set forth below, Eugene Karpinsky's motion for summary judgment of DirecTV's claims will be GRANTED. DirecTV's and Hughes Electronics' motion for summary judgment of Karpinsky's counterclaims will be GRANTED. Karpinsky's motion for leave to file amended counterclaims will be DENIED. Karpinsky's motion for Rule 11 sanctions will be DENIED.

I. Background

DirecTV filed a complaint on October 1, 2002 alleging it executed writs of seizure on December 11, 2002 at a mail shipping facility used by non-party USA Cardcleaners to sell electronic devices that are used to unlawfully intercept DirecTV's encrypted satellite television transmissions. DirecTV alleges that, based on seized USA Cardcleaners' sales records, Karpinsky purchased a pirate access device known as a "Smartcard Recover System" on August 25, 2001, and purchased another "Smartcard Recover System" on September 27, 2001, both being shipped to Karpinsky's Oak Park, Michigan residence. DirecTV alleges Karpinsky purchased the devices for the purpose of viewing DirecTV's satellite television programing without authorization or payment. In Count I, DirecTV alleges Karpinsky received and assisted others in receiving unauthorized programming, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). Count II alleges Karpinsky intentionally intercepted, endeavored to intercept, or procured others to intercept DirecTV's satellite programming in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). Count III alleges Karpinsky has possessed pirate access devices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b). Count IV alleges Karpinsky is liable in common law conversion for unlawfully intercepting DirecTV's satellite transmissions for his own use. DirecTV seeks injunctive relief under 47 U.S.C § 605(e)(3)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(1), damages under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2), or 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(I) and 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2), and reasonable attorney fees under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(3).

By way of leave granted, Karpinsky filed counterclaims against DirecTV¹ and DirecTV's parent corporation Hughes Electronics alleging he purchased and received two "Smartcard Recover System" devices from USA Cardcleaners for use on his personal computer, but that the devices never worked. Karpinsky alleges he received a letter from DirecTV's collection representative "DirecTV End User Development Group" in July 2002 accusing him of using the devices to steal DirecTV's transmissions. Karpinsky alleges that, notwithstanding his denials, he was repeatedly phoned by DirecTV's representative and told that, if he did not want to be sued or face criminal charges, he would need to pay DirecTV $4,500.00. In Count I of his counterclaim, Karpinsky alleges extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 876. Count II alleges conspiracy to commit extortion. Count III alleges violations of both the FDCPA and FCPA. Count IV alleges RICO liability. Count V alleges deceptive trade practices in violation of MCPA. Count VI alleges fraud and misrepresentation based on statements made to Karpinsky that he had attempted to steal DirecTV programming. Count VII alleges defamation based on alleged published false statements made to third-parties that Karpinsky committed a crime or violated a statute.

II. Motions For Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) empowers the court to render summary judgment "forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See FDIC v. Alexander, 78 F.3d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir.1996). The Supreme Court has affirmed the court's use of summary judgment as an integral part of the fair and efficient administration of justice. The procedure is not a disfavored procedural shortcut. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Kutrom Corp. v. City of Center Line, 979 F.2d 1171,1174 (6th Cir.1992).

The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "`whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Winningham v. North Am. Resources Corp., 42 F.3d 981, 984 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir.1989)). The evidence and all inferences therefrom must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Enertech Else, Inc. v. Mahoning County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 257, 259 (6th Cir.1996); Wilson v. Stroh Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 945 (6th Cir.1992). If the movant establishes by use of the material specified in Rule 56(c) that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); see also Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.1995).

A. Karpinsky's Motion for Summary Judgment

Karpinsky argues he is entitled to summary judgment of DirecTV's claims because DirecTV has no evidence to support a requisite finding that he, Karpinsky, ever intercepted a DirecTV satellite transmission. Karpinsky maintains that recently deposed DirecTV Vice President Larry Rissler admitted that the only evidence DirecTV has to support its claims are two receipts evidencing Karpinsky's purchase of the two "Smartcard Recovery System" devices. Karpinsky argues DirecTV has no evidence to dispute that he attempted, without success, to use the devices on his personal computer to restrict access to the Internet. Karpinsky continues that he cannot be held liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) or 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) because these criminal statutes do not provide for civil liability. Karpinsky continues that he is entitled to summary judgment of DirecTV's conversion claims because: (1) DirecTV cannot prove he intercepted or "converted" a DirecTV satellite signal; (2) a satellite signal is not "personal property" subject to conversion, and; (3) the state conversion claim is preempted by federal copyright law.

47 U.S.C. § 605(a) provides:

(a) Practices prohibited

Except as authorized by chapter 119, Title 18, no person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or reception, (1) to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, (2) to a person employed or authorized to forward such communication to its destination, (3) to proper accounting or distributing officers of the various communicating centers over which the communication may be passed, (4) to the master of a ship under whom he is serving, (5) in response to a subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (6) on demand of other lawful authority. No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. No person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by radio and use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. No person having received any...