Disability Law Center, Inc. v. Riel

• Decision Date: 05 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 00-10789-PBS.,CIV. A. 00-10789-PBS.
• Citation: 130 F.Supp.2d 294
• Parties: DISABILITY LAW CENTER, INC., Plaintiff v. Emma RIEL, as guardian of Loretta Riel, and Gerald J. Morrissey, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Page 294

130 F.Supp.2d 294

DISABILITY LAW CENTER, INC., Plaintiff v. Emma RIEL, as guardian of Loretta Riel, and Gerald J. Morrissey, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation, Defendants

No. CIV. A. 00-10789-PBS.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

February 5, 2001.

Romeo G. Camba, Assistant Attorney General, Boston, MA, Matthew Engel, Northampton, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Romeo G. Camba, Assistant Attorney General, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SARIS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Disability Law Center ("DLC") brings this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 6000 et seq.,¹ to compel the guardian of an adult mentally retarded woman, Loretta Riel, and the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Retardation ("DMR") to provide access to Ms. Riel's records. As the Protection and Advocacy system ("P & A") appointed by the state of Massachusetts pursuant to the Act "to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities," 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a)(1), the DLC claims that it needs these records to investigate an incident of alleged abuse, but that the guardian has not consented to access. The Commissioner has moved for summary judgment on the ground that the guardian has the right to refuse access pursuant to § 6042(a)(2)(I)(iii). The plaintiff has cross-moved for summary judgment.²

After a hearing, Defendant Morrissey's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED.

II. BACKGROUND

Loretta Riel³ is a fifty-year-old woman with mental retardation and other developmental disabilities, residing at the Glavin Regional Center, an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded operated by the Massachusetts Department of Mental Retardation. On the evening of December 31, 1998, staff at Glavin prevented Loretta from making a phone call to her family. Upset at being denied the phone call, Loretta sat down on the floor. Staff then put Loretta on a chair in the hallway. Loretta threw herself out of the chair and put her foot under a laundry cart. Staff then forcibly pulled Loretta away, causing her foot to be cut by the laundry cart, and dragged her from the hallway to her room on a blanket.

Believing that the actions of the staff constituted illegal restraint and abuse, the Glavin Human Rights Committee ("GHRC") filed an investigation complaint with the facility alleging illegal use of a restraint, mistreatment, and physical abuse, and requested reconsideration of the "Corrective Action Plan" portion of the report. When the reconsideration request was denied, the GHRC filed an appeal with the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation. In March 1999, a second complaint was filed by the Human Rights Officer at Glavin. According to Steven R. Hennigan, GHRC chairperson, "[t]his second investigation substantiated that mistreatment and emotional abuse occurred in the use of a number of restraints and other interventions which were systematically used when Ms. Riel exhibited difficult behaviors." (Hennigan Aff. ¶ 7) Just as with the first investigation report, the GHRC believed that the Corrective Action Plan from the second investigation also would not adequately protect Loretta from the possibility of future mistreatment. The reconsideration request was again denied, and the GHRC appealed to the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation for the second time.

On August 12, 1999, the Glavin Human Rights Officer contacted the Disability Law Center, which is the Massachusetts Protection and Advocacy system, seeking representation for Loretta regarding the Corrective Action Plan appeal and related matters. In turn, the DLC contacted Emma Riel, who is Loretta Riel's legal guardian and sister-in-law, once by telephone and three times by letter, explaining the DLC's role as the Massachusetts P & A system and requesting the guardian's permission to access Loretta's records for an investigation. The DLC never received a response to its letters and, at one point, on December 15, 1999, was informed by the Human Rights Officer at Glavin that the guardian was refusing to sign the Release of Information form that had been sent to her by the DLC.

Emma Riel is an attentive guardian. She visits with Loretta once a month and speaks with her by telephone between visits. Emma frequently contacts Glavin staff by telephone and inquires about Loretta's progress and care. Emma also attends Loretta's annual team meeting, reviews her behavior plans, and visits her workshop at Glavin. Emma asserts that after she discussed the December 1998 incident with members of the staff at Glavin and reviewed the investigation report and action plans concerning the incident, she was satisfied that the matter "was handled in the best way by staff considering Loretta's condition and behaviors." (E. Riel Aff. ¶ 5.) In addition, the guardian has concluded that "the investigation of the incident was adequately conducted and that Loretta's rights to be free from abuse and illegal restraint are not at risk.... Because [she] did not believe that further investigation was necessary and because [she] feel[s] that further investigation would be disturbing and harmful to Loretta, [Emma] chose not to sign the Release." (E. Riel Aff. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Furthermore, "[b]ased on what [she] believes to be in Loretta's best interests, [Emma has] no wish to take advantage of any services which the Disability Law Center may be offering arising from the December 31, 1998 incident and do[es] not consent to allowing the Disability Law Center access to Loretta's records." (E. Riel Aff. ¶ 7.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's position. Rogers v. Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir.1990); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of at least one factual issue that is both genuine and material. LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To oppose summary judgment successfully, the non-moving party "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading," but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505). If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Rogers, 902 F.2d at 143 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505) (citations omitted). The Court must "view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Barbour, 63 F.3d at 36.

B. Statutory Scheme

The Act mandates that to receive federal funding, every state "must have in effect a system to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities." § 6042(a)(1). These state-appointed Protection and Advocacy systems must "have the authority to — (i) pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies or approaches to ensure the protection of, and advocacy for, the rights of" individuals with developmental disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a)(2)(A)(i). They also must have "the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with developmental disabilities if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred." § 6042(a)(2)(B). The P & A system must "be independent of any agency which provides treatment, services, or habilitation to individuals with developmental disabilities" and must "have access at reasonable times and locations to any resident" with a developmental disability in a facility. §§ 6042(a)(2)(G) and (H).

Of key significance to this suit, the P & A system must also: (I) have access to all records of

(i) any individual with developmental disabilities who is a client of the system if such individual, or the legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative of such individual, has authorized the system to have such access;

(ii) any individual with development disabilities —

(I) who, by reason of such individual's mental or physical condition, is unable to authorize the system to have such access;

(II) who does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative, or for whom the legal guardian is the State; and

(III) with respect to whom a complaint has been received by the system or with respect to whom as a result of monitoring or other activities there is probable cause to believe that such individual has been subject to abuse or neglect; and

(iii) any individual with a developmental disability who has a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative with respect to whom a complaint has been received by the system or with respect to whom there is probable cause to believe the health or safety of the individual is in serious and immediate jeopardy whenever —

(I) such representatives have been contacted by such system upon receipt of the name and address of such representatives;

(II) such system has offered...