Protection & Adv. For Persons v. Armstrong

Decision Date31 March 2003
Docket NumberNo. 3:01 CV 1118 DJS.,3:01 CV 1118 DJS.
Citation266 F.Supp.2d 303
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesOFFICE OF PROTECTION AND AVOCACY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, Plaintiff, v. John J. ARMSTRONG, Defendant.

Gwendolyn K. McDonald, Nancy B. Alisberg, State Of Connecticut, Office Of Prot. & Adv. For Handicapped, Hartford, CT, for Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, State of CT, plaintiff.

Terrance M. O'Neill, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for John J. Armstrong, Comm State of CT Dept of Corr 10, defendant.

RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SQUATFJTO, District Judge.

The plaintiff brings this action for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally 111 Individuals Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10827 ("PAMII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" § 1983"). Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as this action arises under 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10827 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Now pending before the Court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment.

I. FACTS

Examination of the pleadings, Local Rule 9 statements, and supporting materials discloses the following material facts, which, unless otherwise noted, are undisputed.

The plaintiff, State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities ("Connecticut P & A"), is a state agency designated by the Governor of the State of Connecticut to provide protection and advocacy services to individuals with disabilities, including persons suffering from mental illness. In its enabling legislation, the Connecticut legislature created Connecticut P & A to further the State's "special responsibility for the care, treatment, education, rehabilitation of and advocacy for its disabled citizens." Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-7.

The defendant, John J. Armstrong ("Armstrong"), is sued solely in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Correction ("DOC").

The Connecticut P & A is funded in part by the federal government, pursuant to PAMII. Through PAMII, Connecticut P & A is authorized to investigate incidents of abuse, neglect and civil rights violations, and to pursue administrative, legal and other remedies on behalf of individuals with mental illness wherever programs for such individuals are operated within the State of Connecticut or within the State's control. 42 U.S.C. § 10805; 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(b)(2).

Between approximately August 2000 and April 2001, Connecticut P & A became aware of the suicide deaths of five DOC inmates: K.F., G.K., J.B., K.V., and D.C.1 Connecticut P & A's awareness was based solely upon its staffs review of newspaper accounts of the suicides. Pla's Memo, in Support of Mot. for S.J. Ex. 1 (copies of these articles). Connecticut P & A similarly became aware of the death of another DOC inmate, B.W., who died while being transported to the inpatient ward of a DOC mental health unit.

Connecticut P & A subsequently determined that it had probable cause to believe that each of these inmates was mentally ill, and that the inmates had been subject to abuse and neglect. Connecticut P & A did not consult with the families of the deceased inmates when it made these determinations. Upon each probable cause determination, Connecticut P & A requested access to the deceased inmates' psychiatric, medical and all other records relating to their deaths. Connecticut P & A did not obtain releases from the next of kin of the eight deceased inmates before requesting their records.

DOC responded to Connecticut P & A's records request by initially informing it that DOC was conducting investigations into the deaths. DOC told Connecticut P & A that it would be contacted at the conclusion of each investigation. Furthermore, DOC requested that Connecticut P & A substantiate the probable cause determination which formed the basis for Connecticut P & A's records request, and asked that Connecticut P & A obtain authorization from the deceased inmates' next of kin. Connecticut P & A declined to do so. It is unclear what records, if any, were ever sent to Connecticut P & A.2

On June 18, 2001, Connecticut P & A filed, along with its Complaint, an application for preliminai-y injunction in this Court, seeking the requested records. The motion for preliminary injunction was denied without prejudice on February 15, 2002, as was a subsequent motion to dismiss filed by the defendant.

In the interim, on or about July 31, 2001, Connecticut P & A was provided, for the first time, with a release from the next of kin of one of the deceased inmates, D.C. Connecticut P & A subsequently followed up on its prior record request with DOC. Connecticut P & A claims it never received these records.

In addition, in or about September and October 2001, Connecticut P & A became aware of the deaths of two other DOC inmates, J.B. and B.B., one of whom was being held at DOC's Manson Youth Institute. Connecticut P & A requested these inmates' psychiatric, medical and all other records regarding their deaths. DOC responded in the same way it had responded to Connecticut P & A's other prior record requests. Accordingly, on February 26, 2002, Connecticut P & A amended its Complaint to include these two deceased inmates.

Now pending are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate if, after discovery, the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "The burden is on the moving party `to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute.'" Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. London Am. Int'l Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.1981) (quoting Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (2d Cir.1975)). A dispute concerning a material fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Aidrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist, 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., ill U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The court must view all inferences and ambiguities in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bryant v. Majfucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991). "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Id.

III. DISCUSSION

The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment, and appear to be in agreement that there are no disputed facts that would prevent summary judgment as a matter of law. Connecticut P & A argues that Armstrong has violated PAMII by refusing to provide it with records relating to the deaths of eight deceased inmates, and seeks a permanent injunction ordering Armstrong to provide such records. In response, Armstrong argues that Connecticut P & A has failed to meet the statutory and regulatory predicates for obtaining these records, and thus cannot sustain its legal claim of entitlement.

Before examining the parties' respective positions, the Court will provide a brief background of PAMII and the protection and advocacy system ("P & A").

A. Background of PAMII and P & A

In response to the "inhumane and despicable conditions" discovered at a New York institution for persons with developmental disabilities, Congress enacted the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6041-6043 ("DDA"), to "protect the human civil rights of this vulnerable population." Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Gerard Treatment Programs, L.L.C., 152 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1157 (N.D.Iowa 2001) (describing the genesis of DDA). In order to receive federal funds under DDA, a State must have in effect a P & A. 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a)(1).3 The plaintiff, Connecticut P & A, is Connecticut's protection and advocacy agency.

In 1986, Congress passed the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally 111 Individuals Act ("PAMII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10827, as amended, after finding that individuals with mental illness are vulnerable to abuse, neglect and serious injury, and that state systems for monitoring the rights of these individuals vary widely and are frequently inadequate. 42 U.S.C. § 10801(a). Furthermore, Congress found that "family members of individuals with mental illness play a crucial role in being advocates for the rights of individuals with mental illness where the individuals are minors, the individuals are legally competent and choose to involve the family members, and the individuals are legally incompetent and the legal guardians, conservators, or other legal representatives are members of the family." Id.

PAMII was modeled after DDA, and was intended to "ensure that the rights of individuals with mental illness are protected, and to assist States to establish and operate a[P & A] for individuals with mental illness which will protect and advocate the rights of such individuals." Id. §§ 10801(b)(1), 10801(b)(2)(A). PAMII specifically charges the State's P & A, which is an independent agency, with the duty to "investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred." Id. § 10801(b)(2)(B); see also id. § 10805(a)(1). In addition, the State's P & A is authorized to, inter alia, "pursue administrative,...

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