Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., C.A. No. 07–10463–MLW.

• Decision Date: 12 April 2012
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 07–10463–MLW.
• Citation: 960 F.Supp.2d 271
• Parties: DISABILITY LAW CENTER, Plaintiff, v. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

960 F.Supp.2d 271

DISABILITY LAW CENTER, Plaintiff,

v.MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, et al., Defendants.

C.A. No. 07–10463–MLW.

United States District Court,

D. Massachusetts.

April 12, 2012.

James S. Rollins, Alison Hickey Silveira, Carol E. Head, David Yamin, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Bonita P. Tenneriello, James R. Pingeon, Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services Inc., Karen O. Talley, Richard M. Glassman, Disability Law Center, Boston, MA, Nancy J. Murphy, Disability Law Center, Robert D. Fleischner, Center for Public Representation, Northampton, MA, for Plaintiff.

William D. Saltzman, Charles W. Anderson, Jr., Sheryl F. Grant, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Correction, James A. Bello, Morrison, Mahoney LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WOLF, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case was brought in March, 2007, following reports of a number of suicides by mentally ill prisoners in the custody of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (the “Department”), including many held in segregated confinement. Plaintiff Disability Law Center (the “DLC”) represents all Massachusetts prisoners with mental illnesses. It alleges that the Department, and certain individuals sued only in their official capacities, violated the federal constitutional rights of mentally ill inmates by subjecting those inmates to disciplinary and other forms of segregation for prolonged periods of time. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

In November, 2007, in the context of the Department's independent initiatives to improve conditions for mentally ill inmates in correctional facilities, the parties began attempting to settle this case. In 2008, they asked the court to conduct a settlement conference. This court has long believed that the settlement of cases involving the constitutionality of the conduct of public officials is important in our democracy. As the court explained in 1990, judges:

should understand that in some cases the values to be protected by the Bill of Rights may best be served when other officials are required to recognize and wrestle with their responsibilities for constitutional interpretation. As a corollary of this, judges should realize that they may often best serve constitutional interests by encouraging the responsible public officials and their constituents to settle constitutional controversies on proper terms, rather than by deciding the questions such controversies present.

Spacco v. Bridgewater School Department, 739 F.Supp. 30, 35 (D.Mass.1990). ¹ With these principles in mind, the court agreed to the parties' request that it mediate their settlement discussions.

However, the court informed the parties of its view that judges should become involved in the administration of prisons only as a last resort and then only to the most limited extent necessary.² It urged the parties to develop a settlement that would be consistent with these principles or risk having any proposed resolution requiring judicial approval rejected by the court.

The parties' initial two-year effort to negotiate a settlement was frustrated by a fiscal crisis that constrained the Department's ability to agree to certain reforms. However, they eventually resumed settlement discussions. In December, 2011, the parties informed the court that they had agreed to a comprehensive Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”). The Agreement, however, does not become effective unless the court approves it and agrees to retain jurisdiction over the case. Essentially, the court is asked to review the Agreement to ensure that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and if it is, stay the case while the parties perform under the Agreement.

The court continues to believe that a reasonable settlement of this case would be in the public interest. However, the Agreement raises a series of questions which the parties briefed and argued at hearings in February and March, 2012.

First, the court has considered its authority to approve the Agreement and stay the litigation. As discussed in this Memorandum, a federal court has inherent authority to stay litigation in order to manage its docket. The Supreme Court has recognized that a district court can retain jurisdiction to enforce a private settlement agreement when it dismisses a case. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 381–82, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). It follows that a federal court can also retain jurisdiction to enforce a private settlement agreement when it exercises its inherent authority to stay a case and remove it from the active docket.

It is permissible and appropriate for the court to evaluate the parties' Agreement before deciding whether to stay this case. While the court does not have the authority to review and approve private settlement agreements in ordinary litigation, it has the discretion, if not the duty, to do so here because the settlement is entered into by DLC acting in a representative capacity, and the rights of individuals who are not parties will be affected. Since the individuals whose interests are at stake are alleged to have serious mental illness, it is particularly appropriate that the court evaluate the fairness of the Agreement in deciding whether to stay litigation that was brought to protect their constitutional rights. Therefore, the court has evaluated the fairness of the settlement.

The court has also considered whether approving the Agreement and staying the litigation would comport with the requirements of the PLRA. The PLRA prohibits the court from granting or approving “prospective relief” unless it finds such relief “extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). In this case, as in most prison litigation resolved by agreement, the Department denies that it is violating the federal rights of any inmate and the stay of litigation for which the Agreement provides precludes the court from deciding whether such a violation has been proven. Therefore, if the judicial action required by the Agreement is “prospective relief,” the findings required by § 3626(a)(1)(A) could not be made and the required approval of the Agreement could not be granted.

However, as explained in this Memorandum, § 3626(a)(1)(A) is not now implicated in this case because the court is not now ordering any “prospective relief” or, indeed, any “relief” at all. The requirementsof § 3626(a)(1)(A) must be satisfied in a case resolved by a “consent decree,” but not in a case resolved by a “private settlement agreement.” While the review and approval of a settlement agreement and retention of jurisdiction to enforce it are not typical of a private settlement agreement, they are also not incompatible with a private settlement agreement generally or as defined in the PLRA. The order requested in this case is not enforceable by contempt, which is an essential characteristic of a consent decree. The order requested is not enforceable by contempt because the court is not ordering the parties to comply with their Agreement or to do anything at all. Instead, the court is merely staying the litigation and providing the parties with an opportunity to perform under their Agreement.³ As explained in this Memorandum, the parties' Agreement is, therefore, far more similar to a “private settlement agreement” than to a “consent decree,” as these terms are used in the PLRA. As the court is not now being asked to enter an order that constitutes a consent decree and provides “prospective relief,” the requirements of § 3626(a)(1)(A) do not now apply.

Because the PLRA's limitations on “prospective relief” are not now implicated, the court has evaluated the Agreement solely to determine whether it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court finds that the Agreement should be approved.

Where, as here, a settlement has been negotiated at arm's length after discovery that is sufficient for a plaintiff to make informed decisions, the settlement is presumed reasonable. This presumption of reasonableness is confirmed by the terms of the Agreement. The Agreement addresses the fundamental issue in this case—prison suicides—by providing a process for minimizing the possibility that inmates with serious mental illnesses will be confined in segregation and for reviewing the mental health of inmates in segregation. Its reliance on Secure Treatment Units as a therapeutic alternative to confinement in segregation represents the best current practices concerning mentally ill inmates. Moreover, the implementation of many of the reforms required by the Agreement has already succeeded in decreasing self-injurious behavior and enhancing the safety of prison personnel.

In assessing the reasonableness of the settlement, the court has also considered the limited judicial role that the Agreement provides. The Agreement requires that the parties attempt to resolve any future disputes before requesting a lifting of the stay to litigate any issues that are truly intractable. The court is asked to retain jurisdiction generally for only three years and, in any event, for no more than five years if the Department breaches the Agreement. The limited role provided for the court contributes to the conclusion that the Agreement should be approved.

This is a case in which DLC has zealously represented the interests of mentally ill inmates. The Department has vigorously represented the interests of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which include deciding itself how to discharge the constitutional duty to provide adequate medical care for mentally ill inmates and to protect their safety. The Department has resisted any temptation to abdicate its responsibility to meet the challenges these inmates present and thus compel the courts to make the legally required, difficult decisions.

In these circumstances, it is particularly appropriate that the court approve the fair settlement...