Discharge of Jones, Matter of

Decision Date02 June 1986
Docket NumberNo. 19238,19238
Citation720 P.2d 1356
PartiesIn the Matter of the DISCHARGE OF Wayne L. JONES. Appeal of TOOELE COUNTY, Appellant.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Ronald L. Elton, Tooele Co. Atty., Brad Hunsaker, Deputy Co. Atty., Tooele, for appellant.

David E. Yocom, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

BILLINGS, District Judge:

On February 18, 1982, Deputy Sheriff Wayne L. Jones was discharged by the Tooele County Sheriff pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, §§ 17-30-18(a), (c), and (e). 1 The sheriff charged Deputy Jones with improperly taking a truck and a motorcycle from a prisoner, submitting falsified reports, and illegally removing a license plate from an impounded vehicle and using it on the truck taken from the prisoner. In this case, the sheriff appeals a decision of the district court affirming the Tooele County Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Commission's (Merit Commission) reinstatement of Deputy Jones. We reverse.

The sheriff claims that the district court erred in affirming the Merit Commission's Finding of Fact No. 1 because it was not supported by the evidence. He also claims that the Merit Commission improperly modified his decision to terminate Deputy Jones, since it only has the power to affirm or reverse his action. Because our decision concerning the findings of fact disposes of this case, we do not reach the issue of the scope of the Merit Commission's authority. Utah Plumbing and Heating Contractors Association v. Board of Education, 19 Utah 2d 203, 429 P.2d 49 (1967); see also, e.g., Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 922, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976).

On January 26, 1981, Douglas McArthur Jones was arrested and jailed in Wendover, Utah, for loitering and driving without a license. He was en route to San Francisco from Wyoming, where he had just purchased a motorcycle and a truck. At the jail, Deputy Jones confiscated documents from Douglas Jones which indicated that the truck had been purchased for $970 down with a $330 balance remaining and the motorcycle had been purchased for $1,895, for a total of $3,195. Douglas Jones had run out of money and asked Deputy Jones if he could pledge his truck and motorcycle for bail. The evidence at this point is conflicting. Douglas Jones claims that Deputy Jones had him sign three or four papers, released him from jail, gave him $10 and his bags, and took him to the highway to hitchhike to San Francisco. When Douglas Jones returned to Wendover about a month later to pick up his truck and motorcycle, Deputy Jones informed Douglas that Douglas had sold his motorcycle and truck to Deputy Jones. Deputy Jones, on the other hand, claims that Douglas Jones begged him to buy the vehicles for the $100 bail so that he could get out of jail.

Deputy Jones obtained title to the motorcycle from the Wyoming dealer. He thereafter washed the motorcycle, obtained a cover for it, and sold it for $1,100. The truck dealer, however, was in bankruptcy and the bank would not release the title even when Deputy Jones tendered the $330 balance. After driving the truck with temporary permits, Deputy Jones attempted to obtain title to the truck by submitting a falsified back-dated impound report, alleging that the truck was abandoned or stolen. Still unsuccessful, in September or October, 1981, Deputy Jones took license plates from an impounded vehicle and put them on the truck. Subsequently the owner of the impounded vehicle filed a report with Deputy Jones that the license plates had been stolen. Deputy Jones, however, did not acknowledge in his report that he was using the plates for his personal benefit. He thereafter removed the plates from the truck, but replaced them a short time later. The plates remained on the truck until November 26, 1981, when they were removed by an investigator from the Attorney General's office.

Because of this episode and several other claimed infractions, the sheriff discharged Deputy Jones on February 18, 1982.

I.

Deputy Jones appealed his discharge to the Merit Commission pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 17-30-19. 2 The Commission held a hearing and received evidence on four of the five counts filed with the Commission by the sheriff. 3 Counts I and II 4 of the charges stated:

(I) During the later part of January, 1981, Deputy Wayne L. Jones improperly and/or illegally acquired personal property from a prisoner at the Tooele County Jail in Wendover, Utah. Said property included a truck and motorcycle. Jones obtained the property so the prisoner could post a $100.00 bond and be released from incarceration. Thereafter, Jones improperly and/or illegally disposed or maintained possession of said property and made false reports concerning the same.

(II) During 1981, Wayne L. Jones was unable to register in the State of Utah the truck acquired from the prisoner as is mentioned in paragraph (I) above. Wayne L. Jones, then illegally took possession of license plates from another truck owned by the John Paras Furniture Company. That truck had been impounded by the Highway Patrol for safe keeping at Wendover, Utah. Jones used said license plates on the truck he had taken from the prisoner. Jones was subsequently notified about the missing license plates, but never told the John Paras employee making the report or the Sheriff's Department that he had possession of and was using the plates. Jones used said plates from at least October 16, 1981 to November 25, 1981, when they were removed from the prisoner's truck which was in Wayne L. Jones' possession.

As to Counts I and II, the Commission found:

1. We find, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that during the latter part of January, 1981, Deputy Wayne L. Jones did not improperly and/or illegally acquire personal property from the prisoner at the Tooele County jail in Wendover, Utah, and do not find that Jones obtained the property at a fraction of its value and took said property so that prisoner could post a $100.00 bond and be released from incarceration. We do not find that Jones improperly and/or illegally disposed or maintained possession of said property, but find that he did make misleading reports concerning the same on the impound report and the missing license plate.

2. We find, based on preponderance of the evidence, that during 1981, Wayne L. Jones illegally took possession of license plates from a truck owned by the John Paras Furniture Company after that truck had been impounded by the Highway Patrol for safekeeping at Wendover, Utah. We find that Jones used said license plates on the truck he had purchased from the prisoner and that Jones used said plates from at least October 16, 1981, to November 1981, when they were removed from the truck which was in Wayne L. Jones' possession. We do not find that this represented a felony, but was a misdemeanor.

Based on its findings, the Merit Commission voted to reinstate Deputy Jones without back pay. In effect, the Commission's decision amounted to a two-month suspension of Deputy Jones.

Within 30 days of the Merit Commission's order, the sheriff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the district court pursuant to Rules 65B(b)(2) and 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On review, the district court affirmed the Merit Commission's findings. It also determined that the Merit Commission had power to modify the sheriff's discharge of Deputy Jones and therefore also affirmed the Merit Commission's reinstatement of Deputy Jones.

The district court granted the petition despite Deputy Jones' contention that a petition for certiorari was improper because the sheriff was an aggrieved party and therefore had a statutory right to appeal pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 17-30-20. 5 An "aggrieved party" must be both a party to the proceeding and one who is prejudiced or affected by the order. McGough v. Insurance Company of North America, 143 Ariz. 26, 691 P.2d 738, 741 (Ariz.App.1984); Montalvo v. Chang, 64 Hawaii 345, 641 P.2d 1321, 1326 (1982). The sheriff in this case was clearly an aggrieved party. He discharged Deputy Jones. The Merit Commission's order reinstating Deputy Jones affects the sheriff, as he and his department would be required to work with a person the sheriff apparently believed was not qualified to serve as a deputy sheriff. The sheriff had a statutory right to appeal. However, the fact that the sheriff sought review of the Merit Commission's order in the district court by way of a petition for writ of certiorari rather than by notice of appeal was harmless error. The sheriff's petition was filed within the time limit to file a notice of appeal and therefore preserved his right to a review of the Merit Commission's decision. Further, a writ of certiorari, as it results in a review of the entire record, is the review that would have been afforded on appeal. Utah R.Civ.P. 65B(e).

Again in 1983, Deputy Jones was terminated by the sheriff for further misconduct and the Merit Commission upheld his termination. The 1983 termination does not moot this appeal, however, because Deputy Jones appealed his second termination to the district court, where the matter is still pending. As long as the 1983 termination is pending before the district court, there is a possibility that the district court could modify the Merit Commission's decision and reinstate Deputy Jones. See Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., Utah, 659 P.2d 1040 (1983); Cullimore v. Schwendiman, Utah, 652 P.2d 915 (1982).

On appeal from the judgment of a district court acting as an appellate court, this Court reviews the underlying administrative decision just as if it had come directly from the administrative agency. Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, Utah, 675 P.2d 1135, 1139 (1983). This is consistent with the standard of review set forth in section 17-30-20, that "[t]he courts may review questions of law and fact and may affirm, set aside, or modify the ruling complained of." (Emphasis added). The statute grants to this Court the same broad review...

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