Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker

• Decision Date: 25 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2007-1157.,2007-1157.
• Citation: 116 Ohio St.3d 64,876 N.E.2d 556,2007 Ohio 5635
• Parties: DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. PARKER.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

876 N.E.2d 556

116 Ohio St.3d 64

2007-Ohio-5635

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. PARKER.

No. 2007-1157.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted October 9, 2007.

Decided October 25, 2007.

Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, and George D. Jonson, Cincinnati for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

{¶ 1} Respondent, George M. Parker of Mason, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0046664, is admitted to the practice of law in Ohio and serves as judge of the Mason Municipal Court.

{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we suspend respondent's license to practice for 18 months, with six months stayed on conditions, based on findings that he committed numerous improper and injudicious acts in his capacity as a municipal court judge. Respondent objects to the board's recommendation, arguing that mitigating factors including his narcissistic personality disorder and his cooperation in the disciplinary process outweigh any aggravating factors and warrant a more lenient sanction under applicable precedent. On review, we agree with the board that respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. We also overrule respondent's objections and agree that the recommended sanction is appropriate.

{¶ 3} Relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent in a seven-count complaint with repeatedly failing to conform to ethical standards for judges and attorneys, specifying acts of bias, coercion, intemperance, and dishonesty in and out of the courtroom. A three-member panel of the board heard the cause, including the parties' extensive stipulations, and made findings of fact and conclusions of law, with a majority of the panel recommending the 18-month suspension and six-month stay. The board adopted virtually all the findings of misconduct and the panel's majority recommendation.

Misconduct

{¶ 4} Respondent does not dispute that he committed the professional misconduct found by the board. He does, however, attribute the charges filed against him to political disputes between him and other municipal officials. We are aware, as was the board and its panel, that these allegations of misconduct arose in a highly charged atmosphere, in which glaring publicity underscored the differences that respondent has had with the Mason city prosecuting attorney, the Mason police chief, the Mason law director, and Mason City Council. Nevertheless, the Disciplinary Counsel's investigation raised legitimate concerns about this judge, most of which had no connection to any underlying political tension, and required formal disciplinary proceedings. As we said in another case in which charges of judicial misconduct came with countercharges of political motivation and much publicity:

{¶ 5} "`The political context and highly publicized nature of these charges cannot distract us from the seriousness of the underlying conduct * * *.' In re Kroger (1997), 167 Vt. 1, 15, 702 A.2d 64. Respondent's continued pattern of misrepresentation, threats, and intemperate behavior to judges, lawyers, litigants, and court personnel is both inexcusable and detrimental to the integrity of the judiciary." Disciplinary Counsel v. O'Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 51.

{¶ 6} Respondent committed 23 violations of eight judicial Canons and eight violations of three Disciplinary Rules. The extent of his wrongdoing is represented by the following table:

Counts inWhichViolationsCanon/RuleOccurredCanon 1: A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary                                2, 3, and 5
                Canon 2: A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that          1, 2, 3, 4, 5
                promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary                                  6, and 7
                Canon 3(B)(3): A judge shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the judge                             3
                

Canon 3(B)(4): A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses,           1, 3, 6, and
                lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and shall require similar                   7
                conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control
                Canon 3(B)(7): A judge shall not initiate, receive, permit, or consider communications made to the              2 and 3
                judge outside the presence of the parties or their representatives concerning a pending or impending
                proceeding
                Canon 3(B)(8): A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly and                 1
                comply with guidelines set forth in the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio
                Canon 3(E)(1)(a): A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's                 2
                impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including where the judge has a personal bias or
                prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
                concerning the proceeding
                Canon 4: A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's             1, 3, 5, and
                activities                                                                                                         6
                DR 1-102(A)(4): A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or                       5
                misrepresentation
                DR 1-102(A)(5): A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of           1, 2, 3, 4, 5
                justice                                                                                                         and 6
                DR 1-102(A)(6): A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness              5
                to practice law
                

Count I — Respondent Jailed a Gallery Spectator for Contempt without Cause

{¶ 7} During November 2003, a woman attended respondent's courtroom to watch her daughter's probation-violation hearing. She sat in the gallery listening as respondent lectured her daughter from the bench about drug abuse. The woman raised her hand, and respondent trained his attention on her in an erratic departure from his remarks.

{¶ 8} Respondent emphatically told the woman to leave the courtroom. When the woman protested slightly, respondent told her to "just leave" and that he had "heard enough" out of her. He then threatened to put her in jail "in [her] daughter's place" if she did not "[j]ust get up and leave." The woman started to leave the courtroom, muttering, "I can't believe this," but respondent called her back and immediately found her in contempt of court. Respondent sentenced the woman to 24 hours in jail, and officers took her away in handcuffs.

{¶ 9} The measured and even-handed administration of justice is central to our judicial system. Respondent stained the integrity of that system with his intemperate, unreasonable, and vindictive decision to eject this spectator from the courtroom and jail her for contempt. Accord O'Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 33-40; Disciplinary Counsel v. Cox, 113 Ohio St.3d 48, 2007-Ohio-979, 862 N.E.2d 514, ¶ 41. By abusing his power to punish contempt, respondent violated Canons 2, 3(B)(4) and (8), and 4, and DR 1-102(A)(5).

Count II — Respondent Improperly Presided over a Defendant's Plea and Sentencing after Participating in the Defendant's Arrest

{¶ 10} In April 2003, respondent accepted a defendant's guilty plea and passed sentence even though he had been present for the defendant's arrest. The month before, respondent had signed a search warrant for the defendant's apartment and then accompanied an officer to the apartment complex, where officers executed the warrant in an early morning raid. Respondent did not go into the apartment, but he saw the defendant as the officers put him in a cruiser in handcuffs, and the officers confirmed that they had confiscated stolen property from his apartment. Respondent rode with an officer to the Warren County Jail and signed the defendant's commitment order. Some five weeks later, respondent presided over the defendant's guilty plea and sentencing.

{¶ 11} By participating in this defendant's arrest, respondent impermissibly crossed the line between law enforcement and the judiciary, establishing strong evidence of an actual bias. He then exacerbated an already irreparably tainted situation by failing to disqualify himself from proceedings involving the defendant. In fact, respondent presided over the defendant's plea and sentencing even after the defendant apologized to respondent for making him spend several hours at his apartment "that morning" and defense counsel's reminder that respondent had signed the search warrant that led to the defendant's arrest.

{¶ 12} Respondent's conduct cast grave doubt on his ability to act as an impartial arbiter and violated Canon 3(E)(l)(a). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 474, 476-477, 756 N.E.2d 104. His ex parte communication with the defendant violated Canon 3(B)(7). By failing to show the integrity and independence that promotes public confidence in the judiciary, respondent also violated Canons 1 and 2, as well as DR 1-102(A)(5).

Count III — Respondent Attempted to Coerce Plea Agreements in Two Criminal Cases

{¶ 13} While presiding over an October 2003 jury trial in a domestic-violence case, respondent recessed the jury, stepped down from the bench, and told defense counsel that the prosecutor was "about ready to offer" a plea and that the defense counsel was "about ready to take it." The prosecutor, however, had not previously offered a plea deal to the defendant.

{¶ 14} After respondent left the courtroom, the prosecutor told defense counsel that he would agree to a fourth-degree-misdemeanor plea, but he would...