Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver

Decision Date28 November 2018
Docket NumberNo. 2017-1081,2017-1081
Citation2018 Ohio 4717,155 Ohio St.3d 100,119 N.E.3d 405
Parties DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SARVER.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

Jason Allan Sarver, pro se.

Kennedy, J.{¶ 1} Respondent, Jason Allan Sarver, of Rockbridge, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0082073, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2007.

{¶ 2} In a formal complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct on April 6, 2017, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Sarver with four ethical violations arising from his sexual relationship with a client. Initially, the parties entered into an agreement for discipline by consent and stipulated to a two-year suspension, with the entire suspension stayed on just one condition—that Sarver not engage in any further misconduct. The board accepted the consent-to-discipline agreement and the stipulated sanction and recommended that we do so also. However, we rejected that sanction and remanded the matter for additional proceedings. 150 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2017-Ohio-7742, 82 N.E.3d 1173. Subsequently, at a hearing before a panel of the board, the parties presented stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors, submitted 28 joint exhibits, and recommended that Sarver be suspended from the practice of law for two years, with the entire suspension stayed on multiple conditions.

{¶ 3} The panel adopted the parties' stipulations and recommended sanction, and the board again adopted the panel's report in its entirety, and no objections have been filed. Although we agree with the finding that Sarver committed professional misconduct, we reject the board's recommended sanction and conclude that Sarver's misconduct warrants a suspension from the practice of law for two years, with the last 18 months of the suspension stayed on the conditions recommended by the board.

Misconduct

{¶ 4} Sarver and J.B. met each other in 2012 when Sarver represented J.B.'s then boyfriend in a legal matter. On September 11, 2015, J.B. reached out to Sarver when she needed "a good attorney for felony ......some stupid shit happened and I really need to talk to u its not good." The next day, Sarver and J.B. met at a Columbus restaurant, discussed J.B.'s criminal case over drinks, and then had sex in Sarver's vehicle in the parking lot.

{¶ 5} J.B. was charged with theft in the Hocking County Municipal Court and a warrant was issued for her arrest. According to Sarver, he was unaware that a warrant had been issued when he subsequently instructed her to turn off the Global Positioning System ("GPS") on her mobile phone so that law enforcement could not track her. Several days later, a grand jury indicted J.B. for multiple felonies, and due to Sarver's advice to turn off the GPS on her mobile phone, she avoided arrest for almost one month before being apprehended.

{¶ 6} The judge presiding over J.B.'s arraignment appointed Sarver to represent her, and Sarver, now representing an indigent client as court-appointed counsel, engaged in sexual activity with her at least seven more times over the next four months. They also trespassed onto Sarver's neighbor's property to use a hot tub.

{¶ 7} In the meantime, Sarver filed a petition to run for Hocking County Prosecuting Attorney. And although rumors of his sexual relationship with J.B. soon spread, Sarver falsely denied the rumors to the judge presiding over J.B.'s criminal case on two separate occasions. Around the same time that Sarver had lied about his inappropriate relationship with J.B. to the judge, the Hocking County Sheriff's Office began investigating Sarver. Detectives interviewed J.B. and promised her a reduced sentence if she disclosed the true nature of her relationship with Sarver. J.B. agreed to cooperate with the investigation, and during her interview with detectives, she stated that Sarver had "insinuated" that he would help J.B. with her "warrants and cases for sexual favors." She told the detectives that she had "problems saying no to something like that * * *. You feel kinda forced into it. * * * And, you know, of course, I had something over my head, I was facing 7 felonies."

{¶ 8} The state, through a special prosecutor, charged Sarver with several offenses, including two counts of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(1), which prohibits knowingly coercing another to engage in sexual conduct. However, the sexual-battery counts were dismissed as part of an agreement under which Sarver pleaded guilty to three misdemeanor counts of criminal trespassing (based on Sarver's unauthorized use of his neighbor's hot tub) and one misdemeanor count of obstructing official business (based on his advice to J.B. to turn off her phone's GPS while there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest). Additionally, as part of the plea agreement, Sarver had to withdraw his candidacy for county prosecuting attorney and the special prosecutor dismissed the remaining counts of the indictment. The court sentenced Sarver to two years of community control and fined him $1,250.

{¶ 9} After we rejected the board's original recommendation to accept the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement and remanded the cause to the board for further proceedings, a hearing was held before a panel, the parties presented stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors, and they recommended that Sarver be suspended from the practice of law for two years, with the entire suspension stayed on multiple conditions.

{¶ 10} The panel adopted the parties' stipulations and recommended sanction. The board adopted the panel's report in its entirety and found that Sarver's conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) (prohibiting a lawyer from soliciting or engaging in sexual activity with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship between them existed prior to the client-lawyer relationship), 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that adversely reflects on the lawyer's honesty or trustworthiness), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Sanction

{¶ 11} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.

{¶ 12} The parties stipulated and the board found the presence of two aggravating factors—that Sarver acted with a dishonest and selfish motive and committed multiple offenses. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) and (4).

{¶ 13} Stipulated mitigating factors found by the board include the absence of prior discipline, Sarver's full and free disclosure to the board and cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and other penalties and sanctions incurred for his misconduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), and (6). The parties stipulated and the board found that Sarver had submitted letters attesting to his good character and reputation, and the judge who had presided over J.B.'s criminal case also submitted a letter expressing his agreement with the proposed sanction. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(5). In addition, the board noted that Sarver had successfully completed court-ordered counseling and made a good-faith effort to address the issues underlying his misconduct by entering into a contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program ("OLAP") and attending additional counseling with his spouse.

{¶ 14} In considering the appropriate sanction for Sarver's misconduct, the board emphasized that "compelling" mitigating factors in this case warranted a two-year suspension, with the entire suspension stayed on conditions:

(1) not only was there no harm to the client but the client leveraged her relationship with [Sarver] to get a better plea deal by agreeing to testify against him; (2) he received a very public reprimand of sorts from the local media because his arrest and indictment, while he was a candidate for prosecutor, were front-page news; (3) he was over-indicted with 14 felonies and four misdemeanors including bribery and sexual battery charges; (4) he was arrested twice and spent two nights in jail; [and (5) ] he was forced to withdraw his candidacy for county prosecutor.

The board explained that "[w]hat makes these factors so significant is that they all stem from [Sarver's] consensual sexual relationship with his client."

{¶ 15} We agree that Sarver's conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). However, we disagree that a two-year suspension, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions recommended by the board, is the appropriate sanction for that misconduct.

{¶ 16} Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) prohibits a lawyer from soliciting or engaging in sexual activity with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship between them predated the client-lawyer relationship. In the absence of a preexisting, consensual sexual relationship, seeking or having sex with a client is a per se violation. The fact that a client appears to have consented does not mitigate the attorney's misconduct or provide a defense against a violation. Indeed, Comment 17 to Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) explains that "this rule prohibits the lawyer from engaging in sexual activity with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client , unless the sexual relationship predates the client-lawyer relationship." (Emphasis added.) Compare Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 (allowing client to consent to representation of another client that will be directly adverse to the client in certain circumstances); Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(a) (allowing client to consent to an attorney's transacting business with the client when certain...

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    ...activity by advising the client to turn off her phone's GPS while there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest. Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver , 155 Ohio St.3d 100, 2018-Ohio-4717, 119 N.E.3d 405 (" Sarver I ").{¶ 2} In a June 3, 2019 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Sar......
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