Dispensa v. Nat'l Conference Bishops
| Decision Date | 21 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 19-cv-556-LM |
| Parties | Matt M. Dispensa v. National Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
Proceeding pro se, Matt M. Dispensa brings this action against the National Conference of Catholic Bishops1 (the "Conference"), Cardinal Daniel Nicholas DiNardo (in both his individual capacity and his official capacity as the President of the Conference), the Archdiocese of Boston2, Cardinal Sean P. O'Malley (in both his individual capacity and his official capacity as Archbishop of the Archdiocese), Father Jon C. Martin, and 100 fictitiously named Doe defendants. In essence, Dispensa alleges that he suffered sexual abuse at Fr. Martin'shands while he was a minor child, and that the other defendants3 wrongfully concealed that abuse from the public and from prosecuting authorities.
At the center of Dispensa's action, therefore, are his claims asserted against Fr. Martin under New Hampshire common law for sexual abuse of a minor and for assault. Dispensa also asserts the vicarious liability of the Conference, the Archdiocese, Cardinal DiNardo, and Cardinal O'Malley for Fr. Martin's torts, as well as those defendants' direct liability under state law for the negligent retention of Fr. Martin as an employee.
Arising out of the alleged concealment of Fr. Martin's abuse, Dispensa asserts two claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") against the Conference, the Archdiocese, and Cardinal O'Malley, a claim against the Archdiocese for concealing a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), and a claim against the Archdiocese styled as conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Under New Hampshire law, Dispensa additionally asserts claims against alldefendants for breach of fiduciary duty, fiduciary fraud and conspiracy to commit fiduciary fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, Dispensa asserts a state-law claim against the Archdiocese and Cardinal O'Malley for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud.
Now before the court are three motions to dismiss.4 First, Cardinal DiNardo moves in his individual capacity to dismiss Dispensa's claims against him for lack of personal jurisdiction. Second, the Conference and Cardinal DiNardo in his official capacity (collectively, the "Conference defendants") move to dismiss all of Martin's claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction, and to dismiss his state-law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Third, the Archdiocese and Cardinal O'Malley in both his individual and his official capacities (collectively, the "Archdiocesan defendants") move to dismiss all of Martin's claims against them for insufficient service of process, for lack of personal jurisdiction, and for improper venue, and to dismiss his state-law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Although the court has twice extended Dispensa's deadline to respond—once upon the parties'unopposed motion and once sua sponte—Dispensa has filed no objection to any of the three motions.
What follows is a summary of Dispensa's allegations.
Since not later than 1960, the Conference, the Archdiocese, and Cardinal O'Malley have been aware that Catholic priests were sexually abusing children in dioceses across the United States. Despite their knowledge of widespread sexual abuse by priests, those defendants did nothing to prevent further such abuse, but instead conspired to conceal it. Over a period of many years, the Conference, the Archdiocese, and Cardinal O'Malley routinely concealed sexual abuse by Catholic priests by maintaining secret records of the abuse, entering into confidential settlements with abuse victims, obstructing civil and criminal investigations of abuse by Catholic clergy, and knowingly allowing priests who were known serial sexual predators of minors to serve in positions of authority over minor children.
Dispensa was raised in Andover, MA, where he and his family regularly attended religious services at St. Roberts Bellarmine Church (the "Church"). Dispensa's family was devoutly Catholic and "heavily involved" in activities at the Church. Dispensa attended day school at the Church, was a member of a Churchyouth group, and served as an altar boy at the Church. Fr. Martin was an Associate Pastor at the Church from June 1973 through May 1981.
While Fr. Martin was a pastor at the Church, and while Martin was a minor child, Fr. Martin used and manipulated his position of respect and authority as pastor and priest to obtain Dispensa's unquestioning trust and obedience. From 1975 through 1980, Fr. Martin abused Dispensa's trust and obedience by sexually abusing and assaulting him. Fr. Martin instructed Dispensa not to report the abuse. As a result of Dispensa's unquestioning trust in and obedience to Fr. Martin, Dispensa was unable to understand the wrongfulness of Fr. Martin's conduct until April 1981, when he reported it to his parents.
Church officials assured Dispensa's parents that the abuse Dispensa had suffered had been an "isolated occurrence," and the Conference, the Archdiocese, and Cardinal O'Malley took unspecified actions to conceal it from Dispensa's family, the public, and prosecuting authorities. Nevertheless, Fr. Martin was removed from his position at the Church in May 1981.
As a result of the trauma he suffered and the betrayal of his trust, Dispensa repressed his memories of Fr. Martin's abuse for an unspecified period of time.
Dispensa attempted to serve the Archdiocese and Cardinal O'Malley by mailing one copy of the summons and complaint to both defendants via certified mail. The envelope containing the summons and complaint was addressed to Cardinal O'Malley at the Archdiocese's principal place of business, in Braintree, MA. The Archdiocesan defendants received Dispensa's mailing.
The Archdiocesan defendants do not argue that such service failed to provide them with actual knowledge of this action or of Dispensa's claims. Nevertheless, the Archdiocesan defendants argue that Dispensa's service efforts were insufficient for purposes of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4.
Motions to dismiss for insufficient service of process are governed by Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(5). Under Rule 12(b)(5), objections to the validity of service of process must be specific and must identify with particularity the manner in which the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the service requirements. See Taite v. Bridgewater State Univ., 236 F. Supp. 3d 466, 472 (D. Mass. 2017) (citing 2 Moore's FederalPractice § 12.33[1] (3d ed. 2013)); see also, e.g., O'Brien v. R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., 998 F.2d 1394, 1400 (7th Cir. 1993).
Once the objecting party has properly challenged service of process, the burden shifts to the serving party to prove that service was sufficient. Rivera-Lopez v. Municipality of Dorado, 979 F.2d 885, 887 (1st Cir. 1992). A docketed return of service generally creates a rebuttable, prima facie presumption that service was sufficient. Blair v. City of Worcester, 522 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 2008). The challenging party may rebut the presumption through presentation of evidence, and the serving party may either present countervailing evidence or seek a stay of proceedings pending discovery and/or an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 112-115. Where evidence establishes the insufficiency of service, courts enjoy broad discretion either to dismiss an action entirely for failure to effect service or to quash the defective service and permit re-service, meanwhile retaining the case. See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 662 (1996); see also, e.g., Ramirez De Arellano v. Colloides Naturels Int'l, 236 F.R.D. 83, 85 (D.P.R. 2006).
Before a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, that defendant must first be properly served withprocess under Rule 4. See United States v. Carr, Case No. 2:11-CV-00280-GZS, 2012 WL 1109611, at *2 (D. Me. Mar. 2, 2012; see also, e.g., Direct Mail Specialists v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). This is not because service of process is itself a jurisdictional requirement, but rather because proper service is instead the mechanism through which exercise of jurisdiction is effected. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
Under Rule 4, a plaintiff may serve a corporate defendant5 by following the law governing service of either the state where the district court is located (here, New Hampshire) or the state where the defendant is located when service is made (here, Massachusetts). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A), 4(e)(1).
Under New Hampshire law, service on a foreign corporation is accomplished, inter alia, by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail to the corporate secretary at the principal office listed in the corporation'smost recent annual report. RSA 293-A:15.10. Although Cardinal O'Malley is not the corporate secretary of the Archdiocese, Dispensa substantially complied with the requirements of Section 293-A:15.10 when he sent the summons and complaint via certified mail to Cardinal O'Malley at the Archdiocese's principal address. Moreover, as a matter of federal procedural law, minor formal defects in service may be disregarded so long as the defendant receives actual notice of the complaint and the method of service is in substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 4. See Precision Etchings & Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem, Ltd., 953 F.2d 21, 23-25 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Here, it is undisputed that the Archdiocesan defendants actually received the summons and complaint as a result of Dispensa's service efforts. The Archdiocesan defendants' motion to dismiss is therefore denied as to the...
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