Dist. of D.C. v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees

Decision Date28 April 2011
Docket NumberNo. 09–CV–1148.,09–CV–1148.
PartiesDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant,v.AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1403, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General, with whom Peter J. Nickles, Attorney General for the District of Columbia at the time the brief was filed, and Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellant.Betty Grdina, with whom Charles R. Both, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for appellee.Before GLICKMAN and BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, Associate Judges, and STEADMAN, Senior Judge.BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, Associate Judge:

This case arises from protracted labor negotiations between appellant the District of Columbia (“the District”) and appellee the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1403 (AFGE), the union that represents the line attorneys employed by the District's Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”). In September 2007, portions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that affected the OAG line attorneys' rights regarding promotion and disciplinary issues expired.1 AFGE represented the OAG line attorneys in the labor negotiations following the expiration of these non-compensation portions of the CBA governing promotions and disciplinary issues. When the negotiations between AFGE and the District proved unsuccessful, they agreed to submit to arbitration. The Arbitrator ruled in favor of AFGE's arguments on behalf of the line attorneys, but OAG did not accept the Arbitrator's decision as binding. Out of frustration caused by OAG's refusal to recognize the arbitrated agreement as final and binding, AFGE sought enforcement of the arbitration award on behalf of the line attorneys in Superior Court.

We are asked in this appeal to determine whether AFGE was precluded by the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”) from seeking relief via the Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA” or “Arbitration Act) to enforce interest arbitration awards in Superior Court.2 While the specific issue of whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction to enforce a CMPA interest arbitration award is a matter of first impression, we recently held in a similar case that the Public Employee Relations Board (“PERB”) possessed the sole jurisdiction to seek enforcement of grievance awards arbitrated under the CMPA. District of Columbia Metro. Police Dep't v. Fraternal Order of Police/Metro. Police Dep't Labor Comm., 997 A.2d 65, 78–79 (D.C.2010) (“ FOP ”). Interest awards refer to arbitration of disputes arising from the negotiation of new contract terms, while grievance awards refer to arbitration disputes arising from the interpretation or application of an existing agreement. See D.C.Code § 1–603.01(10) (2009 Supp.); see also Council of Sch. Officers v. Vaughn, 553 A.2d 1222, 1224 n. 6 (D.C.1989) (citation omitted). Upon review of the parties' arguments in this case, we see no reason why CMPA interest arbitration awards should be treated differently than CMPA grievance arbitration awards. Therefore, we extend the precedent recently established in FOP to include interest arbitration awards. We hold that the CMPA governs all collective bargaining disputes involving District municipal employees and, thus, preempts any attempt to use the Arbitration Act to confirm an arbitration award involving municipal employees.

In this case, the Superior Court granted, in part, appellee's Application to Confirm and Enforce the Arbitration Award (“Application”). In doing so, the court confirmed the interest arbitration award AFGE won from the District on October 2, 2008 and declared that the arbitrated CBA was effective and binding on the parties. The District seeks reversal of the Superior Court's ruling and dismissal of AFGE's application on the grounds that: (1) the Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain appellee's application; and (2) the Superior Court lacked the authority to enter an order declaring the CBA effective and binding without such CBA having previously received Mayoral approval.

After reviewing the facts in this case and the statutory framework provided by the CMPA and the Arbitration Act, we reverse the Superior Court order confirming the arbitration award, vacate the court's order declaring the arbitrated CBA to be effective and binding, and remand with instructions to dismiss AFGE's application because the CMPA precludes relief under the Arbitration Act and Superior Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Following our ruling in FOP, we hold that PERB has exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes concerning municipal employees involved in CMPA based arbitration.

I. Factual Background

AFGE is the certified collective bargaining representative of the non-management (“line”) attorneys employed by the OAG. In 2004, AFGE entered into a non-compensation CBA with the OAG that was set to expire on September 30, 2007. Prior to the CBA's expiration date, AFGE and OAG entered into negotiations for a successor agreement. The negotiations produced agreement between the parties on nearly all contested matters. However, due to disagreement regarding three articles concerning working conditions, on August 20, 2007, AFGE sent a letter informing PERB that the parties could not agree to a new CBA. Specifically, the three articles in dispute concerned: (1) whether there would be binding arbitration for grievances over serious discipline; (2) whether the union should be able to grieve and arbitrate unsatisfactory performance ratings; and (3) “whether attorneys who are qualified and ranked for promotion but do not get promoted in a particular year should be given priority for promotions” in the following year. In other words, the line attorneys, through their AFGE union representatives, sought greater input regarding their grounds for promotion, suspension, and termination. The OAG maintained that these issues impinged on rights that, under the CMPA, management was allowed to reserve to itself. See D.C.Code § 1–617.08 (2005 Supp.) (detailing management rights and matters subject to collective bargaining). With the parties unable to reach agreement on these three articles, AFGE declared an impasse and invoked PERB's impasse resolution procedures. See D.C.Code § 1–605.02 (2001).

Subsequent mediation proved unsuccessful and, on January 10, 2008, PERB ordered the parties to interest arbitration pursuant to D.C.Code § 1–605.02(4). On January 23, 2008, PERB appointed Dr. Andree McKissick to serve as the Chairperson of the Impartial Board of Arbitrators. Arbitrator McKissick held a hearing on May 28, 2008, and on September 27, 2008, she issued an Opinion and entered an interest arbitration award in favor of AFGE, holding that all three of the union's proposals regarding promotions and disciplinary measures for the line attorneys were “fairer, more reasonable and consistent with existing laws, rules and regulations.”

On October 24, 2008, AFGE sent OAG a letter asking it to comply with and sign the arbitration award. In response, then-Acting Attorney General Peter J. Nickles sent AFGE a letter dated October 29, 2008, in which Nickles maintained that Arbitrator McKissick's award was contrary to law. Nickles disagreed with AFGE's contention that the arbitrator's award precluded further review by the Mayor. According to Nickles, “Under the D.C.Code, the Mayor has the authority to decide that the agreement is contrary to law, return it to the parties for renegotiation or delete the offensive provisions from the CBA.” Nickles asked the Office of Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining (“OLRCB”) to complete a legal sufficiency review of the CBA, and requested that AFGE send him any legal authority for their position that the Mayor need not review and could not reject the CBA containing the arbitration award. Nickles closed his letter by telling AFGE that:

After I review your comments on the Mayor's authority under D.C.Code § 1–617.15 and any comments on OLRCB's memorandum, I will decide what OAG's next steps should be in connection with this matter. I too would like to have a signed successor agreement in place as soon as possible so we can return to the business of representing our clients.

Despite Nickles' stated wish to “have a signed successor agreement in place as soon as possible,” the parties' impasse continued and approximately one month later, on December 3, 2008, AFGE filed an Application to Confirm and Enforce the Arbitration Award in Superior Court pursuant to the UAA. AFGE filed its Application against Nickles, in his capacity as Attorney General, OAG, and the District of Columbia.

In filing the Application, AFGE sought to compel OAG to sign, and accept as binding, Arbitrator McKissick's order. Specifically, AFGE's Superior Court application sought: (1) confirmation of McKissick's arbitration award; (2) a judgment enforcing the arbitration, entered in conformity with the order confirming the arbitration award; (3) an order compelling the District to execute a final CBA containing the terms awarded by Arbitrator McKissick, as well as the earlier agreed upon articles; (4) an order requiring the District to pay appellee's reasonable attorney's fees and costs; and (5) such other relief as the court deemed just and proper. The District successfully moved to have Nickles and OAG dismissed from the lawsuit on the grounds that the OAG was non sui juris, and that Nickles' alleged conduct was performed within the scope of his official duties on behalf of the District. The District also moved to dismiss the Application for lack of jurisdiction, because the CBA lacked finality as it had not yet been submitted for Mayoral review. On July 21, 2009, the Superior Court issued its order in favor of the union, enforcing the arbitrator's award and declaring the negotiated CBA to be final, binding, and in effect. The court concluded that:

Since a final and binding...

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6 cases
  • Coleman v. Dist. of Columbia, 11–CV–937.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • December 12, 2013
    ...are limited to the administrative and judicial remedies provided by the CMPA. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. American Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Local 1403, 19 A.3d 764, 771–74 (D.C.2011) (CMPA foreclosed labor union's action in Superior Court under Arbitration Act to enforce arbitration awa......
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
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  • Wash. Teachers' Union, Local # 6 v. D.C. Pub. Sch.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • October 10, 2013
    ...is comprehensive and, therefore, preclusive.” Id. Persuaded by FOP's reasoning, in District of Columbia v. American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1403, 19 A.3d 764, 774 (D.C.2011) ( “ AFGE ”), we extended our holding in FOP to interest arbitration awards and concluded that “the ......
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    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • July 28, 2016
    ...components of collective bargaining agreements” concerning District government employees. District of Columbia v. American Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Local 1403, 19 A.3d 764, 765 n. 1 (D.C.2011). For non-compensation matters, an agreement is subject to the Mayor's approval. D.C.Code § 1–617.15(a......
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1 provisions
  • DC Register Vol 63, No 08, February 19, 2016 Pages 1833 to 2124
    • United States
    • District of Columbia Register
    • Invalid date
    ...PERB could not consider AFGE’s subject matter jurisdiction argument because 12 Id. (citing District of Columbia v. AFGE, Local 1403, 19 A.3d 764, 771 (D.C. 2011)). 13 Id. at 8. 14 Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 870 (8th ed. 1999)). 15 Id. (citing Jemison v. Nat’l Baptist Convention, 72......

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