Fraternal Order of Police/Metropolitan Police Dep't Labor Comm. v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 28 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14–CV–1479.,14–CV–1479.
• Citation: 143 A.3d 768
• Parties: FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE/METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT LABOR COMMITTEE, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

143 A.3d 768

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE/METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT LABOR COMMITTEE, Appellant

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

No. 14–CV–1479.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 16, 2016.

Decided July 28, 2016.

Gregory K. McGillivary, with whom Diana J. Nobile, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for appellant.

Holly M. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before THOMPSON and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and FARRELL, Senior Judge.

FARRELL, Senior Judge:

The Fraternal Order of Police/Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee (the FOP) appeals from the Superior Court's dismissal of its suit asking for reversal of an impasse arbitration award made under D.C.Code § 1–617.17(f)(3) (2012 Repl.). Key to the issue we decide is that, in order to “take effect,” D.C.Code § 1–617.17(j), the arbitration award had to be submitted to the Council of the District of Columbia for its “accept[ance] or reject[ion].” Id. The Council approved the award by resolution in May of 2014, and the FOP brought this action challenging the Council's decision and the award. The District of Columbia as appellee contends that dismissal of the suit was required because § 1–617.17 bars judicial review of the Council's decision to accept or reject an arbitration award of this kind, one arising from “[c]ollective bargaining concerning [District employee] compensation.”

D.C.Code § 1–617.17 (Title). For the reasons that follow, we agree and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

I.Statutory Overview

The District's Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA), D.C.Code §§ 1–601.01 et seq., creates “separate processes for the [negotiation and] adoption of compensation and non-compensation components of collective bargaining agreements” concerning District government employees. District of Columbia v. American Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Local 1403, 19 A.3d 764, 765 n. 1 (D.C.2011). For non-compensation matters, an agreement is subject to the Mayor's approval. D.C.Code § 1–617.15(a). If disapproved by the Mayor as “contrary to law,” the agreement must be “returned to the parties for renegotiation of the offensive provisions or such provisions shall be deleted from the agreement.” Id. Once an agreement takes effect, the Mayor must “submit [it] to the Council for its information.” D.C.Code § 1–617.15(b).

A different process governs agreement provisions concerning “salary, wages, health benefits, within-grade increases, ... and any other compensation matters.” D.C.Code § 1–617.17(b). Because compensation and related matters affect budget decisions by the Council, “[c]ollective bargaining for a given fiscal year or years shall take place at such times as to be reasonably assured that negotiations shall be completed prior to submission of a budget [to the Council] for said year(s)....” D.C.Code § 1–617.17(f)(1). If negotiations reach an impasse, the parties must inform the District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board (PERB), which must then appoint a mediator, who has thirty days to help the parties resolve the outstanding issues. D.C.Code § 1–617.17(f)(2)–(3).

If mediation does not produce a settlement, PERB, at the request of either party, must appoint an impartial Board of Arbitration to investigate the matter in dispute and hold any necessary hearing. Id. “The last best offer of each party shall be the basis for [this] ... impasse arbitration,” and the arbitrator must issue a written award “with the object of achieving a prompt and fair settlement of the dispute.” Id. Although only compensation matters must be decided in this manner, an arbitrator may also consider non-compensation matters at the request of both parties or PERB. D.C.Code § 1–617.17(f)(3A). The Council is entitled to “the same prior notice of negotiation proceedings” as the parties, and, for the purpose of “informing [Council] members ... of the progress of negotiations,” “the Council may appoint observers from its membership and staff.” D.C.Code § 1–617.17(h).

Of special importance here, the Mayor must “transmit all settlements, including arbitration awards, to the Council,” together “with a budget request act, a supplemental budget request act, a budget amendment act, or a reprogramming, as appropriate,” to ensure that the agreement or arbitration award is “fully fund[ed] ... for the fiscal year to which it applies.” D.C.Code § 1–617.17(i)(1). An arbitration award will “take effect” thirty calendar days (not counting Council recess days) after the Mayor and Council enact budget legislation “that contains the funded settlement,” unless “the Council [meanwhile] accepts or rejects the settlement, including an arbitrator's award, by resolution.” D.C.Code § 1–617.17(j). If the Council rejects a settlement or arbitration award, “then the settlement shall be returned to the parties for renegotiation, with specific reasons for the rejection appended to the document disclosing the rejection of the settlement.” Id.

II.Factual Background

Since 1980, the FOP and the District government have negotiated a series of collective bargaining agreements establishing the wages and terms and conditions of employment for the FOP's member police officers. Five years after their last agreement expired in 2008, the parties reached an impasse on a new agreement and, pursuant to D.C.Code § 1–617.17, submitted their dispute to an arbitration board. Among other things, the FOP proposed a contract that included wholly retroactive wage increases from 2009 through 2014, whereas the District's contract offer was mostly prospective, providing wage adjustments each year for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the FOP argued that the District had failed to submit a separate “last best offer” regarding a duration clause for the contract;¹ in the FOP's view, this required the arbitrator to accept the FOP's duration proposal of a contract ending in 2014.

The arbitrator rejected this argument as elevating “form” over “substance,” because it was clear from the District's submission that “its wage proposal include[d] a contract through September 30, 2017”—hence contained a duration clause in any but a “hyper-technical” sense. The arbitrator ultimately adopted the District's last best offer on wages and related matters, finding that the District's proposal of a largely prospective wage increase through September 2017 “achieves a prompt and fair resolution of the dispute and is more consistent with statutory standards than the FOP's proposal.”

The arbitration award was submitted to the Council as required. Following a public hearing on the matter, the Council rejected the FOP's position that the District had violated the last best offer requirement of § 1–617.17(f)(2)–(3). The Council's resolution approving the award explained:

* * *

(e) The Council finds that the decision of the arbitrator in this matter is reasonable and agrees with it. The Council agrees with the arbitrator that it is clear from the Executive's last best offer that its wage proposal includes a contract [including a duration provision] through September 30, 2017. To conclude otherwise would serve to elevate a hyper-technical argument above the interest of police officers to receive a new compensation agreement.^{[2 ]}

D.C. Council, Res. 20–481, § 2(e), 61 D.C.Reg. 4894 (May 6, 2014).

The FOP then filed this suit in Superior Court to “void” the Council's resolution, asking the court to “declare that the arbitration award violated the CMPA by imposing a duration clause that was not proposed by the Mayor as a last best offer.” The trial judge granted the District's motion to dismiss the suit. In relevant part, he found “dismissal of this action ... appropriate on [the] jurisdictional ground” that “the statute does not explicitly provide for judicial review of an award [approved by the Council] under” D.C.Code § 1–617.17, and contains no “standard of review to be applied by a reviewing court” in assessing the Council's approval. Altogether, this was “evidence that the CMPA does not contemplate any judicial review of an arbitration award approved by the D.C. Council ...” (emphasis in original).

III.Discussion

This court reviews de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Family Fed'n for World Peace v. Moon, 129 A.3d 234, 248 (D.C.2015). The question presented of whether the Council's decision to accept or reject an arbitration award under D.C.Code § 1–617.17 is subject to judicial review is one of first impression. In Council of Sch. Officers v. Vaughn, 553 A.2d 1222 (D.C.1989), the court held that a party could not seek judicial review of a compensation arbitration award before the Council decided whether to accept or reject it, id. at 1226, but left open the question presented here. See id. (“[F]or CSO to obtain relief from an ... arbitration award, the CMPA requires that it first look to the D.C. Council to disapprove the award.... If, however, the award goes into effect, then CSO either will be without a further remedy or will have to sue the District government ..., in which event the issues relating to subject matter jurisdiction would arise.”); see also District of Columbia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Police–Labor Committee, 691 A.2d 115, 117 n. 1 (D.C.1997). We decide that issue now.³

“The CMPA was intended to replace [the District's preexisting personnel] system with a ‘uniform’ and ‘comprehensive merit personnel system.’ ” Coleman, supra note 3, 80 A.3d at 1031 (citation omitted); see D.C.Code § 1–601.02(a). The CMPA therefore “provides the exclusive remedy for many (though not all) grievances suffered by District government employees, and ... the courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to award relief where the CMPA's remedies are exclusive.” Washington Teachers' Union, Local 6 v....