Dister v. Ludwig

Decision Date11 June 1951
Docket NumberNo. 41899,41899
Citation240 S.W.2d 694,362 Mo. 162
PartiesDISTER v. LUDWIG.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Walther, Hecker, Walther & Barnard and Harold F. Hecker, St. Louis, for appellant.

William L. Clinton, and Carleton & Clinton, St. Louis, for respondent, Orville Richardson, St. Louis, of counsel.

HOLLINGSWORTH, Judge.

In this action plaintiff alleged that as he walked southward into the north portion of Chouteau Avenue in the City of St. Louis to board a westbound streetcar standing on the east side of its intersection with Theresa Street he was negligently struck and injured by an automobile driven westward by defendant. He recovered judgment for $8,100, and defendant appealed.

The cause was submitted under the humanitarian doctrine. Defendant assigns as error: (1) that no submissible case was made: (2) admission of prejudicially incompetent evidence, and (3) certain instructions given in behalf of plaintiff.

Chouteau Avenue extends east and west; Theresa north and south. Theresa intersects Chouteau on the north at a right angle, veers slightly to the east, and then leaves it on the south at a right angle. Two streetcar lines extend along the center of Chouteau, the south line being used for eastbound cars and the north line for westbound cars. It is 18 feet from the north curbline of Chouteau to the north rail of the north tracks. A safety zone, 5 feet and 6 inches in width, for alighting and departing passengers on westbound streetcars, extends 61 feet eastward on Chouteau from the intersection of Theresa. It is adjacent to the north rail of the westbound tracks. However, the north line of the safety zone is several feet shorter than its south line at the east end. To mark its eastern boundaries four metal buttons are diagonally set from the east end of its north line to the east end of its south line. The distance between the north curbline of Chouteau and the north line of the safety zone is 12 1/2 feet. Defendant's automobile, a red Oldsmobile, is 6 feet wide.

On the date plaintiff was injured, May 27, 1948, he was a bookkeeper, accountant and cashier for Viteena Feed Mills, which is located on the north side of Chouteau, 200 feet west of its intersection with Theresa. At 6:45 p. m., he left his office for the purpose of boarding a westbound streetcar at the intersection of Chouteau and Theresa to go to his home. There is a light pole at the northeast corner of the intersection. The west end of the safety zone is directly south of this light pole. As plaintiff proceeded westward to the corner he saw the streetcar coming west-ward. When he came to within two or three feet of the light pole, he saw the streetcar stopped with its front end at the west end of the safety zone. Its front doors were open for receiving passengers. At the same time he saw defendant's automobile at the east end of the safety zone, proceeding westward with its left side adjacent to the north line of the safety zone. He observed its speed and estimated it to be then travelling at 15 to 20 miles per hour. Plaintiff then testified: 'Well, I dashed across, I started across the street about two or three feet from the lamp post, east of the lamp post, at a slight angle to get the streetcar, and as I got to the safety zone line I was struck by this automobile'; and that the car brushed his left side causing him to fall, breaking his ankle. There was further evidence in behalf of plaintiff that defendant's automobile did not stop, swerve or sound any warning from the time he first saw it until it struck him. The automobile came to a stop at the point plaintiff fell.

On direct examination, plaintiff further testified:

'Q. Now, when you first saw this automobile, Mr. Dister, where was it in relation to the side of the safety zone? A. When I first saw it it was at the rear end of the streetcar.

'Q. It was right at the rear end of the streetcar, but where was it in relation to the safety zone, the side of the safety zone? A. Right around the line of the safety zone.'

* * *

* * *

'Q. Now, did you watch this automobile as you proceeded across the street toward the streetcar? A. I looked once, saw it, and I proceeded to cross to the streetcar.

'Q. You didn't see it any more then until you were struck? A. Until after I was struck, that is right.

'Q. Did you see the automobile after you were struck? A. After I was down, yes, on the street.

'Q. Where was it in relation to the safety zone at that time? A. I was in the safety zone. It was right next to my head. As I turned my head the left front wheel was right next to my head, right there at the line.'

* * *

* * *

On cross examination, plaintiff further testified:

'Q. So that the front end of that car [meaning defendant's automobile when plaintiff first saw it], at least, and the side was past the buttons at the back end of the safety zone, you are sure of that? A. Yes.

'Q. And was near the rear end of the streetcar? A. That is correct.

'Q. Did it seem to be coming right on through? A. Sure, it was doing about 15 or 20 miles an hour.

'Q. Now, you say as you saw it there before you started out on the street, it was coming at the back end of that streetcar somewhere along this safety zone here doing 15 or 20 miles an hour. Did it give any indication of slowing down? A. Just a little.

'Q. Did it give a horn? A. No.

'Q. Looked to you as if it was going right on through past, did it? A. Going on past the safety zone.

'Q. As though it was coming right on past it. Yet you want the jury to understand you walked right out from the curb to get over to the safety zone, when that car seemed to be coming straight through without stopping; is that what you want the jury to understand? A. Well, there was a number of feet there between the----

'Q. Just answer me, is that what you want the jury to understand, that you walked right out from the curb towards the front door of that car when you saw the car coming through the safety zone going about 15 miles an hour; is that what you want the jury to understand? A. That is right.'

* * *

* * *

'Q. When you came out from the curb, didn't you run out from the curb to get on that streetcar? A. No.'

* * *

* * *

'Q. You didn't run at all, just walked the ordinary gait? A. Maybe a little faster gait.'

* * *

* * *

'Q. Was there anything to prevent you from looking again toward the east as you went from this curbline out here to the safety zone, anything that interfered with your seeing that automobile coming? A. No.

'Q. The last time you saw it just when you started off, you say it was coming about 15 miles an hour, is that right? A. I figured it was going to stop.'

* * *

* * *

Plaintiff introduced in evidence Section 2472 of the Revised Code of the City of St. Louis, an ordinance reading as follows: 'Stopping Behind and Passing Streetcars--The operator of a vehicle overtaking any streetcar stopped or about to stop for the purpose of receiving or discharging any passengers shall stop such vehicle to the rear of the nearest running board or door of such streetcar, and keep it stationary until any such passenger has boarded such car or reached a place of safety except that where a safety zone has been established, the vehicle need not be stopped before passing any such streetcar, but may proceed past such streetcar at a speed not greater than is reasonable and proper, and with due caution for the safety of pedestrians.'

Briefly stated, defendant's version, supported by her testimony and that of several guest passengers riding with her and other witnesses, was that as she drove west a streetcar overtook her and stopped at the streetcar stopping place. She saw plaintiff running westward on the sidewalk on the north side of Chouteau as though to catch the streetcar. She stopped near a trolley pole (31 feet east of the light pole). The man stopped, she believed, near the trolley pole. The streetcar began to move slowly away, she started her car, the man dashed across the street in a vain attempt to get the streetcar and he fell as he passed her automobile. Her automobile did not touch him at all. When plaintiff started to fall he was two or three feet in front of her automobile, almost to the safety zone, and he fell into the safety zone. She was travelling only 3 or 4 miles an hour when plaintiff fell, and stopped her automobile almost immediately. She was taken to the police station and released from custody after the police talked with plaintiff over the telephone and he told them he did not want her prosecuted.

Thus it is seen defendant's version of the happening is so completely at war with plaintiff's evidence, that no part of it may be seized upon by plaintiff to piece out his case except such parts thereof as may tend to support his version of the facts. Pentecost v. St. Louis Merchant's Bridge Term. R. Co., 334 Mo. 572, 66 S.W.2d 533, 535-536; Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 357 Mo. 904, 211 S.W.2d 696, 697.

Upon the evidence above narrated, the trial court submitted the issue of defendant's negligence under the humanitarian doctrine on four specifications of negligence after plaintiff came into a discoverable position of imminent peril, to wit: failure, by the exercise of the highest degree of care with the means at hand, and with safety to herself, the automobile and its occupants, to have either stopped her automobile or sufficiently slackened its speed, or swerved her automobile, in time to have avoided striking plaintiff, or to have sounded a warning of her approach. Inasmuch as all four of these specifications of negligence were submitted in the disjunctive, there must be evidence to support the submission of each of them; otherwise the trial court was in error in submitting such as were not supported by the evidence. Carlisle v. Tilghmon, Mo.Sup., 159 S.W.2d 663, 665; Ayres v. Key, 359 Mo. 341, 221 S.W.2d 719. Therefore, did the evidence warrant the submission of all four? The answer to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
27 cases
  • Harrellson v. Barks
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 26, 1959
    ...Mo., 291 S.W.2d 883; Homfeld v. Wilcoxon, Mo., 304 S.W.2d 806; Cosentino v. Heffelfinger, 360 Mo. 535, 229 S.W.2d 546; Dister v. Ludwig, 362 Mo. 162, 240 S.W.2d 694, 699.3 Perry v. Dever, Mo., 303 S.W.2d 1; Farmer v. Taylor, Mo.App., 301 S.W.2d 429; Turbett v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 577, 252 S.W......
  • Welch v. McNeely
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • July 12, 1954
    ...v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 500, 251 S.W.2d 704, 707(2); Vietmeier v. Voss, Mo., 246 S.W.2d 785, 788(4); Dister v. Ludwig, 362 Mo. 162, 240 S.W.2d 694, 699(7); Yeaman v. Storms, 358 Mo. 774, 217 S.W.2d 495, 498(1); Buehler v. Festus Mercantile Co., 343 Mo. 139, 119 S.W.2d 961, ......
  • Faught v. Washam
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 14, 1959
    ...Coleman, 358 Mo. 157, 160, 213 S.W.2d 420, 421(2); Chenoweth v. McBurney, 359 Mo. 890, 894, 224 S.W.2d 114, 117(3); Dister v. Ludwig, 362 Mo. 162, 170, 240 S.W.2d 694, 699(8); Lilly v. Boswell, 362 Mo. 444, 452, 242 S.W.2d 73, 75(2); Kelley v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo., 248 S.W.2d 5......
  • Farmer v. Taylor
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • March 22, 1957
    ...v. Coleman, supra, 213 S.W.2d loc. cit. 421(2); Chenoweth v. McBurney, 359 Mo. 890, 894, 224 S.W.2d 114, 117(3); Dister v. Ludwig, 362 Mo. 162, 170, 240 S.W.2d 694, 699(8); Lilly v. Boswell, 362 Mo. 444, 452, 242 S.W.2d 73, 75(2); Kelley v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo., 248 S.W.2d 597,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT