District of Columbia v. Little 11 8212 12, 1950

• Decision Date: 20 February 1950
• Docket Number: No. 302,302
• Citation: 94 L.Ed. 599,70 S.Ct. 468,339 U.S. 1
• Parties: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. LITTLE. Argued Jan. 11—12, 1950
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

339 U.S. 1

70 S.Ct. 468

94 L.Ed. 599

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

v LITTLE.

No. 302.

Argued Jan. 11—12, 1950.

Decided Feb. 20, 1950.

Mr. Chester H. Gray, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Jeff Busby, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Anne X. Alpern, Pittsburgh, Pa., for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers as amicus curiae.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

An information was filed against the respondent Geraldine Little in the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia charging that she had interfered with a District Health Department inspector in the performance of his official duties. The evidence showed that respondent had told the health officer, who had no search warrant, not to enter her home to inspect its sanitary condition; she had also refused to unlock her door. She was convicted and fined $25. The Municipal Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures forbade the health officer to enter respondent's private home without a search warrant. 62 A.2d 874. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed on the same grounds. 85 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 178 F.2d 13. The case raises important questions concerning legal provisions for protecting the health of the people by special and periodic inspection and elimination of potential sources of disease. We granted certitorari, 338 U.S. 866, 70 S.Ct. 141.

In this Court the constitutional arguments have extended far beyond the comparatively narrow issues involved in the particular case. At one extreme the District argues that the Fourth Amendment has no application whatever to inspections and investigations made by health officers; that to preserve the public health, officers may without judicial warrants enter premises, public buildings and private residences at any reasonable hour, with or without the owner's consent. At the opposite extreme, it is argued that no sanitary inspection can ever be made by health officers without a search warrant, except with a property owner's consent. Between these two extremes are suggestions that the Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to inspect premises where the object of inspections is to obtain evidence for criminal punishment or where there are conditions imminently dangerous to life and health, but that municipalities and other governing agencies may lawfully provide for general routine inspections at reasonable hours without search warrants. An impressive array of facts is also presented concerning the uniform practices of agencies of local governments to provide for such general routine inspections in connection with sanitation, plumbing, buildings, etc.

Neither the facts of this case, nor the District law on which the prosecution rests, provide a basis for a sweeping determination of the Fourth Amendment's application to all these varied types of investigations, inspections and searches. Yet a decision of the constitutional requirement for a search in this particular case might have far reaching and unexpected implications as to closely related questions not now before us. This is therefore an appropriate case in which to apply our sound general policy against deciding constitutional questions if the record permits final disposition of a cause on non-constitutional grounds. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 575, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 1419—1423, 91 L.Ed. 1666, and cases there cited. Applying this policy, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the Fourth Amendment required a search warrant here. For even if the Health Officer had a lawful right to inspect the premises without a warrant, we are persuaded that respondent's statements to the officer were not an 'interference' that made her guilty of a misdemeanor under the controlling District law.¹

The District regulation which respondent was convicted of violating is set out in part below.² It requires that occupants of premises in the District shall keep them 'clean and wholesome'; that Health Officers shall 'examine or cause to be examined any building supposed or reported to be in an unsanitary condition'; and that 'any person violating * * * any of the provisions of these regulations, or interfering with or preventing any inspection authorized thereby, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. * * *' An occupant of respondent's house reported to the Health Officer that conditions inside her home were very far from 'clean and wholesome.'³ The Health Officer then went to respondent's home. She was away and the door was locked. The officer had no search warrant. While he was standing outside the door, respondent returned. She protested the right of the inspector to enter her private home, claiming that his entry would violate her constitutional rights. She neither used nor threatened force of any kind.⁴ In view of these facts found by the courts below, the question boils down to whether respondent's mere refusal to unlock the door accompanied by remonstrances on substantial constitutional grounds was the kind of interference prohibited by the regulation.⁵ We hold that it was not.

Although force or threatened force is not always an indispensable ingredient of the offense of interfering with an officer in the discharge of his duties, mere remonstrances or even criticisms of an officer are not usually held to be the equivalent of unlawful interference.⁶ Nor does any express language in the District regulation controlling here impose any duty on home owners to assist health officers to enter and inspect their homes. It does not even prohibit 'hindering' or 'refusing to permit any lawful inspection,' in sharp contrast with a separate inspection statute enacted by Congress for the District which adds these phrases to prohibitions against 'interference' and 'prevention.'⁷ The word 'interfere' in this regulation cannot fairly be interpreted to encompass respondent's failure to unlock her door and her remonstrances on constitutional grounds.

Had the respondent not objected to the officer's entry of her house without a search warrant, she might thereby have waived her constitutional objections. ⁸ The right to privacy in the home holds too high a place in our system of laws to justify a statutory interpretation that would impose a criminal punishment on...