District of Columbia v. Healy, No. 2508.

Docket NºNo. 2508.
Citation160 A.2d 800
Case DateMay 17, 1960
CourtCourt of Appeals of Columbia District
160 A.2d 800
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant,
v.
Patrick C. HEALY, Appellee.
No. 2508.
Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Argued February 8, 1960.
Decided May 17, 1960.

Page 801

Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corporation Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom Chester H. Gray, Corporation Counsel, Milton D. Korman, Principal Asst. Corporation Counsel, and Hubert B. Pair, Asst. Corporation Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.

Arthur E. Neuman, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges, and CAYTON (Chief Judge, Retired) sitting by designation under Code, § 11-776(b).

HOOD, Associate Judge.


On February 16, 1959, appellee was charged by information with operating a motor vehicle on February 14 while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. On that day he pleaded not guilty and demanded trial by jury. The case was continued until March 24. On that day at appellee's request the case was continued until April 21. On this date, at the government's request, the case was again continued until June 3. On this last date, the government again moved for a continuance because of the absence of one of its witnesses. The trial court denied the continuance and dismissed the information for lack of prosecution.

Twelve days later a second information was filed against appellee charging the same offense charged in the prior information. The trial court (not the same judge who had dismissed the first information) dismissed the second information, holding that "the prior dismissal was a final order which barred any further action on the merits of the case." The government has appealed from his ruling.

In approaching the question raised, we should bear in mind the following: (1) There is no statute in this jurisdiction, as in many of the States, providing for dismissal of a criminal charge if the accused is not brought to trial in a specified time, and in some instances providing the effect of such dismissal;1 (2) in this jurisdiction, unlike other federal jurisdictions, the government had the right, which it did not exercise, of an appeal from the first order of dismissal;2 (3) the criminal rules of the Municipal Court do not contain a rule similar to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b), 18 U.S.C.A., providing for dismissal of an information for unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial. We also feel we must assume that the dismissal of the first information was justified, because the propriety of that dismissal is not before us. We say this because of the assertion in the government's brief that an appeal from the dismissal of the first information "would almost certainly have obtained a reversal."

The narrow question before us is whether the dismissal of an information for lack of prosecution is a bar to prosecution under a second information which

Page 802

merely repeats the charge of the prior information. Both the government and appellee concede there is no local authority on the subject, and indeed we have found no case directly in point in any...

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9 practice notes
  • Diamond v. Davis, No. 93-CV-1246.
    • United States
    • District of Columbia Court of Appeals of Columbia District
    • February 20, 1996
    ...misrepresentation, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been ascertained at the time" of the alleged fraud); Maddox, supra, 160 A.2d at 800 ("Fraud ... is not discovered when one's prior knowledge is confirmed as correct by another."); cf. Brown v. Lamb, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 316 &......
  • DIAMOND v. DAVIS, No. 93-CV-1246
    • United States
    • District of Columbia Court of Appeals of Columbia District
    • February 20, 1996
    ...misrepresentation, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been ascertained at th[e] time" of the alleged fraud); Maddox, supra, 160 A.2d at 800 ("[F]raud . . . is not discovered when one's prior knowledge is confirmed as correct by another."); cf. Brown v. Lamb, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 314,......
  • Iowa v. Buckley, No. 1--56537
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • August 29, 1975
    ...whether the prosecution would have been barred if the dismissal order had been reversed on appeal. See District of Columbia v. Healy, 160 A.2d 800 Prior to the Johnson case, dismissal of a felony charge for denial of statutory rights to speedy indictment or trial had been held to be without......
  • Mann v. United States, No. 16655
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • May 24, 1962
    ...rule that every dismissal for want of prosecution is necessarily with prejudice announced in District of Columbia v. Healy, D.C.Mun.App., 160 A. 2d 800, is, of course, not binding on this court. Nor is it persuasive, for it is grounded on the fallacy that the defendant gains nothing by dism......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
9 cases
  • Diamond v. Davis, No. 93-CV-1246.
    • United States
    • District of Columbia Court of Appeals of Columbia District
    • February 20, 1996
    ...misrepresentation, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been ascertained at the time" of the alleged fraud); Maddox, supra, 160 A.2d at 800 ("Fraud ... is not discovered when one's prior knowledge is confirmed as correct by another."); cf. Brown v. Lamb, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 316 &......
  • DIAMOND v. DAVIS, No. 93-CV-1246
    • United States
    • District of Columbia Court of Appeals of Columbia District
    • February 20, 1996
    ...misrepresentation, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been ascertained at th[e] time" of the alleged fraud); Maddox, supra, 160 A.2d at 800 ("[F]raud . . . is not discovered when one's prior knowledge is confirmed as correct by another."); cf. Brown v. Lamb, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 314,......
  • Iowa v. Buckley, No. 1--56537
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • August 29, 1975
    ...whether the prosecution would have been barred if the dismissal order had been reversed on appeal. See District of Columbia v. Healy, 160 A.2d 800 Prior to the Johnson case, dismissal of a felony charge for denial of statutory rights to speedy indictment or trial had been held to be without......
  • Mann v. United States, No. 16655
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • May 24, 1962
    ...rule that every dismissal for want of prosecution is necessarily with prejudice announced in District of Columbia v. Healy, D.C.Mun.App., 160 A. 2d 800, is, of course, not binding on this court. Nor is it persuasive, for it is grounded on the fallacy that the defendant gains nothing by dism......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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