Iowa v. Buckley

• Decision Date: 29 August 1975
• Docket Number: No. 1--56537,1--56537
• Citation: 232 N.W.2d 266
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Dennis Benjamin BUCKLEY, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 266

232 N.W.2d 266

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Dennis Benjamin BUCKLEY, Appellee.

No. 1--56537.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Aug. 29, 1975.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Haskins, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Richard A. Williams, County Atty., for appellant.

John P. Mansfield, Humboldt, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

McCORMICK, Justice.

The State appeals from an order of the trial court sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss three felony charges against him for denial of his statutory right to speedy trial under § 795.2, The Code. We hold the trial court erred in dismissing the charges, and we remand the cases for trial.

I. The three charges against defendant were brought in district court by county attorney informations filed April 23, 1973. He was arraigned April 26, 1973. Attorney John P. Mansfield was appointed to represent him. Defendant entered pleas of not guilty to the charges. By mistake on the part of all concerned, he was brought before the court May 21, 1973, and was asked to plead again. He again entered pleas of not guilty.

Defendant did not demand speedy trial. On June 14, 1973, an order was entered setting the three cases for trial on June 26, 1973. On June 22, 1973, the sixtieth day after the county attorney's informations were filed, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges under § 795.2, The Code, by reason of the State's failure to bring him to trial within 60 days after they were instituted in district court. The motion was amended June 25, 1973, to challenge the demand-waiver rule, rejected by this court in State v. Gorham, Iowa, 206 N.W.2d 908, filed April 25, 1973, and to allege denial of his constitutional right to speedy trial. The motion was heard on June 26, 1973, and was sustained.

In relevant part, § 795.2, The Code, provides that, 'If a defendant indicted for a public offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial within sixty days after the indictment is found, the court must order it to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown.' Before the Gorham case was decided, a defendant had to demand a speedy trial to obtain the benefit of the statute, unless he was incarcerated and unrepresented by counsel. State v. Gorham, supra, at 909. Although the defendant here was incarcerated, he was represented by counsel. Since defendant made no demand in these cases, the limitation in the statute is unavailable to him unless the Gorham holding is applicable.

Application of the Gorham holding is limited to 1) the Gorham case, 2) cases then pending on appeal where the demand-waiver rule had been properly challenged in the trial court, and 3) cases in which an indictment was returned or county attorney's information was filed after the filing of the Gorham opinion. 206 N.W.2d at 913. The present cases do not fit any of these categories. These cases are governed by the Pre-Gorham interpretation of § 795.2. Boyle v. Critelli, 230 N.W.2d 495 (Iowa 1975). Under that interpretation, since defendant did not demand speedy trial, the 60 day limitation in § 795.2 never started to run. Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing these cases under the statute.

Defendant's separate contention that the delay in bringing him to trial breached his right to speedy trial under Amendments 6 and 14 of the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 10, of the Iowa Constitution is also without merit. See State v. Kimball, 203 N.W.2d 296, 300--301 (Iowa 1972).

The trial court's order cannot be supported on either ground urged by defendant. The court erred in sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss the cases. Therefore, the court's order must be reversed.

II. The remaining issue is whether the cases can be remanded for trial. Defendant contends remand is barred by our holding in State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974), and by § 793.20, The Code.

In State v. Albertsen, 228 N.W.2d 94 (Iowa 1975), an appeal by the State, we reversed an order dismissing a case for denial of speedy trial and remanded the case for trial. However, no issue was presented in that appeal regarding the State's right to have the case remanded for trial. The issue is squarely presented in this appeal.

Defendant asserts the issue was decided in State v. Johnson, supra. We do not agree. In Johnson the trial court had permitted reprosecution of a defendant on a charge that had been dismissed for denial of his right to speedy trial under Code § 795.2. We said this was error. No appeal had been taken from the order of dismissal. We held a dismissal under § 795.2 for failure to provide a speedy trial is an absolute dismissal, a dismissal with prejudice, prohibiting reprosecution of the offense. We did not decide whether the prosecution would have been barred if the dismissal order had been reversed on appeal. See District of Columbia v. Healy, 160 A.2d 800 (Mun.Ct.App.D.C.1960).

Prior to the Johnson case, dismissal of a felony charge for denial of statutory rights to speedy indictment or trial had been held to be without prejudice. State v. Gebhart, 257 Iowa 843, 134 N.W.2d 906 (1965); State v. Bige, 195 Iowa 1342, 1345, 193 N.W. 17, 19 (1923) ('The defendant had not been placed in jeopardy by the mere returning of the indictment.'); § 5013, Revision of 1860. The new rule in Johnson resulted from our view of policy manifested in the speedy indictment and speedy trial provisions of the Code, in several decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and in ABA Standards, Speedy Trial, § 4.1 (1968).

We must now decide for the first time whether a trial court's dismissal of a case for denial of a defendant's right to speedy trial is a bar to further prosecution of the case when the dismissal is determined upon direct appeal to have been wrong. Such a bar would have to be found either in an extension of the rule of the Johnson case or in Code § 793.20, the statute which imposes restrictions upon the effects of certain State appeals.

Considerations which led to the rule in the Johnson case do not support extending the rule to bar further prosecution when the trial court's order is reversed upon appeal. Nothing in §§ 795.1 and 795.2, The Code, or in our cases interpreting those provisions, signifies a legislative desire to bar resumption of prosecution in such a situation. Nor is that result supported by decisions of the United States Supreme Court or the ABA Standards. In fact, decisions of the Supreme Court and the ABA Standards support an opposite result.

In United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975), the Supreme Court held a conviction may be reinstated when a post-verdict motion to dismiss a federal charge for denial of defendant's constitutional right to speedy indictment is determined upon appeal to have been erroneously sustained. No constitutional barrier exists to remand of a case upon successful appeal by the government when the effect of additional proceedings is that the defendant will be placed in jeopardy on the charge only once. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 43 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975); State v. Bige, supra.

Moreover, the ABA Standards would not foreclose remand for trial. Those standards provide for appeal by the State and remand for trial in this very situation. ABA Standards, Criminal Appeals, § 1.4 (1970).

We have no reason to extend the rule in the Johnson case to bar remand of a case for prosecution when a dismissal for denial of speedy indictment or speedy trial is reversed on appeal. Rather, we believe the interests of justice would be better served if the State were permitted to resume its prosecution upon a successful appeal from a pretrial order erroneously dismissing a criminal charge.

However, we must still determine whether prosecution after reversal of the order of dismissal here is barred by § 793.20, The Code, as alternatively urged by defendant. That section provides:

'If the State appeals, the supreme court cannot reverse or modify the judgment so as to increase the punishment, but may affirm it, and shall point out any error in the proceedings or in the measure of punishment, and its decision shall be obligatory as law.'

Defendant maintains this statute applies to all appeals by the State from final orders. An order of dismissal for denial of speedy indictment or speedy trial is a final order or judgment because it is a dismissal with prejudice under the rule of the Johnson case. Hence, according to the defendant's reasoning, it is necessarily a judgment which § 793.20 says cannot be changed on appeal.

This issue requires examination of the statute in its historical context in the light of familiar principles of statutory interpretation and construction.

Double jeopardy is proscribed by Art. I, § 12, of the Constitution of Iowa, which provides in part that, 'No person shall after acquittal, be tried for the same offence.' This proscription first appeared in the Constitution adopted in 1846.

In the Code of 1851, the defendant in a criminal case was accorded the right of review by writ of error, but not the State. State v. Johnson, 2 Iowa (2 Clarke) 549 (1856). In 1857, the defendant and the State were each granted the right of appeal from a judgment of conviction. Acts 6 G.A., ch. 251, § 1. In the Revision of 1860, both parties were given the right to appeal any judgment, action, or decision of the district court, after final judgment. § 4905 Revision of 1860. The language of § 793.20 was introduced in § 4926 of that Code.

In interpreting and construing this provision, our goal is to ascertain legislative intent. In searching for legislative intent, we consider the object sought to be accomplished and the evil sought to be remedied. We seek a reasonable interpretation and construction which will best effect the purpose of the provision. State v. Prybil, 211 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Iowa 1973). The...