Diversified Computer Services, Inc. v. Town of York

• Decision Date: 22 March 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-2,81-2
• Citation: 104 Ill.App.3d 852,433 N.E.2d 726,60 Ill.Dec. 684
• Parties: , 60 Ill.Dec. 684 DIVERSIFIED COMPUTER SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff- Appellee, v. TOWN OF YORK, a Municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 726

433 N.E.2d 726

104 Ill.App.3d 852, 60 Ill.Dec. 684

DIVERSIFIED COMPUTER SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation Plaintiff- Appellee, v. TOWN OF YORK, a Municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 81-2.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

March 22, 1982.

Barry E. Garley, Oak Brook, J. Edward Vertovec, Elmhurst, Jack M. Siegel, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Bell, Boyd, Haddad & Burns, John P. Scotellaro, Larry L. Thompson, Chicago, and Robert Radasevich, for plaintiff-appellee.

NASH, Justice:

Defendant, Town of York (the Township), appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of DuPage County entered upon the verdict of a jury finding it to be in breach of contract and awarding damages to plaintiff, Diversified Computer Services, Inc. (DCS), of $165,500, together with attorney's fees of $80,000 and $19,315.89 for prejudgment interest. The primary issue presented is whether the township was authorized to enter into a contract for the purchase of computer components, programs and maintenance services, to be paid for over a five-year period, where no full, prior appropriation had been made for that purpose. We conclude the township was not so authorized and accordingly reverse.

Lester Swailes, the York Township Assessor, sought to improve the operation of his office by installation of a computer system. He entered into negotiations with DCS, which is in the business of selling and leasing computer systems, and, because of budgeting considerations, he expressed interest in a multi-year lease arrangement with an option to purchase. The town board was kept apprised of the progress of these discussions, and the proposed system was demonstrated before it. The assessor advised the town board his office needed the system and that it would be more economical than using the DuPage County computer services as it had in the past.

On March 8, 1977, Swailes and representatives of DCS appeared before the town board of auditors and requested that it approve contracts for the lease-purchase of a computer system from DCS. The minutes of the board meeting reflect that the contracts between Assessor Swailes and DCS were presented to the board, voted upon and approved by it. The necessary documents were thereafter executed by Swailes on behalf of the "York Township Assessor's Office"; they provided for the payment to DCS of $3,900 each month commencing in March 1977 and continuing for a period of 60 months, with the payments to be applied toward the total purchase price of $175,250 for the computer system at the expiration of the lease. DCS was authorized by the terms of the agreement, on default of the township, to terminate the lease and declare all unpaid installments immediately due and payable. The contract also provided for the recovery of costs and attorney's fees incurred by DCS in enforcing its terms.

Because of space limitations in the assessor's office, it was agreed between Swailes and DCS that the computer equipment would be maintained in DCS's office and a terminal installed in Swailes' office linked to it. They apparently further agreed that DCS would also apply its own equipment to the services as a back-up, if necessary, until such time as space for it became available in the assessor's office.

This arrangement between DCS, the township and the assessor operated without incident for several months. Funds for the initial monthly payments due under the lease were included in the annual budget and appropriation ordinances adopted for the years 1977 and 1978 by the town board of auditors, as reconstituted after the April 1977 town election,[104 Ill.App.3d 854] and 15 monthly payments of $3,900 each were made to DCS through May 1978 pursuant to the terms of the agreement. The town board, however, thereafter expressed dissatisfaction with the equipment believing it to be of greater capacity than was required for the assessor's needs and also questioning whether other agencies were making use of it in addition to the assessor. The town board declined to approve the June 1978 payment to DCS, and no further payments were made thereafter under the lease-purchase agreement. DCS served notice the township was in default and then brought this action for breach of contract to recover the remaining payments due under its 60-month term, together with its attorney's fees and costs. The township counterclaimed for recovery of the payments it had made under the agreement on the grounds it was invalid and, alternately, alleged that the agreement was breached by DCS by its failure to make prompt delivery and provide exclusive use of the equipment to the assessor's office.

At the close of all the evidence, the trial court directed findings that a valid contract existed between the parties and that the township had waived its rights relating to the delivery and exclusive use of the equipment. The sole issue submitted to the jury was whether the assessor had been induced to waive the delivery and exclusive use provisions of the agreement by fraudulent representations attributable to DCS, and the question of damages, if any. The jury returned a verdict in favor of DCS for damages and attorney's fees after which the court entered judgment thereon and also awarded prejudgment interest.

Initially, we consider DCS's argument that the issue of whether the township had the power to enter into a contract for which no full, prior appropriation had been made has been presented for the first time on appeal and is thereby waived.

It is true this issue, as now framed, was not raised in the trial court; while the township did attack the validity of the agreement, it did not do so in the present terms. Nevertheless, it has been held that a claim of illegality of an agreement can properly be considered although raised for the first time on review, as the courts may not be called upon to adjudicate rights growing out of an agreement which is void as against public policy or in violation of the public law. (Lind v. Spannuth (1956), 9 Ill.2d 311, 316, 137 N.E.2d 360, 362; Pietsch v. Pietsch (1910), 245 Ill. 454, 459, 92 N.E. 325, 327; see Lasko v. Meier (1946), 394 Ill. 71, 67 N.E.2d 162.) Also, while this specific issue was not included in a post-trial motion, the question of the validity of the contract was one of law for the trial court and it directed a finding adverse to the township thereby excusing its failure to raise that issue in a post-trial motion. (See Robbins v. Professional Construction Co. (1978), 72 Ill.2d 215, 20 Ill.Dec. 577, 380 N.E.2d 786; Keen v. Davis (1967), 38 Ill.2d 280, 230 N.E.2d 859; E. M. Melahn Construction Co. v. Village of Carpentersville (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 544, 56 Ill.Dec. 101, 427 N.E.2d 181, leave to appeal denied.) Moreover, it must be recognized that while the litigants are bound by rules of waiver the courts are not similarly barred when it may be proper to override them to achieve a just result or maintain a uniform body of precedent in a case of public importance. (Wozniak v. Segal (1974), 56 Ill.2d 457, 460-61, 308 N.E.2d 611, 612-13; Hux v. Raben (1967), 38 Ill.2d 223, 225, 230 N.E.2d 831, 832.) We choose to consider the merits of the issue of whether a township has authority to enter into a multi-year contract for which funds have not been fully appropriated.

In response to this question, DCS argues that as neither the Township Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 139, pars. 1 et seq.), nor any other statute, restricts the power of a town board of auditors to bind a township to the type of contract here considered that it is enforceable, citing 9 Ill.L. & Prac., Cities & Villages, § 663 (1954); City of Rock Island v. Central Union Telephone Co. (1907), 132 Ill.App. 248; Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. City of Centralia (E.D.Ill.1935), 11 F.Supp. 874, remanded (7th Cir. 1937), 89 F.2d 985. Each of these cases, however, was concerned with public utility franchises for telephone and electrical services and were limited in their application to contracts permitting the long-term arrangements necessary to provide such services. Neither case involved an appropriation of funds by a municipality or any obligation to expend public funds; they therefore do not assist in the resolution of the present issue.

The township contends the lease-purchase agreement was ultra vires and void as it constituted a promise to expend public funds which had not yet been appropriated for that purpose. The township refers to the Illinois Municipal Budget Law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 85, pars. 801-805) which requires a township to adopt an annual budget and appropriation ordinance in the first quarter of each fiscal year specifying the objects and purposes for which such appropriations are being made and the amount appropriated for each such object or purpose; it also generally prohibits any additional appropriation and provides for notice to the taxpayers and a public hearing prior to passage of the appropriation ordinance. The township argues that the Illinois Municipal Budget Law may be considered on the same basis as the more specific, but similar, statute regulating appropriations and expenditures of those governmental bodies which are subject to the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 24, pars. 1-1-1 et seq.). Section 8-1-7 of the Code provides that "(n)o contract shall be made by the corporate authorities * * * unless an appropriation has been previously made concerning that contract" and that a contract not supported by a prior appropriation is "null and void as to the municipality". It is apparent DCS would be barred from recovery under its lease-purchase agreement if townships were governed by the Municipal Code. (See Chicago Patrolmen's Association v. City of Chicago (1974), 56 Ill.2d 503, 309 N.E.2d 3, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 839, 95 S.Ct. 68, 42 L.Ed.2d 66; Koudelka v. Village of Woodridge (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 884, 46 Ill.Dec. 268, 413 N.E.2d 1381; Guerine v. City of...