Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Standard Coil Products Co.
| Decision Date | 04 October 1955 |
| Citation | 288 P.2d 637,136 Cal.App.2d Supp. 919 |
| Court | California Superior Court |
| Parties | 136 Cal.App.2d Supp. 919, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2003 DIVISION OF LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, Department of Industrial Relations, State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STANDARD COLL PRODUCTS CO., Inc., etc., Defendant and Appellant. C. A. 8783. Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California |
Chase, Rotchford, Downen & Drukker, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Pauline Nightingale, Edward M. Belasco and Leon H. Berger, Los Angeles, for respondent.
The assignors of the plaintiff were discharged from their employment by defendant corporation, and plaintiff now seeks two weeks' vacation pay claimed to be due them. The trial court awarded $626.40, the amount prayed for in the complaint, and defendant appeals.
The contention of the appellant is that the employment of plaintiff's assignors on June 1, 1944 was a condition precedent to their right to vacation pay. In order to establish this the contract between appellant and the Union setting forth the terms and conditions of employment was offered into evidence by appellant, and was rejected. Appellant contends that this ruling was error. We conclude that this contention must be sustained. While this contract was not in evidence, it has been placed in the record on appeal, so that we are able to review its contents.
Contrary to respondent's claim, this collective bargaining agreement was admissible under the general denial. 'A contract of employment different from the one alleged by the employee in his action to recover compensation for his services, or any terms of the alleged contract, which would operate to bar his recovery, may be shown under the general issue or denial * * *.' 56 C.J.S., Master and Servant, § 128 b, p. 574. To similar effect see 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 549 b, p. 1186. And 'It is firmly established by the decisions that the best evidence of the contents of a writing is the writing itself.' 18 Cal.Jur.2d 659; Code of Civil Procedure, § 1855; Sublett v. Henery's, etc., Lunch, 1942, 21 Cal.2d 273, 275, 131 P.2d 369.
The contract in question was relevant and material as to the rights of the employees, both union and non-union members. Although the collective bargaining agreement is in its inception a contract separate from the contract of employment, it may be incorporated into the separate contracts of hiring of the employees. MacKay v. Loew's, Inc., 9 Cir., 1850, 182 F.2d 170, 172, 18 A.L.R.2d 348. It is in the nature of a general offer, and an individual who accepts employment or continues his employment, after it becomes effective, does so on the terms and conditions thereby fixed. See cases cited in note 95 A.L.R. 40, 41. When the agreement purports to cover all employees, non-union members who adopt it are fully bound and protected by it. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Webb, 5 Cir., 1933, 64 F.2d 902, 904; Gregg v. Starks, 1920, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459, 461.
The collective bargaining agreement here does not apply to all of appellant's employees, but is limited to employees of certain classes, for whom the 'company [appellant] recognizes the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent.' One of plaintiff's assignors, McKeon, was not a part of this bargaining unit, and his case will be separately considered.
The other assignors, four in number, were within the description of the bargaining unit. They were all employed and joined the Union prior to the date of the contract, December 13, 1952, and remained members of the Union and in the same employment for some time after the contract was executed, with knowledge of its terms. Thereafter, by dealings to be considered later, they were removed from the bargaining unit and withdrew from the Union.
Under the rule already stated the collective bargaining agreement applied to and governed the relations between the appellant and these four employees, as far as its terms extended. It is respondent's claim that when these four were originally employed, certain oral agreements were made between them and the appellant, under which they were entitled to the vacation pay sued for. But these oral agreements were made long before the collective bargaining agreement, and it is clear to us that it was the intention of the latter agreement to terminate all previous arrangements regarding vacations. Moreover, on examining the testimony as to these oral agreements, we do not find that they are inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreements. While the oral agreements provided for vacations, they did not declare when they were to be taken, and the actual vacations allowed the employees under them were taken at the times specified in the collective bargaining agreement and would have been permitted by it.
The collective bargaining agreement contains many provisions regarding hours and times of work, rates of pay, seniority, and other matters affecting employment, and contains one whole Article entitled 'Vacations and Holidays.' Section 2 of this Article provides: 'The Company will grant vacation with pay to each employee in accordance with the following conditions: (a) In order for any employee to receive vacation pay under this Article, the employee must be in the active employ of the Company (not laid off, absent, resigned or dismissed or on leave) at the start of the vacation period as defined in this Article.' Section 1 of the same Article provides: There is no doubt or ambiguity about the meaning of these provisions. While it is true that 'Courts are disinclined to construe the stipulations of a contract as conditions precedent, unless compelled by the language of the contract plainly expressed' 'Division of Labor Law Enforcement, Department of Industrial Relations v. Ryan Aero. Co., 1951, 106 Cal.App.2d Supp. 833, 835, 236 P.2d 236, 30 A.L.R.2d 347, yet in this case we are so compelled. To be entitled to a vacation in any year an employee must be 'in the active employ of the company' on June 1 of...
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