Dixon v. Commonwealth
| Citation | 172 S.E. 277 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Virginia |
| Decision Date | 11 January 1934 |
| Parties | DIXON. v. COMMONWEALTH. |
Error to Corporation Court of Lynchburg.
Clemon Dixon was convicted of murder, and he brings error.
Reversed and remanded.
Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, EPES, HUDGINS, GREGORY, BROWNING, and CHINN, JJ.
A. S. Hester and John D. Easley, both of Lynchburg, for plaintiff in error.
John R. Saunders, Atty. Gen., and Edwin H. Gibson and Collins Denny, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
The plaintiff in error, Clemon Dixon, was arraigned in the corporation court of the city of Lynchburg upon an indictment which charges "that Clemon Dixon, on the 24th day of February, * * '* 1933, within said city, unlawfully and feloniously did kill and murder one William Haas."
Upon his arraignment the accused pleaded "guilty"; and thereupon the court impaneled a jury to try the case. After hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, the jury returned the following verdict: "We, the jury, find the prisoner guilty of first degree murder as charged in the within indictment and fix his punishment at death." The court entered judgment upon this verdict, sentencing the accused to death by electrocution.
So far as the record discloses, the accused made no objection to anything' that was done by the court, nor was a motion made to set aside the verdict.
The accused is here contending that he is entitled to have the judgment of the court, reversed and to be awarded a new trial, because the court submitted his case to a jury instead of trying him itself, without the Intervention of a jury.
Section 8, art. 1, of the Constitution of Virginia, as it read prior to the amendment of 1928, and section 4900, Code Va. 1919, so far as they are here material, and section 4919, Code Va. 1919, read as follows:
Article 1, § 8, Const, of Va.: " * * * In all criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty; provided, however, that in any criminal case, upon a plea of guilty, tendered in person by the accused, and with the consent of the attorney for the Commonwealth, entered of record, the court shall, and in a prosecution for an offence not punishable by death, or confinement in the penitentiary, upon a plea of not guilty, with the consent of the accused, given in person, and of the attorney for the Commonwealth, both entered of record, the court, in its discretion, may hear and determine the case, without the intervention of a jury." (Italics ours.)
by certain named sections "or any other statute relating to crimes and punishments." (Italics ours.)
Section 4919, Code Va. 1919: (Italics ours.) '
Under these sections of the Constitution and the Code, this question (which was not decided in any of the opinions handed down by this court) was raised: Where a person indicted for murder pleads guilty to the indictment, and the attorney for the commonwealth consents that the court shall try him without the intervention of a jury, is it mandatory that the court shall try him and fix his puro-ishment, or is it left to the...
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Pruett v. Thompson
...analysis in similar fact situations). This argument rests entirely on the fact that Pruett's appeal brief cited Dixon v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1098, 172 S.E. 277 (1934) and Fogg v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 164, 207 S.E.2d 847 The former case dealt entirely with the construction of a portion of......
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Stonebreaker v. Smyth
...in mitigation of the offense; after which the trial judge alone determines the measure of punishment. It was said in Dixon v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1098, 172 S.E. 277, 278: "The accused and the public were both entitled to the independent judgment of the court upon the degree of his guilt a......
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Stonebreaker v. Smyth
...in mitigation of the offense; after which the trial judge alone determines the measure of punishment. It was said in Dixon Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1098, 172 S.E. 277: "The accused and the public were both entitled to the independent judgment of the court upon the degree of his guilt and the p......
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Hobson v. Youell
...practice is permissible under the change in the statute, it is a practice that may be abused and should not be extended. In Dixon v. Com, 161 Va. 1098, 172 S.E. 277, we held it reversible error for the trial court to impanel a jury to determine the extent of the punishment in a case in whic......
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Judicial suicide or constitutional autonomy? A capital defendant's right to plead guilty.
...was given under duress and the defendant was not advised of his rights, thus, his guilty plea was not voluntary); Dixon v. Commonwealth, 172 S.E. 277, 278 (Va. 1934) (reversing the lower court's decision and awarding a new trial because the defendant had a right to have the court determine ......