Dixon v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 30 March 1961
• Docket Number: No. 2649.,2649.
• Citation: 168 A.2d 905
• Parties: Marietta M. DIXON, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

168 A.2d 905

Marietta M. DIXON, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee.

No. 2649.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued December 5, 1960.

Decided March 30, 1961.

Curtis P. Mitchell, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

H. Thomas Sisk, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom Chester H. Gray, Corp. Counsel, Milton D. Korman, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Hubert B. .Pair, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges, and CAYTON (Chief Judge, Retired) sitting by designation under Code § 11-776(b).

QUINN, Associate Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant sustained bodily injury when she allegedly tripped over a hole in a public street. She brought this suit for damages, charging the District with negligent maintenance of the roadway. Government motions for directed verdict made at the end of the plaintiff's case and later at the close of all the evidence were denied. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. The trial court, however, without stating its reasons therefor, set aside the verdict, entering judgment non obstante veredicto in favor of defendant-appellee. This is an appeal from that judgment.

The facts are brief. The incident occurred in April 1957 as appellant stepped from the sidewalk to cross a street. She attempted to avoid a small pool of water which had collected in the gutter and caught her foot in a hole, causing a fall and resulting injury. A number of photographs, illustrating a section of the gutter lined with crevices and ruts, were introduced into evidence showing the accident site. A passer-by, who had witnessed appellant's fall and had come to her assistance, testified that the area had been in a "rough and cracked" condition since 1954.

The Inspector of Claims for the District acknowledged receiving written notice in May 1957 that appellant "was caused to fall as a result of a faulty condition in the sidewalk in front of the premises" at 624 T Street, Northwest. But examining this area, he testified that he could not find the defect complained of. Not until November, more than six months after the accident, did he receive the photographs from appellant disclosing that the "faulty condition" was situated in the gutter, not the sidewalk.

Our Code Section 12-208 bars suit for unliquidated damages against the District "unless the claimant within six months after the injury * * * gave notice in writing to the commissioners of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of such injury * * *." In support of the judgment n.o.v. the Government maintains that appellant's failure to correctly designate the place of her accident invalidated the notice sent pursuant to this provision. It is asserted that the letter of notice mistakenly identifying the site as the sidewalk in front of 624 T Street, Northwest, instead of the roadway, prejudiced preparation of the defense.

For the first time on appeal the Government directly attacks a Section 12-208 notice as being misleading and prejudicial as well as imperfect. In Hurd v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App. 1954, 106 A.2d 702, two such notices, inaccurately stating the place of injury, led to dismissal of the claimant's suit though the District's investigation was admittedly not impaired by the misinformation. We reversed, holding that the two notices, read together, furnished sufficient information so that District authorities could have discovered the right place without other assistance. As we pointed out, all adequate notice need do is "describe the situs of the injury in such a manner as to reasonable enable the investigating agency to find it." Hurd v. District of Columbia, supra, 106 A.2d at page 704. Since the notices met this standard without any prejudice resulting to the District, there was sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement.

The same test was announced in Stone v. District of Columbia which declared that "* * * notice fully complies with the purpose of the statute when it...