Dixon v. Federal Farm Mortg. Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1939
• Docket Number: 12593.
• Citation: 1 S.E.2d 732,187 Ga. 660
• Parties: DIXON et al. v. FEDERAL FARM MORTGAGE CORPORATION.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

1 S.E.2d 732

187 Ga. 660

DIXON et al. v. FEDERAL FARM MORTGAGE CORPORATION.

No. 12593.

Supreme Court of Georgia

March 8, 1939

Syllabus by the Court.

1. It is well settled that a former decision of this court in the same case becomes the law of that case, and can not thereafter, upon a subsequent appeal, be modified or overruled.

2. Where a party executes an instrument which is in form and substance an offer to purchase certain described real estate on specified terms, and it is therein provided that the offeree's acceptance of the offer to purchase 'must be in writing,' and, further, that the acceptance of the offer to purchase, to be valid, must be approved by the offeree's 'executive committee,' an endorsement of acceptance on the instrument by the proper authorities on behalf of the offeree does not constitute a binding contract unless and until the acceptance so required by the instrument be communicated to the offerer. A statement made by an agent of the offeree to the offerer, after the actual entry of such acceptance on the offer, that he (the offeree) had purchased the property and could consider the trade closed, which was not in fact made, nor represented to be made by such agent with knowledge of and pursuant to such entry of acceptance does not create a binding contract under the above rule.

3. The amendment setting up fraud in the procurement of the offer was not supported by any evidence.

4. The trial judge did not err in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the possession of the land sued for.

To an action in ejectment by the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, T. A. Dixon, the defendant, set up an alleged contract of purchase of the land from the plaintiff,--partial payment of the purchase money, and possession thereunder. This is the second appearance of the case in this court. On its first appearance it was decided that the evidence demanded a verdict for the plaintiff, and that the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant decreeing specific performance of the alleged contract of purchase was erroneous. 185 Ga. 466, 195 S.E. 414. For a detailed statement of the pleadings and the evidence on the first trial, reference to that decision may be had. When the case was returned to the trial court the defendant offered an amendment to its answer which was allowed. A new trial was had, and after ruling out certain evidence the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant excepts to the overruling of his motion for new trial.

R. Earl Camp and L. F. Watson, both of Dublin, and A. S. Boone, Jr., of Irwinton, for plaintiffs in error.

Victor Davidson, of Irwinton, for defendant in error.

REID Chief Justice.

1. The former decision of this court is in the main controlling on the present appeal, for the facts developed at the second trial were not substantially and materially different from those that appeared at the first trial. However, counsel for the defendant request that the former decision be modified or overruled. This request can not be entertained. It is well settled that a former decision of this court in the same case becomes the law of that case, and can not thereafter, upon a subsequent appeal, be modified or overruled. Rawlins v. State, 126 Ga. 96, 54 S.E. 924; Allen v. Schweigert, 113 Ga. 69, 38 S.E. 397; Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Third National Bank, 125 Ga. 489, 54 S.E. 621; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Glawson, 140 Ga. 507, 79 S.E. 136, and citations.

2. Under the view that we take of the case, we need not direct ourselves specifically to the assignments of error complaining of the rejection of evidence, for had the court allowed its introduction a verdict would still have been demanded in favor of the plaintiff. In the former decision this court held, in effect, that where a party executed an instrument which in form and substance was an offer to purchase certain described real estate, on terms stated therein, wherein it was provided that the offeree's acceptance of the offer to purchase 'must be in writing,' and, further, that the acceptance of the offer to purchase to be valid must be approved by its executive committee, the mere endorsement of acceptance on the instrument by the proper authorities on behalf of the offeree did not constitute a binding contract unless and until the acceptance so required by the instrument be communicated to the offerer. In such case the offeree had the right, at any time before communication of its acceptance to the offerer, to rescind its previous entry of approval and acceptance and reject the offer. The court cited many authorities which fully sustain the ruling there made.

On the former trial the defendant testified that at the time he executed the above instrument the agent of the plaintiff with whom he dealt in the matter, informed him...