Dixon v. Gassert

• Decision Date: 20 January 1958
• Docket Number: No. A--57,A--57
• Citation: 138 A.2d 14,26 N.J. 1
• Parties: Edgar I. DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Louise Gales, Plaintiff, v. Frederick J. GASSERT, Jr., Director of The Division of Motor Vehicles in the Department of Law and Public Safety, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 1

26 N.J. 1

138 A.2d 14

Edgar I. DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant and Louise Gales, Plaintiff, v. Frederick J. GASSERT, Jr., Director of The Division of Motor Vehicles in the Department of Law and Public Safety, Defendant-Respondent.

No. A--57.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Dec. 16, 1957.

Decided Jan. 20, 1958.

Charles A. Cohen, Camden, for appellant (E. George Aaron, Camden, attorney).

Peter J. Devine, Jr., Camden, for respondent (Orlando, Kisselman & Devine, Camden, attorneys).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PROCTOR, J.

This appeal presents for determination the effect and meaning of certain provisions of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law. N.J.S.A. 39:6--61 et seq. Specifically, the question is whether payments made under an accident and health policy, and payments made by 'Blue Cross' under a hospitalization contract, constitute 'indemnity or other benefits' which are deductible from the maximum amount payable to a claimant pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6--70(m) and N.J.S.A. 39:6--84.

On November 12, 1955 plaintiffs Edgar I. Dixon and Louise Gales, both residents of New Jersey, while standing on a public street in Camden, were struck by a motor vehicle, thereby sustaining personal injuries. The motor vehicle continued on its way, and its identity and the identity of its owner and operator could not be ascertained. Thereafter, plaintiffs brought an action in the Superior Court, Law Division, against the defendant, the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 39:6--78 which prescribes the remedy for the relief of 'hit-and-run' victims. After trial and jury verdicts, judgments were entered against the Director in the amount of $25,000 for Dixon and $10,000 for Mrs. Gales.

Upon appropriate proceedings as prescribed by N.J.S.A. 39:6--84 the court issued an order directing the State Treasurer, acting as Custodian of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund, to make payments out of the Fund of $2,791.55 to Dixon and $5,000 to Mrs. Gales, plus costs. N.J.S.A. 39:6--84 limits the maximum amount payable to a claimant out of the Fund to $5,000. The court's order limiting Dixon's recovery to $2,791.55 was based on its finding that he had already received payments and benefits amounting to $2,208.45 for his injuries and that these payments should be deducted from the $5,000 maximum. The payments deducted consisted of the following items:

'(a) 26 weekly payments of $35.00 each, amounting in all to $910.00, paid to said Dixon by the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company under a certain accident and health insurance policy furnished and paid for by his employer, National Waterproof Papers, Inc., C.T.C. Industries, Inc., at no expense to the employees, said payments being made by the Insurance Company during part of the period said Dixon was disabled and unable to pursue his employment because of the injuries suffered by him in said accident;

'(b) $250.00 medical payments paid by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company under a certain Group Policy No. 54705--G.T.C., issued to said Dixon's employer, National Waterproof Papers, Inc., C.T.C. Industries, Inc., furnished and paid for by said employer at no expense to the employees, said payment being made by the Insurance Company to Dr. George Grenhart for medical treatment rendered to said Dixon because of the injuries suffered by him in said accident.

'(c) $1,048.45 paid by 'Blue Cross', that is, The Associated Hospital Service of Philadelphia, to the West Jersey Hospital, Camden, New Jersey, on account of the hospital bill to said Dixon for services rendered him because of the injuries suffered by him in said accident, the cost of which 'Blue Cross' coverage was paid entirely by said Dixon.'

Dixon alone has appealed contending that he was entitled to the maximum of $5,000 under N.J.S.A. 39:6--84 and that the deduction of the above mentioned payments was improper.

While the case was pending in the Appellate Division we certified it on our own motion.

The purpose of N.J.S.A. 39:6--61 et seq. is to provide a measure of relief to persons who sustain losses inflicted by financially irresponsible or unknown owners and operators of motor vehicles, where such persons would otherwise be remediless. But this statute is not one of general application to all classes of claimants. It does not extend to a person who is entitled to workmen's compensation, or is a spouse, parent or child of the judgment debtor, or was a guest occupant in the automobile, or was himself operating or riding in an uninsured motor vehicle owned by him or his spouse, parent or child, or was operating a motor vehicle in violation of an order of suspension of revocation. N.J.S.A. 39:6--70. Moreover, even within the class of persons who qualify for relief, further limitations are imposed upon the amounts recoverable from the Fund. N.J.S.A. 39:6--70(m) and N.J.S.A. 39:6--84. It is with these limitations that we are concerned.

N.J.S.A. 39:6--69 provides that upon recovery of a judgment, which is non-collectible, a person qualified under the statute may apply to the court in which the judgment was entered for an order directing payment out of the Fund, up to a maximum of $5,000. N.J.S.A. 39:6--70 provides that upon such application the court shall proceed in a summary manner, and upon the hearing thereof the applicant must show certain facts, among which are:

'(m) Whether he has recovered a judgment in an action against any other person against whom he has a cause of action in respect of his damages for bodily injury or death or damage to property arising out of the accident and stating the amounts recovered upon such judgments or the amounts, if any, received for indemnity or other benefits for such injury or death or damage to property from any person other than the operator or owner of the motor vehicle causing such injury, death or damage.'

N.J.S.A. 39:6--71 provides that after the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6--70 have been satisfied by the claimant the court shall make an order directing payment out of the Fund.

The above procedure requires that a judgment first be obtained against a known tortfeasor, which proves to be uncollectible, before resort may be made to the Fund. However, the statute also specifies a procedure to be followed in a 'hit-and-run' case, such as this, where the plaintiff is unable to obtain a judgment because the tortfeasor's identity is unknown. N.J.S.A. 39:6--78 to --85. In this situation the plaintiff may bring his action against the Director in the first instance. N.J.S.A. 39:6--78. N.J.S.A. 39:6--84 provides...