Dixon v. Henderson

Decision Date22 April 1954
Docket NumberNo. 6739,6739
PartiesDIXON et al. v. HENDERSON et al.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Gossett & Gossett, Henry O. Gossett, Longview, for appellants.

Smead & Harbour, Longview, for appellees.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

A deed executed by F. L. Dixon on March 9, 1925, filed for record October 7, 1930, purports to convey to M. B. Henderson in fee simple a 50-acre tract of land out of the P. P. Rains Survey in Gregg County, Texas, the tract here in controversy, with general warranty of title. The 'premises' in this deed as to the grantors' reads: 'That we, F. L. Dixon (commonly known as Phil Dixon) and wife Bettie Dixon.' The latter did not sign or acknowledge the deed. She was the second wife of F. L. Dixon and owned no interest in the fee. A clause in this deed which immediately follows the field notes, reads: 'It is intended herein to convey only such interest to which the undersigned are entitled out of the community estate of F. L. Dixon and his deceased wife Eliza Dixon.' The tract of land was the community property of F. L. Dixon and his wife Eliza Dixon, who are the common source of title.

Appellants, Mattie Dixon, a feme sole, and others as later herein shown, the plaintiffs below, are all the heirs at law of Eliza Dixon, who died intestate January 22, 1917, and of F. L. Dixon, the father, who died intestate in July, 1927. Bettie who married F. L. Dixon in January, 1918, died intestate in June, 1931, without issue. Appellees M. B. Henderson, above named grantee, and his wife are the defendants in this suit filed January 21, 1953.

We are in accord with the trial court's conclusion of law, which litigants recognize, that they became tenants in common in the tract as of March 9, 1925, the date of execution and delivery of the deed. Plaintiffs alleged such co-tenancy and that such relationship 'had peacefully continued through the years without any overt act in repudiation or assertion of any adverse claim hostile to plaintiffs' one-half interest, either by actual or constructive notice' until an oil and gas lease executed by defendants to Cargile and Flewellen was filed for record December 1, 1952. In their prayer they sought removal of cloud on title and for partition. Settlement was had on the lease, and Cargile and Flewellen were dismissed from the suit. This lease is not a part of this record, but we assume that it was filed for record December 1, 1952. Defendants asserted title under the ten year and twenty-five year statutes of limitation, articles 5510 and 5519a, R.C.S. of Texas, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. arts. 5510, 5519a. Grounded on establishment of title under the ten year statute of limitation, art. 5510, supra, the judgment decreed that plaintiffs take nothing in this cause. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed.

The trial court's sixth conclusion of law which in all material elements embraces and includes the court's conclusions of law Nos. 4 and 7, and the 24th finding of fact, all of which are attacked under appellants' first three points and which constitute the heart of the issue on appeal, reads: 'Subsequent to the date of accrual of their action and for more than ten years prior to the institution of this suit, Lillie Ann Pruitt, Artensie Coby, Lawrence H. (Hence) Dixon, Plez Dixon, Oliver Dixon, Tom Dixon and F. L. Dixon, Jr., either had actual knowledge of the fact that M. B. Henderson and his wife Gladys Henderson were claiming the property in controversy adverse to them, or in the absence of such actual knowledge, it is presumed that they had knowledge of such adverse claim because of the unequivocal notoriety of the adverse claim, possession, use and occupancy had and asserted by M. B. Henderson and his wife, Gladys.'

The trial court's finding of fact No. 24, reads: 'M. B. Henderson and wife, Gladys Henderson, have had and held peaceful and adverse possession of the tract in controversy, cultivating, using or enjoying the same for more than ten years after the cause of action, if any, of F. L. Dixon, Jr., Tom Dixon, Oliver Dixon, Lawrence H. (Hence) Dixon, Addie Dixon, Plez Dixon, Mattie Dixon, Artensie Coby, Levi Coby, Aron Pruitt and Lillie Ann Pruitt accrued and before the commencement of this suit.'

The summary which follows represents the character of the evidence in support of the court's extensive findings of fact upon which the conclusions of law were based.

Shortly after delivery of the deed in March, 1925, F. L. Dixon and Bettie, his wife, moved to another farm in the area. Henderson and wife then moved in and established their residence there. During the period of over 27 years that has elapsed, appellees completely fenced the tract and continuously maintained the fences; made improvements from time to time such as the construction of barns, outhouses and tenant houses. Shortly after moving on the tract, appellees rebuilt the home dwelling. They dug wells. They sold timber off of it. They sold gravel off of several areas in the tract from time to time to Gregg County and collected the proceeds from such sales. An instrument, styled 'Lease and Mining Right' which appellees executed to Gregg County which dealt with the sale of gravel, sand and clay off of an acre, 'same being at the old home place' on the tract, was recorded January 31, 1936, in the Gregg County deed records. Since the delivery of the deed appellees have cultivated, pastured and otherwise used and enjoyed the tract in its entirety each and every year. During the same period appellees have retained for themselves all rents, revenues and benefits arising out of the possession, use and occupancy of the tract each and every year. They paid the taxes for every year, but at times have been delinquent. Plaintiffs paid no taxes on the tract during the period.

Tom Dixon, a plaintiff, on the date of the deed, prior thereto and at all times subsequent thereto, was an inmate of a penitentiary in Minnesota, serving a life term. The testimony does not disclose the residence of F. L. Dixon, Jr., other than at some indefinite date he was in Minnesota. The other named plaintiffs during the period since 1925 have resided within the immediate vicinity of the tract and had actual knowledge of appellees' residence thereon and of the latters' use, cultivation and enjoyment of the tract. During the period that elapsed between the date of the deed in 1925 until this suit was filed in 1953 no plaintiff had ever received from or demanded of appellees any portion of any revenue derived from the use of the tract or from the sale of timber or gravel. They never made any demand on appellees prior to the suit of any claim to any part of the land nor raised any objections to appellees' exclusive use, occupancy and enjoyment of the tract. Four of the plaintiffs, namely, O. L. Dixon, L. H. Dixon, Artensie Coby and Lillie Ann Pruitt executed a power of attorney in January, 1931, forthwith filed for record, about 22 years prior to suit, wherein they authorized an attorney to clear title and sell certain mineral interests in the tract.

The testimony of various residents in the area corroborate appellees' long-continued use and occupancy of the tract as herein-above mentioned. And according to them it was common knowledge in the community that the property in question belonged to M. B. Henderson and that since the date he acquired it, they had never heard of any person other than M. B. Henderson assert any type, kind or character of claim to any part of the tract until this suit was filed, and that to their knowledge no person had ever been in possession of or used any portion of the tract from and after 1925 except M. B. Henderson and his tenants.

It was Henderson's testimony that he had claimed and asserted title to the whole tract continuously from the date he entered into possession and was unaware of the legal meaning of the limitation mentioned in the deed or that such clause was in it until shortly before suit. As a matter of law, though, he was charged with notice that only the interest of F. L. Dixon was so conveyed to him,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Sachs v. Board of Trustees of Town of Cebolleta Land Grant
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • November 22, 1978
    ...Hunsley v. Valter, 12 Ill.2d 608, 147 N.E.2d 356 (1958); Smith v. Nyreen, 81 N.W.2d 769 (N.D.1957); Dixon v. Henderson, 267 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Civ.App.1954). Also, when title to the surface passes by adverse possession (to which acquiescence is analogous and frequently compared, see, e. g., St......
  • Sachs v. Board of Trustees of Town of Cebolleta Land Grant, KERR-M
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • November 16, 1976
    ...Hunsley v. Valter, 12 Ill.2d 608, 147 N.E.2d 356 (1958); Smith v. Nyreen, 81 N.W.2d 769 (N.D.1957); Dixon v. Henderson, 267 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Civ.App.1954). Also, when title to the surface passes by adverse possession (to which acquiescence is analogous and frequently compared, see, e.g., Sta......
  • Johnson v. Gray
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1966
    ...minerals by the owner of a fee simple estate will only effect a severance of the fractional interest so conveyed or reserved. Dixon v. Henderson, 267 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Civ.App.); Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Develop. Co., 132 Tex. 413, 123 S.W.2d 290, 291, 300; Henderson v. Chesley, su......
  • TV Azteca v. Ruiz
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • January 9, 2020
    ...rule); Lerma v. Pecorino , 822 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (disability of imprisonment); Dixon v. Henderson , 267 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1954, no writ) (disability of imprisonment). A review of appellants' third amended petition establishes ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT