Dixon v. People ex rel. Elliott

• Decision Date: 25 October 1912
• Citation: 53 Colo. 527,127 P. 930
• Parties: DIXON v. PEOPLE ex rel. ELLIOTT, Dist. Atty.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

127 P. 930

53 Colo. 527

DIXON v. PEOPLE ex rel. ELLIOTT, Dist. Atty.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

October 25, 1912

Rehearing Denied Nov. 11, 1912.

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Greeley W Whitford, Judge.

Quo warranto by the People, on the relation of Willis V. Ellott district attorney of the Second judicial district, against John R. Dixon to oust respondent from the office of judge of the county court of the city and county of Denver. Judgment for relator, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

John R. Dixon, of Denver, pro se.

E. P Costigan, Hugh McLean, Chester E. Smedley, and Joseph D. Pender, all of Denver, for defendant in error.

WHITE J.

This controversy is over the right of different claimants to hold and enjoy the office of county judge of the county court within the political and corporate entity known as the city and county of Denver. The plaintiff in error, John R. Dixon, is the incumbent of the office, and claims the right to hold the same by virtue of his election thereto at the general election for state and county officers held on November 3, 1908, for the term of four years commencing on the second Tuesday of January, 1909. May 21, 1912, Wayne C. Williams and Roger H. Wolcott were elected county judges by virtue of the provisions of the charter of the city and county of Denver. Article 4, p. 131 et seq. There being no incumbents of the office under the charter, Williams and Wolcott immediately qualified and demanded the ouster of Dixon, and the cessation by him of the exercise of the functions which they claim pertain to the office to which they were elected. Quo warranto proceedings were thereupon instituted against Dixon, resulting in his ouster from the office and the induction therein of Williams and Wolcott.

We have repeatedly held that a county and likewise state and county governmental functions and duties exist in the territory known as the city and county of Denver as they exist in other portions of the state, and the sole effect of article 20 of the Constitution, in relation thereto, is to impose upon the inhabitants of such territory the power and duty to designate the agencies which shall therein discharge the acts and duties required of county officers to be done by the Constitution and general law.

And, furthermore, that the city and county of Denver has not been freed from the Constitution, but is as much subject thereto as any other part of the state, though portions of the Constitution, as it existed prior to the adoption of article 20, became inapplicable to such territory because of the express provision of the new article. People v. Cassiday, 50 Colo. 503, 117 P. 357; Mauff v. People, 52 Colo. 562, 123 P. 101.

Adhering to these decisions, it follows that, if a judge of a county court is a county officer within the meaning of the Constitution, the judgment of ouster, as far as it affects plaintiff in error, is right; otherwise, it is wrong. This is true irrespective of the question of the validity of the provisions of the charter enlarging the duties of county judge, and providing for two incumbents of the office instead of one. So the sole question we deem necessary to determine herein is whether a county judge is a county officer within the meaning of the Constitution. To reach a proper solution of the problem, it is essential that we take the Constitution as it is, including every part thereof relating to the subject-matter under consideration, and construe the instrument as a whole, causing it, including the amendments thereto, to harmonize, giving to every word as far as possible its appropriate meaning and effect. People ex rel. v. Le Fevre, 21 Colo. 218, 40 P. 882. Except as in the Constitution otherwise provided, article 6 thereof vests the judicial power of the state, as to matters of law and equity, in a Supreme Court, district courts, county courts, justices of the peace, and such other courts as may be provided by law.

Courts, in the constitutional sense, are the tribunals established for the purpose of administering justice. 11 Cyc. 633, 655. Without them the judicial power lies dormant and inactive in the people. In creating them it is essential, among other things, that the sovereign fix or make provision for fixing limits within which the power is to be exercised. Accordingly, in the formation of constitutions, it is customary to subdivide the territory constituting the state and create or establish courts within and for such subdivisions. So our Constitution, having vested judicial power in certain courts, as designated in article 6, supra, fixes the territorial limits in which such courts shall tranact business, or makes provision therefor. As to district courts, the duty is imposed upon the General Assembly to divide the state into judicial districts in each of which judges, as provided by law, are to be elected by the electors thereof for a term of six years. As to county courts, it, in effect, adopts a subdivision established by section 1 of article 14 of the Constitution in the creation of counties which is evidenced by section 22 of article 6, providing for the election in each organized county for a term of four years of 'a county judge, who shall be judge of the county court of said county.' And in section 24 of article 6 like adoption is made of the county as the territorial entity in making provision for the establishment of criminal courts in counties having a population in excess of a designated number. As to justice of the peace, the matter is left with the General Assembly, as is that relative to the establishment of other courts.

When we consider that counties are involuntary political and civil divisions of the territory constituting the state created to aid in the administration of governmental affairs, that they are really quasi corporations or subordinate agencies for orderly government within the scope of their authority, and have certain well-known duties to perform through officials provided for that purpose, while territorial divisions or districts created in which to establish courts have no semblance of corporate character, no duties of functions to perform, it is clear that the selection by the organic law of a local subdivision of the state known as a 'county' for and within which to establish a court does not make the functions of the court, county functions, or the officers of the court, county officers. A court of record is essentially not an office. It is an institution, an entity, or agency within itself, invested with certain functions, just as the county is another agency within itself invested with other duties to perform. Clearly the use of the words 'district' 'county,' and 'criminal' in article 6, as prefixes to the word 'courts,' has no other significance than to give appropriate names to tribunals of government. The prefixes can in no sense imply that the persons, who, under the law, become the members or officers of such tribunals, thereby come officers of the respective entitles that bear such prefixes as their territorial designation. This is essentially true, because the subject dealt with and the thing created is 'courts.' Moreover, in making provision for the establishment and maintenance of courts, it is 'judges of courts,' not officers of districts or counties or political or territorial entities, that the Constitution commands shall be elected. So we conclude there is nothing in artice 6 that signifies that the officers therein named, or for which provision is therein made, are county officers. The article covers the subject of the judicial power of the state, creates its courts, or makes provision, therefor, and does not purport to treat of either county or county officers. We must, therefore, direct our attention to other portions of the organic law to ascertain if there be a constitutional declaration as to what officers are county officers within the meaning of that instrument. It is not necessarily the duties to be performed, the territory which elects, the manner of election, appointment or removal of the incumbent from office, that classifies an office, though in the absence of definite constitutional or legislative classification such matters would be persuasive, and, perhaps, controlling. Be that as it may, whatsoever the Constitution hath said, if anything, relative to classification, must control the courts.

We have examined the original manuscript of the Constitution on file in the office of the Secretary of State. In article 6 thereof the several headings or subjects treated are set forth. As a heading to section 1 appears the words, 'Judicial Department'; to section 2, 'Supreme Court'; to section 11, 'District Courts'; to section 21, 'District Attorney'; to section 22, 'County Court'; to section 24, 'Criminal Court'; to section 25, 'Justice of the Peace'; to section 26, 'Police Magistrates'; and to section 27, 'Miscellaneous.' In article 14 we find the following subjects: As a heading to section 1 the word 'Counties'; to section 6 the words, 'County Officers,' under which heading we find not only in the original manuscript but also in the instrument as amended the creation and provision for the establishment of certain offices and the election of officers thereto. Section 6 of the article provides for the election of county commissioners; section 8 for the election of one county clerk, one sheriff, one coroner, one treasurer, one county superintendent of schools, one county surveyor, one county assessor, and for the election or appointment of one county attorney. Section 11 provides for the election of justices of the peace and constables in each precinct in each county, and section 12 directs the General Assembly to provide for the election or...