Dixon v. State

• Decision Date: 29 May 1889
• Citation: 26 S.W. 500
• Parties: DIXON v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

26 S.W. 500

DIXON v. STATE.

Court of Appeals of Texas.

May 29, 1889.

Appeal from district court, Falls county; J. R. Dickinson, Judge.

Charley Dixon was convicted of forgery, and appeals. Affirmed.

The brief of the assistant attorney general was as follows:

"Defendant was convicted for passing the following forged instrument: `Memoranda. Take Simmons' Live Regulator. Dec. the 6th. Sir: You will please pay barrar five dollares, and charge to mi account. W. H. Peoples.' It is insisted by appellant that this is such an instrument as would not create any liability at law, and is therefore not the subject of forgery; and, not being addressed to any one, is not a valid legal instrument. This position is not tenable. Mr. Roscoe says: `The prisoner was indicted for uttering a forged request for the delivery of goods in the words and figures following: "Gentlemen, be so good as to let bearer have 5½ yards of blue to pattern, etc., and you will oblige. M. Reading, Mortimer St." The request was not addressed to any one. The prisoner being convicted, the recorder respited the judgment, to take the opinion of the judges on the question whether, as the request was not addressed to any individual person by name or description, it was a request for the delivery of goods, within the words and true intent of the statute. All the judges who were present at the meeting held the conviction right.' Rosc. Cr. Ev. (7th Ed.) 555, 556; citing Rex v. Carney, 1 Moody, Cr. Cas. 351. `This is contrary to some of the previous cases. See Rex v. Cullen, Id. 300. No difficulty would arise now in such a case, as the person to whom the request was made might be shown by the evidence, under the provisions of 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, § 5.' Rosc. Cr. Ev. p. 564. In Reg. v. Snelling, Dears. Cr. Cas. 219, the prisoner was convicted of forgery upon the following: `Holtern, Mar. 31, 1853. Sirs: Please to pay the bearis, Mrs. Smart, the sum of eight hundred and 50 £ ten shillings for me. James Ramsey.' Jarvis, C. J., says: `A request, not addressed to any one, may be a request, but the conduct of the party must show that he intended it to be a request. Rex v. Cullen is an authority to show that a request need not be directed to any one. The cases of Rex v. Carney and Reg. v. Pulbrook are not dissimilar from Rex v. Cullen, Dears. Cr. Cas. 223.' Pollock, C. B., in same case, says: `I am of opinion that this is a valid order. Supposing the facts to have been true, and the instruments to have been genuine, would it not have been such an order as, if paid, would have relieved the bankers from any further demand for the money so paid? I am of opinion it would. The facts supply the want of a formal direction to a banker. We are bound to suppose that Ramsey told her to go to the bank; that she was told they would not pay her without an order; that she replied, "Ramsey says that an order is not necessary," and that she came back the next day, with this document from Ramsey. It would then be a good order. It is addressed, "Sirs," and she delivers it to the persons for whom she says it was intended. I am clearly of opinion that the document in question is an order for the payment of money, within the statute.' Parke, B., says in same case: `I entirely concur with the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chief Baron.' Coleridge and Williams, JJ., concurred, and the conviction was affirmed. Dears. Cr. Cas. 223 et seq. In Noakes v. People, 25 N. Y. 382, Davies, J., says: `It is insisted on by the counsel for the prisoner, in support of the first request to charge, that the instrument set out in the indictment is not, upon its face, the subject of forgery, as it is not addressed to any one. If it be essential that an order or request for delivery of goods, to make it the subject of a forgery, should, on its face, be directed to a particular person, there then would doubtless be force in this objection. A reference to the language of the section of the statute would seem to indicate that there is not much force in this argument.' Then follows the statute, partly copied, and the court rule. Observe the similarity to the statute of this state. Then the court states the indictment, and says it therefore falls directly within the statute. Same authority. See the order set out on page 381, 25 N. Y. On page 383 the court further says: `The paper under consideration would therefore seem to fall within the very words of the statute, and is precisely of that character which the legislature, by the forgery of and the passing and uttering of which intended to subject the offender to indictment and punishment.' The order was not addressed to any one, and not dated. See this case at length. In 2 Lea, 513 et seq., the order then declared on read as follows, to wit: `"May let Lorie Rogers have nineteen ($19.00) dollars in goods, and charge to me. W. Cpell." Indorsed: "Brownsville, Tenn." * * * The questions made for reversal are: First, that the order is addressed to no one. This is not material. See 2 Archb. Cr. Pr. & Pl. 1633.' Peete v. State, 2 Lea, 514. The court will notice the similarity between that case and the one at bar. It, too, was not directed to any one, nor was it dated. See, also, Whart. Cr. Law, §§ 680, 695. Mr. Desty says: `An order is subject of forgery, — as an order for the payment of money, though no consideration be expressed; and a writing not addressed to any particular person may be an order for the payment of money.' Desty, Cr. Law, § 150i, pp. 606, 607. In the following section (150j) the same author says: `An order for the delivery of goods is subject of forgery, although not addressed to any one; or a request to deliver goods to bearer,' —...