Dixon v. State
Decision Date | 09 November 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 2D00-3197.,2D00-3197. |
Citation | 823 So.2d 792 |
Parties | John DIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard M. Fishkin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
John Dixon challenges his convictions of two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer, two counts of obstructing a law enforcement officer with violence, one count of attempted aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, one count of depriving a police officer of his weapon, and one count of depriving a police officer of his means to summons assistance. All of these charges arose from Dixon's attempt to avoid capture by police officers. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
Responding to an early morning alarm, officers discovered that two adjoining businesses had been burglarized. The first officer to arrive noticed Dixon on a bicycle nearby and attempted to detain him. Dixon began to flee, and the officer followed. When the officer caught up with Dixon, a struggle ensued. During this encounter, Dixon (1) struck the officer; (2) wrestled with the officer over the officer's gun; (3) prevented the officer from calling for help over his radio; (4) took the officer's pepper spray from the officer's belt and sprayed the officer in the face; and (5) threatened to shoot the officer with his own service revolver.
When the second officer arrived on the scene with his canine, Dixon again began to flee, running through streets and yards. The canine officer deployed his dog, who tracked Dixon into a retention pond. A third officer arrived and entered the pond from the other side. As this third officer reached Dixon, another struggle ensued. It was not until a fourth officer arrived that the officers were able to subdue and handcuff Dixon.
Dixon argues that, based on these events, the trial court erred in adjudicating him guilty of two counts of resisting an officer with violence. He maintains that this was one continuous episode of obstruction under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1999). We agree. Pursuant to Wallace v. State, 724 So.2d 1176, 1181 (Fla.1998), it is apparent that Dixon committed one "continuous resistance to an ongoing attempt to effect his arrest," which constitutes one single episode of obstruction.
In Vasquez v. State, 778 So.2d 1068, 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), the Fifth District established the following three-part test for determining whether multiple offenses form a single episode: "1) whether separate victims are involved; 2) whether the crimes occurred in separate locations; and 3) whether there has been a temporal break between the incidents." Here, although there were separate victims and separate locations, there was no temporal break between the incidents. The officers never stopped trying to capture Dixon, and Dixon never stopped trying to avoid capture. During the sequence of events, Dixon was never subdued. His resistance was continuous. Under these facts, the trial court erred in adjudicating Dixon guilty of two counts of resisting with violence. Accordingly, we reverse one conviction of resisting a law enforcement officer with violence.
Next, Dixon argues that the trial court erred in adjudicating and sentencing him for both attempted aggravated battery and...
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...the charged or uncharged form of the offense. See id. On appeal, the Second District, applying its previous decisions in Dixon v. State, 823 So.2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), andVega v. State, 900 So.2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), reversed the conviction. In Dixon, as in Weaver, the jury was instru......
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Weaver v. State
...This case is controlled by this court's prior opinion in Vega v. State, 900 So.2d 572, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing Dixon v. State, 823 So.2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)), and we therefore reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. However, because there is some question whether our pr......
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Griffis v. State
...jury instruction did not create a preservation problem, for the mistake rises to the level of fundamental error. See Dixon v. State, 823 So.2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (finding that error in giving jury instruction on charge of battery on a law-enforcement officer that permitted conviction if......
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Mitchell v. State, 1D03-2478.
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