Djodeir v. Mayorkas
Decision Date | 24 September 2009 |
Docket Number | Civil Case No. 08-1461 (RJL). |
Citation | 657 F.Supp.2d 22 |
Parties | Masoomeh DJODEIR, et ano., Plaintiffs, v. Alejandro MAYORKAS, Director, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al.,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Thomas K. Ragland, Maggio & Kattar, P.C., Washington, DC, Amy C. Prokop, Law Offices of Carl Shusterman, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Brian P. Hudak, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Masoomeh Djodeir and her daughter Samira Sadoughi (collectively, "plaintiffs") challenge the decision of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") (collectively, "defendants"), denying their applications for adjustment of immigration status. Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint on the ground that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review that decision. In light of the jurisdiction-stripping provision set forth at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.
Federal District Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and they have an "affirmative obligation to ensure that [they are] acting within the scope of [their] jurisdictional authority." Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 514 F.Supp.2d 84, 86 (D.D.C.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). At issue is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which provides that "no court shall have jurisdiction to review — (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title." Defendants contend that the plain language of this provision forecloses judicial review of USCIS decisions, like the one here, that either grant or deny adjustment of immigration status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Plaintiffs, not surprisingly, take a more nuanced position. They contend that judicial review is foreclosed only as to the ultimate discretionary decision of whether to grant or deny an application for adjustment of status. The determination regarding statutory eligibility for adjustment of status, however, is a purely legal determination that they contend falls outside of the jurisdiction-stripping provision. Because the USCIS denied plaintiffs' applications on the ground that they were statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2),2 plaintiffs argue that this eligibility determination is not a discretionary judgment about whether to grant or deny adjustment of status but a purely legal judgment about eligibility that is within the jurisdictional province of this Court.
While plaintiffs' argument is not without some support in the case law,3 I disagree. The capacious language of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not, in my judgment, support plaintiffs argument. By its plain terms, the statute bars judicial review, "regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings," of "any judgment regarding" the adjustment of immigration status. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added); see Ayanbadejo v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 273, 277 (5th Cir.2008) . It draws no distinction between judgments that are discretionary and judgments that are purely legal. Nor does it carve out any exception for judgments pertaining to eligibility. Furthermore, it applies whether or not the judgment is made in removal proceedings. To the extent that legal determinations like statutory eligibility are subject to judicial review, they are reviewable only by our Circuit Court on a petition for review of a final removal order pursuant to Section 1252(a)(2)(D), which Congress added when it enacted the REAL ID Act in May 2005. Pub.L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). This provision states that "[n]othing in subparagraph (B) or (C) . . . shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added). Indeed, if Section 1252(a)(2)(B) did not foreclose judicial review of purely legal questions like statutory eligibility, there would be no need to except questions of law from the jurisdictional bar. In short, plaintiffs argument, if embraced, would render subparagraph (D) superfluous.
Given the plain text and structure of Section 1252(a)(2), this Court must conclude, as other courts have concluded, that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs' claim.4 See, e.g., Hassan v. Chertoff, 543 F.3d 564, 566 (9th Cir.2008) ( ); Ruiz v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 269, 276 n. 4 (2d Cir.2009) ( ). Moreover, because judicial review is barred by this provision, it is also unavailable under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (...
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