DL v. Dist. of Columbia, Case No: 05–cv–1437–RCL

• Decision Date: 25 August 2017
• Docket Number: Case No: 05–cv–1437–RCL
• Citation: 267 F.Supp.3d 55
• Parties: DL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

267 F.Supp.3d 55

DL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Case No: 05–cv–1437–RCL

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed August 25, 2017

Todd A. Gluckman, Bruce J. Terris, Carolyn Smith Pravlik, Kathleen Lillian Millian, Terris, Pravik & Millian, LLP, Cyrus Mehri, Mehri & Skalet, PLLC, Margaret A. Kohn, Law Office of Margaret Kohn, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

HW, pro se.

Timothy Lantry, pro se.

Arlette Mankemi, pro se.

Kerianne Piester, pro se.

TL, pro se.

Ronald Wisor, pro se.

XY, pro se.

Bryan Young, pro se.

Tammika Young, pro se.

Chad Wayne Copeland, Daniel Albert Rezneck, Matthew Robert Blecher, Robert C. Utiger, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Samuel C. Kaplan, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This case comes before the Court on plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, ECF No. 537. Plaintiffs brought claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), the Rehabilitation Act, and District of Columbia law. After many years of litigation which included class certification issues, summary judgment, trial, and appeals, this case is finally at its end. Plaintiffs now seek $9,760,487.55 in attorneys' fees and costs. For the reasons stated below, this Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to fees and costs, although not in this amount. It will grant in part and deny in part plaintiffs' motion, but will seek a revised calculation from plaintiffs before ordering the District of Columbia to pay.

II. BACKGROUND

This case, originally filed in 2005, was brought by the parents of preschool age children with various disabilities who tried to obtain special education services from the District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS"), alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), the Rehabilitation Act, and District of Columbia law, which require that the District offer a "free and appropriate public education" ("FAPE") to disabled children. These laws require "states to develop a 'practical method' to track which children are receiving special education services and to ensure that all children 'who are in need of special education and related services ... are identified, located, and evaluated' within a timeframe set by the state—120 days in this case." DL v. D.C. , 860 F.3d 713, 717 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) ; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i)(I) ; D.C. Code § 38–2561.02(a)(1) ). States are additionally obligated "to provide a seamless transition when three-year-olds move from 'early intervention' programs (governed by IDEA Part C) to preschool (governed by IDEA Part B)." Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(9), 1435(a)(8)(A), 1437(a)(9) ; 34 C.F.R. § 303.209 ). These provisions are known as the "Child Find" duty.

Plaintiffs alleged numerous knowing, pervasive, and systemic failures to comply with the "Child Find" requirement. The procedural history of this case is set out in the many opinions from both this Court and the Court of Appeals. It was most recently summarized in DL v. D.C. , 860 F.3d 713 (D.C. Cir. 2017), and need not be repeated in full here. It is sufficient to note

267 F.Supp.3d 61

that plaintiffs ultimately brought claims related to four subclasses:

(1) disabled three-to-five-year-olds whom the District failed to identify for the purpose of offering special education services; (2) disabled three-to-five-year-olds whom the District failed to give an initial evaluation within 120 days of being referred for special education services; (3) disabled three-to-five-year-olds whom the District failed to give an "eligibility determination"—i.e. , a decision as to whether they qualify for IDEA services—within 120 days of being referred; and (4) all children who transitioned from early intervention to preschool programs, and whom the District denied a "smooth transition" by age three.

DL , 860 F.3d at 719.

In 2014, the Court found that "the District was liable for violating the IDEA and District law for the period up to April 6, 2011" for all four subclasses. DL v. D.C. , 194 F.Supp.3d 30, 37 (D.D.C. 2016). It ruled for defendants, however, "on (1) plaintiffs' IDEA and District law claims related to the failure timely to evaluate children for special education and related services for the period from April 6, 2011 to the present [Subclass 2], and (2) all of plaintiffs' Rehabilitation Act claims for the period from March 22, 2010 to the present." Id. Then, at trial, plaintiffs alleged that the District violated the IDEA with respect to Subclasses 1, 3, and 4 from April 6, 2011 through the present, and that the District violated the Rehabilitation Act with respect to all four subclasses for the period up to March 22, 2010. Id. at 37–38. After trial, the Court found that the District had violated the IDEA with respect to Subclasses 1, 3, and 4 from April 6, 2011 through the first day of trial (November 12, 2015), and that it violated the Rehabilitation Act with respect to all four subclasses through March 22, 2010. Id. at 88–96. The breakdown of each party's success is as follows:

TDEA Claims through April 6,2011	TDEA Claims from April 6, 2011 to present	Rehabilitation Act Claims through March 22,2010	Rehabilitation Act Claims from March 22, 2010 to present
Subclass 1	Plaintiffs	Plaintiffs	Plaintiffs	Defendants
Subclass 2	Plaintiffs	Defendants	Plaintiffs	Defendants
Subclass 3	Plaintiffs	Plaintiffs	Plaintiffs	Defendants
Subclass 4	Plaintiffs	Plaintiffs	Plaintiffs	Defendants

On May 18, 2016, this Court found that "[p]laintiffs have prevailed on both IDEA and Rehabilitation Act claims. Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (IDEA) and 20 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (Rehabilitation Act), the District shall pay plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fees and related nontaxable expenses associated with litigating this suit." May 18, 2016 Order ¶ 30, ECF No. 521. Plaintiffs now request fees for two periods of time: 1) through November 16, 2011 (Period 1); from November 17, 2011 to June 22, 2016 (Period 2). Plaintiffs originally requested fees and costs totaling $10,010,956, using the current rates set out in the LSI Matrix. After briefing, they now request $9,760,487.55 using LSI Matrix rates. The law firm of Terris, Pravlik & Millian, LLP ("TPM"), lead counsel in this case, requests fees totaling $8,962,597.98 and costs totaling $259,409.83. Professor Jeffrey S. Gutman, who oversaw a clinic at The George Washington University Law School in which students worked on this case, requests fees totaling $135,476.32. Co-counsel Margaret

267 F.Supp.3d 62

A. Kohn, who served as class counsel and the primary contact with the named plaintiffs, requests fees totaling $380,009.56 and costs totaling $1,727.61. Co-counsel Cyrus Mehri, who performed work related to class certification and settlement, requests fees totaling $21,266.25.

The District argues that the Court should award fees using the USAO Matrix, and should use historic (2012) rates with interest for Period 1, and current rates for Period 2. The District also argues that the requested fees should be reduced because plaintiffs billed an unreasonable number of hours for many tasks, because they improperly billed for matters in which they failed to prevail, and because they failed to exercise reasonable billing judgment. It also argues that fees for co-counsel should be reduced substantially or denied. Furthermore, it argues that plaintiffs' costs are excessive and should be reduced significantly, and that expert fees are not reimbursable. Finally, the District argues that the IDEA's statutory fee cap requires that the Court deny plaintiffs' request unless and until plaintiffs demonstrate actual class membership. The United States has...