DL v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 21 June 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Case No. 05-1437 (RCL)
• Citation: 194 F.Supp.3d 30
• Parties: DL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

194 F.Supp.3d 30

DL, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Case No. 05-1437 (RCL)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed June 21, 2016

HW, pro se.

Arlette Mankemi, pro se.

Kerianne Piester, pro se.

TL, pro se.

Ronald Wisor, pro se.

XY, pro se.

Bryan Young, pro se.

Tammika Young, pro se.

Bruce J. Terris, Todd A. Gluckman, Jane M. Liu, Terris, Pravik & Millian, LLP, Cyrus Mehri, Mehri & Skalet, PLLC, Lauren Seffel, Sanford Heisler, LLP, Margaret A. Kohn, Law Office of Margaret Kohn, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Chad Wayne Copeland, Daniel Albert Rezneck, Matthew Robert Blecher, Robert C. Utiger, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Samuel C. Kaplan, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OPINION & FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Royce C. Lambert, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The named plaintiffs in this lawsuit—former preschool-age children in the District with various disabilities—allege that defendants have systemically failed to provide, or failed to timely provide, special education and related services to them and other children, in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and District of Columbia law. The plaintiffs have been divided into four subclasses and bring claims that correspond to distinct requirements of the IDEA. More specifically, plaintiffs' claims relate to the District's alleged failures to: (1) identify substantial numbers of children who are in need of special education and related services, (2) timely evaluate children for special education and related services, (3) timely issue eligibility determinations for special education and related services, and (4) provide smooth and effective transitions for children from Part C to Part B services.

Given that this lawsuit was initiated in 2005, the Court has had ample opportunity to acknowledge the importance of the early intervention programs at stake in this litigation. Indeed, when executed properly, the early intervention mandated by the IDEA and at the core of plaintiffs' complaint "can work a miracle," allowing an estimated 75–80% of disabled children to enter "kindergarten alongside every other ordinary five-year-old—without needing further supplemental special education." DL v. District of Columbia , 845 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2011). These positive outcomes substantially advance the IDEA's primary goal: "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

In order to achieve its aim, the IDEA provides federal funding to states, including the District of Columbia, on the condition that they "establish policies and procedures to ensure ... that free appropriate public education [FAPE] ... is available to disabled children." Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia , 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C.Cir.2005) (internal quotations omitted); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). More specifically, the IDEA imposes an affirmative obligation on school systems to "ensure that all children with disabilities residing in the State ... regardless of the severity of their disabilities, and who are in need of special education and related services, are identified, located, and evaluated." Reid , 401 F.3d at 519–20 (internal quotations omitted); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A). The District's laws implementing the IDEA require that once a potential candidate for special education services is identified, the District must conduct an initial evaluation and make an eligibility determination within 120 days. D.C. Code § 38-2561.02(a)(1). The duties to identify, locate, and evaluate disabled children are collectively known as the "Child Find" obligation. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A).

Children under three years of age who are identified, evaluated, and determined eligible may receive early intervention services under Part C of the IDEA. For these children, the Act requires a "smooth and effective" transition from Part C's early intervention services to Part B's preschool special education programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(9). A smooth and effective transition is one that (1) begins no less than 90 days prior to the child's third birthday; (2) does not include a disruption in services between Part C and Part B services; and (3) involves Part B personnel. See D.L. v. District of Columbia , 302 F.R.D. 1, 7 (D.D.C.2013) ; 34 C.F.R. § 303.209. The transition process must include a conference between the child's family and school officials to determine eligibility for Part B services and to develop a transition plan and an Individualized Education Program ("IEP"). The goal is "a seamless transition between services" under Parts C and B of the Act. 34 C.F.R. § 303.209(a)(3)(ii).

Dating back to 2005, the procedural history of this case is long and somewhat complex, centering in large part on issues relating to class certification. First, in August 2006 this Court certified a plaintiff class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), defining it as:

All children who are or may be eligible for special education and related services, who live in, or are wards of, the District of Columbia, and (1) whom defendants did not identify, locate, evaluate or offer special education and related services to when the child was between the ages of three and five years old, inclusive, or (2) whom defendants have not or will not identify, locate, evaluate or offer special education and related services to when the child is between the ages of three and five years old, inclusive.

DL v. District of Columbia , 237 F.R.D. 319, 324 (D.D.C.2006) ; see also Mem. Order 3–4, ECF No. 389.

With this group of children serving as the original plaintiff class, in 2010, the Court found that the District's policies were inadequate to meet its obligations under the IDEA and that they violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in programs receiving federal funding. See Mem. Op. 4–5, ECF No. 389 (citing DL v. District of Columbia , 845 F.Supp.2d 1, 10–17 (D.D.C.2011) ). First, on August 10, 2010, the Court partially ruled for plaintiffs on summary judgment and found that, at least through 2007, the District violated the IDEA and District law by denying a FAPE to numerous preschool-age children with disabilities. DL v. District of Columbia , 730 F.Supp.2d 84, 95 (D.D.C.2010). The Court in 2010 also found that, at least through 2007, the District violated the Rehabilitation Act by demonstrating "bad faith or gross misjudgment" in failing to bring itself into compliance with the IDEA, even though it "knew that [its] actions were legally insufficient." See Mem. Op. 4–5, ECF No. 389.

Following this summary judgment ruling, the Court held a two-day bench trial on the 6th and 7th of April 2011 regarding the District's liability and plaintiffs' remaining claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for the period from January 1, 2008, through the trial. After hearing the evidence at trial, the Court found that the District's prior liability extended to April 6, 2011. To remedy these violations, the Court then issued a structural injunction, which included programmatic requirements and numerical goals that would remain in effect until the District demonstrated sustained compliance. Mem. Op. & Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 138–76.

After the trial but before this Court issued its final decision, the Supreme Court decided Wal – Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes , 564 U.S. 338, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011), which clarified the proper interpretation of the commonality requirement for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) (" FRCP 23(a)(2)"). Wal – Mart essentially found that to establish commonality under FRCP 23(a)(2), a class must present a common question that is "capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." Id. at 2551.

Immediately following Wal – Mart , the defendants in this case sought to decertify the consolidated plaintiff class, arguing that it was too broadly defined to satisfy FRCP 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement. Essentially, the defendants argued that the single and undivided class could not satisfy FRCP 23(a)(2) because it "bundled together multiple different allegations of a variety of different provisions of the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and local District of Columbia law" and "amalgamat[ed] ... a variety of provisions of a single statutory scheme." DL v. District of Columbia , 277 F.R.D. 38, 42 (D.D.C.2011). This Court rejected that argument, ruling that the plaintiff class satisfied FRCP 23's commonality requirement because it presented the common question of whether or not each class member received a FAPE. The Court then ruled that the class members' "differing allegations only represent the differing ways in which defendants have caused class members' common injury," that is, the "denial of their statutory right to a free appropriate public education." Id. at 45.

After the Court denied defendants' motion to decertify the class, the District filed an appeal to the D.C. Circuit and ultimately prevailed. The D.C. Circuit vacated the Court's original order on class certification grounds—which as a result effectively and entirely vacated the Court's various findings of liability. The Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, holding:

After Wal – Mart it is clear that defining the class by reference to the District's pattern and practice of failing to provide FAPEs

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