DL v. Dist. of D.C.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 05-1437(RCL)
• Citation: 730 F.Supp.2d 84
• Parties: DL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

730 F.Supp.2d 84

DL,¹ et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 05-1437(RCL).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

Aug. 10, 2010.

Alexander R. Karam, Bruce J. Terris, Terris, Pravlik & Millian, L.L.P., Jeffrey S. Gutman, The George Washington UniversityLaw School, Margaret A. Kohn, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

HW, Washington, DC, pro se.

Timothy Lantry, Washington, DC, pro se.

Arlette Mankemi, Washington, DC, pro se.

Kerianne Piester, Washington, DC, pro se.

TL, Washington, DC, pro se.

Ronald Wisor, Washington, DC, pro se.

XY, Washington, DC, pro se.

Bryan Young, Washington, DC, pro se.

Tammika Young, Washington, DC, pro se.

Daniel Albert Rezneck, Sarah Ann Sulkowski, Robert C. Utiger, Samuel C. Kaplan, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs, a class of disabled 3- to 5-year-olds in the District of Columbia, bring this action against defendants the District of Columbia, Michelle Rhee in her official capacity as Chancellor of the District of Columbia Public Schools, and Kerri Briggs in her official capacity as the current District of Columbia State Superintendent of Education.² Plaintiffs allege that defendants denied them a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"); failed to identify, locate, and evaluate them as qualified disabled children ("Child Find" duties); and failed to provide them a smooth and effective transition from assistance under Part C of the IDEA to assistance under Part B of the IDEA by their third birthdays, in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities and Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and District of Columbia law.

Before the Court are Defendants' Motion [177] for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion [178] for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability, and Plaintiffs' Consent Motion [189] for Order Scheduling Oral Argument on Pending Summary Judgment Motions. Upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the opposition [179] thereto, the reply brief [185], applicable law, and the entire record in this case, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion for the reasons set forth below. Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability, the opposition [180] thereto, the reply brief [183], applicable law, and the entire record in this case, the Court will grant the motion for the reasons set forth below. Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Consent Motion [189] for Order Scheduling Oral Argument on Pending Summary Judgment Motions, the Court will deny the motion for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

The IDEA was enacted to "ensure that all children with disabilities have availableto them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). States, as well as the District of Columbia, are eligible for federal funding under this statute if they comply with its terms.

Plaintiffs are a class of disabled 3- to 5-year-olds in the District who allege that they have been denied the benefits of the IDEA. The Court previously ordered that plaintiffs' class consists of

All children who are or may be eligible for special education and related services, who live in, or are wards of, the District of Columbia, and (1) whom defendants did not identify, locate, evaluate or offer special education and related services to when the child was between the ages of three and five years old, inclusive, or (2) whom defendants have not or will not identify, locate, evaluate or offer special education and related services to when the child is between the ages of three and five years old, inclusive.

( [58] Order, 237 F.R.D. 319 (D.D.C.2006.)) Plaintiffs have alleged systematic failures by defendants, claiming that defendants have failed to provide a free appropriate public education to a large number of qualifying children, have failed to find all of the disabled children in the District, have failed to ensure smooth transitions for children within the system, and have done all of this in bad faith or with gross misjudgment.

In their First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Amended Complaint") [46-2], plaintiffs brought suit against defendants on five separate claims, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The First Claim alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as a means of enforcing the IDEA. The Second Claim alleged a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Third Claim alleged a violation of § 1983, as a means of enforcing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Fourth and Fifth Claims alleged violations of District of Columbia law, D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5, §§ 3000.1, 3002.1(a), 3002.1(d), and 3002.3(a).

In several orders dated August 25, 2006, the Court, inter alia, held that plaintiffs did not need to exhaust their administrative remedies, because exhaustion was futile. Even if exhaustion was futile, however, the Court found that plaintiffs had properly exhausted their administrative remedies. ( [53] Order, 450 F.Supp.2d 11 (D.D.C.2006).) The Court also certified the plaintiffs' class. ( [58] Order.) The parties have completed discovery and have both moved for summary judgment.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court will treat both defendants' and plaintiffs' motions as motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue that defendants' motion is more akin to a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under Rule 12(b)(6) than to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. (Pls.' Opp'n at 1.) Defendants' failure to raise this defense in their answer, however, would not waive their right to file a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss now. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(2). But the Court need not resolve whether this is more like a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 motion. Even if this were a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court can treat it as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, because both parties have had the opportunity to present matters outside the pleadings in this motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).

The Court will grant a motion for summary judgment where a party shows "thatthere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). There is a genuine issue as to a material fact if "reasonable minds could differ" as to that fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), cited in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there is an "absence of a genuine issue of material fact" in dispute. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The Court will believe the evidence of the non-moving party and will draw all reasonable inferences from the record in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. It is not enough, however, for the non-moving party to show that there is merely " some alleged factual dispute": the fact must be "material." Id. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant fails to offer "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "In determining a motion for summary judgment, the court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion." D.D.C. LCvR 7(h)(1).

III. DISCUSSION

A. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Defendants do not raise any factual disputes in their motion. Accordingly, the Court will decide whether defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the legal disputes raised by defendants.

1. First Claim: Plaintiffs Cannot Bring Suit Under § 1983 to Enforce the IDEA.

In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs sued under § 1983 to enforce the IDEA. Plaintiffs do not have a right to sue under § 1983 to enforce the IDEA. Rather, plaintiffs must sue directly under the IDEA. Defendants argue that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rancho Palos Verdes forecloses suit under § 1983, because the IDEA creates a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with § 1983 relief. Plaintiffs argue that the broad relief that plaintiffs request exceeds the type of relief available under the IDEA, so suit under § 1983 is proper. The Court agrees with defendants.

While this case was pending, the Supreme Court decided Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, which held that a plaintiff may not sue under § 1983 when there is in place a statutory "comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983." 544 U.S. 113, 120, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005). The existence of such a scheme indicates that "Congress did not intend [relief under § 1983] for a newly created right." Id. "The critical question, then, is whether Congress meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by [the IDEA] to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a § 1983 action." Id.

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court explained that "to sustain a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the federal statute creates an individually enforceable right in the class of beneficiaries to which he belongs." Id. The parties here do not dispute that plaintiffs are within the IDEA's intended class of beneficiaries.The...