Dobbie v. Bremen Police Dep't, Case No. 3:17-CV-430 JD
| Decision Date | 24 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-CV-430 JD |
| Citation | 341 F.Supp.3d 896 |
| Parties | Michael DOBBIE and Janice Dobbie, Plaintiffs, v. BREMEN POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Michael A Dobbie, South Lyon, MI, pro se.
Janice Dobbie, South Lyon, MI, pro se.
Robert T. Keen, Jr., Barrett McNagny LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, William A. Ramsey, Barrett McNagny LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Aleksandrina Penkova Pratt, Bryan R. Findley, Indiana Attorney General's Office, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.
Pro se plaintiffs, Michael Dobbie and Janice Dobbie, filed a complaint against various defendants after a welfare check on an individual located in Mr. Dobbie's home resulted in a warrantless search of the home, as well as the arrest and prosecution of Mr. Dobbie for possession of marijuana and paraphernalia. Construing the pro se claims liberally, it appears that plaintiffs assert Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against the Bremen Police Department and Bremen Police Officers Bradley Kile and Ronald Rybicki (counts 1 and 2) for unlawful search, seizure, and arrest; a Sixth Amendment claim against the Marshall County Prosecutors' Office and Prosecutors Lynn Berndt and Matthew Sarber (count 3) pertaining to the state charges; and, a state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") against all six of the defendants (count 4).
Rather than file answers to the complaint, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)1 and provided the requisite Lewis v. Faulkner notices. The individual prosecutors (and their employer) allege that they are entitled to absolute immunity [DE 21]. The individual officers (and their employer) allege that the claims against them are barred by the statute of limitations and that the facts fail to support the claims alleged [DE 25; DE 37]. Plaintiffs oppose the motions to dismiss [DEs 33-36]. On a referral, the magistrate judge recommended that the Court grant both motions in their entirety [DE 43]. Plaintiffs have objected to that recommendation [DE 46], which then generated responses from defendants [DEs 47-48]. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motions with respect to the federal claims and denies the motions with respect to the state claim because the Court declines to exert supplemental jurisdiction over it.
The facts viewed in the plaintiffs' favor are as follows. On April 2, 2015, Officers Kile and Rybicki arrived at Mr. Dobbie's residence to conduct a wellness check on a female guest of Mr. Dobbie. After entering the home without permission and finding that the guest was okay, the officers conducted a search of the premises over Mr. Dobbie's objection and discovered a pipe typically used for drugs. After threatening to return with a narcotics detection dog, Mr. Dobbie turned over a small amount of marijuana to the officers. The marijuana and paraphernalia were seized and Mr. Dobbie was arrested, but he was never provided Miranda warnings during the encounter.
Mr. Dobbie bonded out of jail the following day, but was charged with possession of marijuana and paraphernalia. As part of his defense, Mr. Dobbie filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his residence. On March 3, 2016, the evidentiary hearing on the motion was held; and on March 17, 2016, the judge found that the warrantless entry, search, and seizure were illegal, which required that the evidence obtained during the search be suppressed. On June 15, 2016, Prosecuting Attorney Sarber moved to dismiss the criminal charges against Mr. Dobbie and the motion was granted on the same day.
The plaintiffs filed their pro se complaint on June 2, 2017. Counts 1-3 imply an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, in count 1, plaintiffs allege that Officers Kile and Rybicki violated Mr. Dobbie's Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unlawful search of his home on April 2, 2015. In count 2, plaintiffs allege that by threatening to further search the home and then arresting Mr. Dobbie on April 2, 2015, Officers Kile and Rybicki violated Mr. Dobbie's Fifth Amendment rights by "forc[ing him] to be a witness against himself," depriving him "of his liberty without due process of law," and failing to "read him his rights." In count 3, plaintiffs allege that Mr. Dobbie was "denied the right to a speedy disposition or trial," as protected by the Sixth Amendment, because the "prosecuting attorneys" took about fourteen months to determine that they did not have a case against him. The plaintiffs contend that the prosecutors delayed the case because they "should have known that the search conducted was illegal and that Mr. Dobbie was not read his Miranda Rights." In count 4, the plaintiffs allege that the stress and expenses incurred as a result of the criminal prosecution of Mr. Dobbie support a claim for IIED. Mr. Dobbie explains that for "well over a year [he] did not know his fate" and that having to post bond, pay attorney's fees, and attend court hearings were financially and emotionally stressful on him. Ms. Dobbie (whose relationship to Mr. Dobbie is unclear) alleges that the situation was equally stressful on her, even though she has lived in Michigan the entire time.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts the factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc. , 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That statement must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face, Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). However, a plaintiff's claim need only be plausible, not probable. Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. , 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). Evaluating whether a plaintiff's claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a motion to dismiss is " ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’ " McCauley v. City of Chicago , 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).
That same standard of review applies to the Court's review of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), the district court must undertake a de novo review "of those portions of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection is made." Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp. , 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999) ; Goffman v. Gross , 59 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1995) ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Given the plaintiffs' objections to the magistrate judge's recommendations, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint de novo .
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' pro se complaint in its entirety. The Court first considers the federal claims and explains why these claims are subject to dismissal. The Court then considers the state claim and explains why it declines to exert supplemental jurisdiction over it.
The Bremen Police Department and Officers Kile and Rybicki seek dismissal of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. They further contend that plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead a violation of the Fifth Amendment. For the following reasons, the Court finds that plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim (count 1) is barred by the statute of limitations, and that plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim (count 2) is insufficiently pled.
With respect to the Fourth Amendment claim (count 1), the parties do not dispute when the claim accrued.2 Case law makes clear that any claims for Mr. Dobbie's alleged unlawful search and seizure occurred on April 2, 2015; however, it must be clarified that any claim for unlawful detention would have accrued the following day when Mr. Dobbie was released from jail. Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois , 903 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2018) ). Therefore, the only outstanding dispute and portion of the report and recommendation to which the plaintiffs object is the magistrate judge's conclusion that a two-year, rather than a five-year, statute of limitations applies to count 1.
"Federal law does not set the limitations period in § 1983 actions." Ray v. Maher , 662 F.3d 770, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2011). "In order to determine the proper statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, a federal court must adopt the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims." Ashafa v. City of Chicago , 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) ); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). Indiana has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a). However, Indiana also has a five-year statute of limitations for "action[s] against a sheriff; another public officer; or the officer and the officer's sureties on a public bond; growing out of a liability...
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...Code § 34-11-2-7. However, federal law, not state law, governs the accrual of a cause of action under §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986. Dobbie, 341 F.Supp.3d at 901 n.2; Johnson Winstead, 900 F.3d 428, 434 (7th Cir. 2018). Generally, a claim under § 1983 accrues when “the plaintiff has a complete and......