Dobbin v. Cordiner

• Decision Date: 02 July 1889
• Citation: 41 Minn. 163,42 N.W. 870
• Parties: DOBBIN v CORDINER.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

41 Minn. 163

42 N.W. 870

DOBBINvCORDINER.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 2, 1889.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. A married woman who, at her husband's request, executes and acknowledges a deed of conveyance of real property, knowing it to be such, and allows her husband to take it away for delivery to a purchaser, is estopped, as against an innocent purchaser under the deed, to assert that the deed was invalid because, when she executed it, no grantee was named in it, or because she did not know that the land described in the deed was her own, and not her husband's, land, she not having read the deed, nor having shown sufficient excuse for not reading it.

2. The capacity of married women to be bound and estopped by their conduct is incident to their enlarged power to deal with others.

3. A deed is effectual as a conveyance, although there was but one subscribing witness. Following Morton v. Leland, 27 Minn. 36, 6 N. W. Rep. 378;Johnson v. Sandhoff, 30 Minn. 197,14 N. W. Rep. 889; and Conlan v. Grace, 36 Minn. 276,30 N. W. Rep. 880.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; BAXTER, Judge.

Action by Lizzie D. Dobbin against William Cordiner for the cancellation of a deed. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Hart & Brewer, for appellant.

Wilson & Lawrence, for respondent.

DICKINSON, J.

This action is prosecuted for the purpose of securing the cancellation of a deed of conveyance from the plaintiff and her husband to the defendant. The plaintiff seeks to avoid the deed upon the grounds that, as she alleges, the deed, when executed by her, was incomplete, not containing the name of the grantee nor any description of the property conveyed; that, by her husband's misrepresentations, she was induced to sign and acknowledge the instrument in its incomplete form; and that he afterwards, without her authority, inserted the name of the defendant as grantee, and the description of the property, and delivered the deed to the defendant. By the findings of the court the following facts are established: The land had been purchased by the plaintiff's husband, who paid a part of the purchase price. The conveyance was made to the plaintiff, who gave a mortgage upon the property for an unpaid part of the purchase price. The plaintiff's husband, having bargained with the defendant for the sale of the land to him, prepared a deed for the conveyance of the property, complete in form, except that it did not contain the name of any grantee. He requested the plaintiff to execute it; and, without objection, she signed and acknowledged it, the husband also joining in the execution of it. She delivered the deed, after her acknowledgment, to her husband, for the purpose of completing and delivering it to the purchaser. The husband then wrote in the name of the defendant as grantee, delivered it to him, and the latter receiving the deed, paid the price to plaintiff's husband, in good faith, without notice of any defects or omissions in the making or executing of the deed. He assumed, as part of the consideration, the payment of the outstanding mortgage on the property. The plaintiff's allegations as to the fraudulent procuring of her execution of the deed are not sustained by the findings of the court. It is conceded on the part of the appellant, the plaintiff, that, in general, one executing a deed of conveyance may give authority to another, by parol, to insert in the deed, after its execution, the name of a grantee, the grantee not having been before named in the deed; but it is contended that a wife cannot confer such authority upon her husband. We deem it unnecessary to decide whether this distinction can be recognized. Without regard to that question, and however it might be decided, we are of the opinion that by her conduct the plaintiff is precluded, upon the principle of estoppel, from asserting, as against the defendant, the invalidity of this deed. Our statutes have gone far to remove the common-law disabilities of married women. The property held by them at the time of their marriage continues to be their separate property after marriage. They may, during coverture, receive, hold, use, and enjoy property of all kinds, and the rents, issues and profits thereof, and all avails of their contracts and industry, free from the control of their husbands. They are capable of making contracts by parol or under seal. They are bound by their contracts, and responsible for their torts, and their property is liable for their debts and torts to the same extent as if they were unmarried. Their power to contract, and to convey real estate, is, however, so far qualified that they cannot contract with their husbands, relative to the real estate of either, or by power of attorney, or...