Dobbin v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co.

Decision Date30 June 1879
Citation31 Am.Rep. 512,81 N.C. 446
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesFRANKLIN DOBBIN v. RICHMOND & DANVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

CIVIL ACTION for Damages tried at Spring Term, 1879, of ROWAN Superior Court, before Schenck, J.

The plaintiff alleged that he was employed by the defendant company as a train hand, under the control and management of one T. W. Lowrie, an employee and superintendent of the company, and by the direction of said Lowrie, he was engaged in digging gravel, when by the negligence of defendant's employee, a bank of dirt and gravel fell in upon the plaintiff, whereby he was greatly injured, having his leg broken and being permanently disabled from performing any actual work. The defendant denied the allegations of the complaint and alleged that the injury was caused by plaintiff's own negligence; and that its employees and servants on the material train under said Lowrie were men of ordinary skill and care; and if plaintiff was injured by the negligence of defendant's employees, superintendent, or servants, the defendant is in no way responsible therefor.

The facts set out in the statement of the case are substantially embodied in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice ASHE, and upon them the court below held that the plaintiff could not recover on the ground that Lowrie was a mere fellow-servant of the plaintiff. Upon this intimation the plaintiff submitted to a judgment of nonsuit and appealed. And it was agreed if this court should reverse the decision below, no final judgment is to be given, but only judgment setting aside the nonsuit.

Mr. W. H. Bailey, for plaintiff .

Mr. J. M. McCorkle, for defendant .

ASHE, J.

This is an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant to recover damages for an injury to his person resulting from the negligence of the defendant. The defendant in the answer denied the allegations of the complaint, and for a further defence insisted that if the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of defendant's employees, superintendent or servants, the defendant was not responsible for the injury received.

The case was submitted to a jury for trial, and the evidence produced disclosed the facts, that the plaintiff was employed as a train-hand and laborer, and at the time of the injury was engaged in digging gravel under the direction of one T. W. Lowrie, and that said Lowrie was engineer, superintendent, conductor and master of the gravel and material train of the defendant, whose business it was to employ and discharge hands connected with the business for which the gravel train was used; also, that he had entire charge of this branch of business on his section of the railroad, known as that of digging gravel, putting the same upon the track, digging ditches and repairing the same; and also repairing culverts, &c.

After hearing this evidence, His Honor expressed the opinion that the plaintiff could not recover, admitting that he was injured by the negligence of said Lowrie, for the reason as he alleged that Lowrie was a mere fellow-servant of the plaintiff.

Who is a fellow-servant within the meaning of the law appertaining to this subject, is a difficult question, one that has never been decided in this state. And so far as we have been able to find, no definition of the relation as a test applicable to all cases, has as yet been adopted by the courts; and we do not think can be, so variant are the relations subsisting between master and servant, principal and agent, co-laborer and employee, in the various enterprises and employments, with their numerous and divers branches and departments; the cases frequently verging so closely on the line of demarcation between fellow-servants or co-laborers and what are called “middle men,” that it is difficult to decide on which side of the line they fall. Each case in the future as heretofore will have to be determined by its own particular facts.

Where the relation of fellow-servants or co-laborers is found to subsist, it is well established by the English as well as American authorities, and is conceded in the argument of this case, that the master is not responsible for an injury to one of his servants occasioned by the negligence of a fellow-servant engaged in the same business or employment. This principle has been so universally recognized by the courts, that it may be regarded as a general rule of law. And the reason of the rule is, that where one engages to serve, he undertakes, as between him and his master, to run all the ordinary risks of the service, which includes the risk of the negligence of his fellow-servants, acting in the discharge of his duty as servant of the common master, and engaged in the same common employment. But he does not undertake to incur the risks that may result from the negligence of the master, or such person to whom he may choose to delegate his authority in that branch or department of business in which he is engaged. To impute the negligence of such an agent to the master, he must be more than a mere foreman to oversee a batch of hands, direct their work under the supervision of the master, see that they perform their duty, and in case of dereliction, report them. He must have entire management of the business, such as the right to employ hands and discharge them, and direct their labor, and purchase materials, &c. He must be an agent clothed in this respect with the authority of the master, to whom the laborers are put in subordination, and to whom they owe the duty of obedience. Such an agent is what is known as a “middle man,” who as well as the laborer is the servant of the master, and although he may work with the laborer in furthering the common business of the master, he is yet not a “fellow-servant” in the sense of that term as used by the courts, because he represents the master in his authority to direct, control and manage the business. To such an agency, the maxim of qui facit per alium applies. His acts are the acts of the master; his duties, the duties of the master; and his neglects and omissions, the neglects and omissions of the...

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