Dobrich v. General Dynamics Corp., Elec. Boat Div.
| Decision Date | 28 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:96CV01672(GLG).,3:96CV01672(GLG). |
| Citation | 40 F.Supp.2d 90 |
| Parties | Judith DOBRICH, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP., ELECTRIC BOAT DIVISION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Robert B. Muchinsky, Hartford, CT, for plaintiff.
Roger W. Lehr, Jr., General Dynamics/Electric Boat Division, Groton, CT, David L. Metzger, Metzger & Richters, Hartford, CT, for defendant.
This is an employment discrimination action brought by plaintiff, Judith Dobrich, against her former employer, the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation, in which she claims that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender, age, and disability, and retaliated against and discharged because of her objection to these practices. She has asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), as well as pendant state claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all counts of plaintiff's complaint [Doc. # 19]. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the Court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. The burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact rests with the party seeking summary judgment, in this case defendant Electric Boat. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). In assessing the record to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, this Court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.1997) (citations omitted).
Additionally, the Second Circuit has held that a district court should exercise particular caution when deciding whether summary judgment should issue in an employment discrimination case. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994). Because writings directly supporting a claim of intentional discrimination are rarely if ever found among an employer's documents, a trial court must be particularly cautious about granting summary judgment when the employer's intent is at issue. Affidavits and depositions must be scrutinized for circumstantial evidence which, if believed, would show discrimination. Id.
Accordingly, we set forth the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Plaintiff was hired by Electric Boat on June 9, 1994, as a laborer at the Windsor Site Office. She was 50 years old at the time of hire. On January 4, 1996, at the age of 51, she was laid off, ostensibly as part of defendant's reduction in force. To understand the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's lay-off, some background on the Windsor Site facility is necessary.
Electric Boat is the division of General Dynamics that designs and builds nuclear submarines for the United States Navy. The Windsor Site Office, where plaintiff worked, was developed in the 1950's by the U.S. Department of Energy and the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program to house a prototype nuclear reactor for a particular class of submarines. The site was operated until approximately 1991, when it was closed. In 1993, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, which had been operating the facility, initially contracted with Electric Boat to stabilize the plant, and, then in 1995, to completely deactivate and dismantle the reactor and demolish all structures on the site. The project was called "Return to Green Fields," because when the project is completed there will be no evidence that the site ever existed.
Because this was a demolition project, the footprint of the Windsor Site continually decreased and, accordingly, the type of work being done on the jobsite and the types of craftsmen needed for this work also changed. At the beginning of the project, there had been 16 buildings. By January, 1996, when plaintiff was laid off, only three remained, although a number of temporary buildings had been erected outside the fenced enclosure.
Because of the nature of the project, at its inception, anyone entering the site had to have a U.S. Department of Energy Security Clearance, which took about six months to process. However, with the demolition of existing structures, in October, 1995, the Department of Energy downgraded the security status of the Windsor Site, requiring security clearance in only the most sensitive areas of the project. This change greatly increased the number of craft employees eligible for hire, since in most instances they no longer needed security clearance.
In 1993, when Electric Boat accepted the contract for the Windsor Site project, it executed an industry-wide craft labor agreement, the General Presidents.' Project Maintenance Agreement ("GPPMA"), which governed all union-represented employees on the job site regardless of their trade union affiliation. Under the GPPMA, Electric Boat was required to hire from the local union hiring halls and to designate a working leader (foreman) for each local union. The union foreman was responsible for work assignments and for ensuring that assigned work was completed, but the foreman had no authority to hire, fire, suspend, discipline, formally evaluate performance or adjust grievances. At the time of plaintiff's hire as a laborer, the labor foreman was Dennis McCann, and Andrew Moeckel, the boilermaker foreman, was designated as the general foreman, responsible for overall coordination of craft assignments. Mr. Moeckel could also "write up" employees for disciplinary procedures and could make recommendations for lay-offs. Plaintiff maintains that, although the union foremen were not part of corporate management, they were part of the "chain of command."
In June, 1994, plaintiff was hired out of the local laborers' hiring hall along with three other individuals to move furniture from the buildings being demolished at Windsor Site. Although plaintiff had no prior experience doing manual labor,1 she possessed the necessary security clearance, which was something few laborers possessed. This work proved too physically demanding for her, and she was reassigned to lighter duty work including janitorial work and "High Rad Watch" work, monitoring access to high radiation areas, for which there was a significant need at the beginning of plaintiff's employment.2
On August 24, 1994, plaintiff injured her right wrist at work when a co-worker allegedly kicked a chair on rollers at her. (The co-worker has denied this). Initially, the injury did not cause plaintiff to miss any work. However, her wrist grew progressively more painful and, in December 1994, she was placed on various medical restrictions for a period of three weeks. From February 16, 1995, to May 1, 1995, plaintiff was out of work because of her wrist, which required surgery in March 1995. She returned to work in May 1995, with a 30-pound lifting/40-pound pushing restriction on her right hand and a 5% partial permanent disability rating for her right wrist.
Notwithstanding these limitations, plaintiff testified that she was able to perform her assigned work until the time of her lay-off. Since the time of her lay-off, plaintiff has worked off and on as a laborer for other employers on other jobs.
In October, 1995, Electric Boat was running behind schedule on the demolition of Building I at the Windsor Site and hired ten additional laborers to empty two floors of this building. Because the majority of the Site had been declassified such that security clearances were no longer required, only one of the laborers hired had a security clearance.
These additional hires caused the project to go over budget and, in January, 1996, with only three buildings remaining, Electric Boat decided to lay off eleven craft workers, including seven laborers. Plaintiff was one of the individuals that was chosen for lay-off.
According to Mr. Moeckel, the general foreman who recommended which laborers to lay off, plaintiff was the "obvious first choice" for lay-off. She had no manual labor experience prior to being hired by defendant; she had problems with the physical requirements of the job; defendant's need for janitorial work had significantly declined with the demolition of most of the buildings on site; and the work scheduled for the upcoming months consisted of heavy demolition work, increasing the need for persons with heavy equipment experience, which plaintiff did not have.
The two other laborers who performed primarily janitorial work were also chosen for lay-off, and, after January 1996, no laborer was assigned primarily to do cleaning work. The union collective bargaining agreement, the GPPMA, did not require lay-offs to be based upon seniority. The final decision regarding lay-offs was made by Mr. Roger LaCourse, the manager of production.
Plaintiff states that her name was not on the initial list of individuals to be laid off and that her name was added later. Indeed, plaintiff states that she was assured by management, as late as December 1995, that she was not going to be laid off. She believes that she was chosen for lay-off in part because of her disability, because defendant had recently requested her medical records relating to her wrist injury. Emmett Harper, head of human relations,...
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