Doctors Hosp. 1997 v. Sambuca Houston
Decision Date | 28 October 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 14-04-00079-CV.,14-04-00079-CV. |
Parties | DOCTORS HOSPITAL 1997, L.P. d/b/a Doctors Hospital Tidwell, Appellant, v. SAMBUCA HOUSTON, L.P. d/b/a/ Sambuca, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Murphy S. Klasing, Houston, for appellant.
Dean Miles Blumrosen, Houston, for appellee.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices FOWLER and SEYMORE.
Show Business Entertainment, a music band, prevailed in its suit against Sambuca, a restaurant, and Doctors Hospital, the host of a party at Sambuca, when neither paid the band for playing at a Christmas party. Sambuca, in turn, successfully claimed that Doctors Hospital was responsible for the band's fees. On appeal, Doctors Hospital complains only about attorney's fees awarded to Sambuca. First, it asserts the fees should not have been awarded because Sambuca recovered on a promissory estoppel claim, not a contract claim, and second, it argues the court should not have reopened the evidence to receive testimony about Sambuca's attorney's fees. We modify the judgment to delete the attorney's fee award because Sambuca recovered on its promissory estoppel claim, which, under Texas law, is available to a claimant only when a valid contract does not exist, and the attorney's fee statute is limited to valid contract claims.
Sambuca and Doctors Hospital disputed who should have paid Show Business Entertainment for playing at the Christmas party. When no one paid, Show Business Entertainment brought suit against both parties. Sambuca ultimately paid the band and cross-claimed against Doctors Hospital, alleging that Doctors Hospital was responsible for the band's fee. After both parties rested their cases and closed, the judge announced his decision in favor of Sambuca and asked the parties to submit a judgment. Sambuca prevailed only on its promissory estoppel theory, although it had also pleaded breach of contract, and the judge awarded attorney's fees to Sambuca. Sambuca's counsel then received permission from the court to reopen briefly to testify — over Doctors Hospital's objection — about anticipated attorney's fees in the event of an appeal.
I. Does a Promissory Estoppel Theory of Recovery Support an Attorney's Fee Award Under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 38.001(8)?
In its first point of error, Doctors Hospital asserts that section 38.001(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not permit the court to award attorney's fees to a party that prevails on a promissory estoppel theory of recovery. Because determining whether a statute provides for attorney's fees is a question of law, our review is de novo. Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex.1999) (). Like other courts to consider this issue, we note there is no controlling Texas case. We also acknowledge that we are the first court to hold as we do. But, because the statute's plain language includes only valid contract claims, and because promissory estoppel does not create a contract, and, in fact, can be successful only when no valid contract exists, we conclude section 38.001(8) does not permit a promissory estoppel claimant to recover attorney's fees.
Section 38.001(8) allows a party to recover its "reasonable attorney's fees ... in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for ... an oral or written contract." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 38.001(8). Section 38.001's most basic requirement is that the party seeking attorney's fees must first prevail on a valid contract claim. Mustang Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Driver Pipeline Co., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 195, 201 (Tex.2004) ( ); Sikes v. Zuloaga, 830 S.W.2d 752, 753 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, no writ) (recovery of valid claim in suit on a contract required to recover attorney's fees under 38.001); Huddleston v. Pace, 790 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied) ( ); see also In re Southland Corp., 19 F.3d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir.1994) ( ).
For many years, Texas courts have held that promissory estoppel becomes available to a claimant only in the absence of a valid and enforceable contract. See Montgomery Indus. Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas Constr. Co., Inc. 620 F.2d 91, 95 (5th Cir.1980) () (citing Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex.1966)); Subaru of Amer., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 226 (Tex.2002) () (citing Wheeler, 398 S.W.2d at 96-97); Superior Laminate & Supply, Inc. v. Formica Corp., 93 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) () (citing Vogel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 966 S.W.2d 748, 754 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.)); Richter, RMS v. Wagner Oil Co., 90 S.W.3d 890, 899 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) ("Promissory estoppel is not applicable to a promise covered by a valid contract....") (citation omitted); Stable Energy, L.P. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 327, 336 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, no pet.) ("If an alleged promise is part of a valid contract, the promisee cannot disregard the contract and sue... under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.") (citation omitted); Fretz Constr. Co. v. So. Nat'l Bank of Houston, 600 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980) ( )(citing Wheeler, 398 S.W.2d at 93) (overruled on other grounds, 626 S.W.2d 478 (Tex.1981)); Pasadena Assocs. v. Connor, 460 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) () (citing Prince v. Miller Brewing Co., 434 S.W.2d 232, 240 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ()); see also Montgomery Indus. Int'l, Inc., 620 F.2d at 95 ( )(citing Wheeler, 398 S.W.2d at 97). Thus, a claim for promissory estoppel and a contract claim are mutually exclusive claims; a litigant cannot recover on one if it recovers on the other.1 See, e.g., Barker v. Brown, 772 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ) ("The law is well settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable where there exists a legally valid contract between the parties.") (citing Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc. v. Enserve, Inc., 719 S.W.2d 337, 344 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
If the two previous propositions — that section 38.001(8) authorizes attorney's fees only when a party has a valid contract claim, and a party can recover on promissory estoppel only if it does not have a valid contract claim — are correct, then they are mutually exclusive remedies. If they are mutually exclusive remedies, then section 38.001(8) cannot include a promissory estoppel claim. Were we to hold otherwise, we would have to (1) ignore a long line of cases holding that a recovery under promissory estoppel means no valid contract existed and (2) add a cause of action that the statute's plain language does not include. We intend to do neither of these.
In holding that a party may not recover attorney's fees on a promissory estoppel claim, we recognize that we are a lone voice. See Preload Tech., Inc. v. AB & J Constr. Co., Inc., 696 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.1983); Traco, Inc. v. Arrow Glass Co., Inc., 814 S.W.2d 186 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied); Adams v. Petrade Int'l, 754 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Safe Env., Inc. v. Pelzel & Assocs., Inc., No. 03-98-00721-CV, 1999 WL 815819 (Tex.App.-Austin Oct.14, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication); DeNucci v. Moretti, No. 03-98-00114-CV, 1999 WL 250141 ( )(not designated for publication). However, the Texas cases holding that attorney's fees may be recovered generally stem from one case: Preload, 696 F.2d at 1084-85, 1093-95. Preload was the first case to address this dilemma. Noting that no Texas case had addressed the issue, it turned to section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Id. at 1094-95. Section 90 addressed promissory estoppel; comment d provided that a binding promise under that section was a contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. d (1981). Without considering the Texas rule that promissory estoppel claims and contract claims are mutually exclusive, the court concluded that section 38.001(8) includes promissory estoppel claims because the restatement treats at least some of these claims as contracts. Preload, 696 F.2d at 1093-95.
When Texas courts have concluded that section 38.001(8) includes promissory estoppel, they have relied upon Preload to some extent. See Traco, Inc., 814 S.W.2d at 193-94 (Preload) ; Adams, 754 S.W.2d at 720 (Preload) ; Safe Env., Inc., 1999 WL 815819 at *3 (citing Traco, Inc., Adams, and Preload)...
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