Dodge v. Sawyer
| Decision Date | 27 November 1934 |
| Parties | DODGE v. SAWYER (two cases). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Hammond, Judge.
Actions of tort by May K. Dodge and Charles P. Dodge, respectively, against Edward G. Sawyer. Verdicts for plaintiffs, and defendant brings exceptions.
Exceptions overruled.
M. G. Rogers, of Lowell, for plaintiffs.
D. H. Fulton, for Boston, for defendant.
These are actions of tort in which the plaintiff May K. Dodge alleges she was injured through the negligence of the defendant in the operation of an automobile, and the plaintiff Charles P. Dodge, husband of said May K. Dodge, sues for consequential damages. The cases were tried together to a jury. The combined bill of exceptions is filed by agreement of the parties and by leave of the court. It is therein stated that ‘there was evidence from which the jury could properly infer that the injuries occurred solely through the negligence of the defendant.’ Before the charge the defendant filed no written requests for instructions. Rule 71 of the Superior Court (1932) reads: ‘Requests for instructions or rulings in trials of hearings with or without jury shall be made in writing before the closing arguments unless special leave is given to present requests later.’ The exceptions of the defendant ‘are to the charge and on the subjects of the female plaintiff's due care and the damage sustained by herself and her husband.’
There was non-expert testimony which would warrant the jury in finding that May K. Dodge, hereafter called the plaintiff, while crossing a public street was knocked down by an automobile driven by the defendant and that she was unconscious or semi-conscious when she was brought into the hospital in Concord, Massachusetts; that before the accident and her injury the plaintiff was in good health, able to take care of her home, to drive a car, to attend to the renting, collection of rents and supervision of real estate which she owned; that before the accident her memory was good; that she enjoyed social relations; that she was in the hospital as the result of the accident from June 2, 1931, the date of the accident and injury, until June 21, 1931; that since the accident she has suffered great loss of memory, is easily confused, and is unable to attend to the renting and supervision of her real estate.
There was non-expert evidence relating to the amount of expenses incurred by Charles P. Dodge for the treatment of his wife at the hospital and after she returned home. Dr. Christie, called for the plaintiff, testified, in substance, that he treated her in 1929 for acute arthritis involving several joints, that at that time she did not exhibit any loss of memory, that she made a good recovery, and that this trouble would not affect her mentally. On cross-examination he testified that he had not seen the plaintiff since 1929 until the trial, and, at the time of his treatment of her, there was no evidence of arterio-sclerosis. Dr. Tighe testified for the plaintiff, in substance, that he treated her on June 2, 1931, for a large hematoma in the occipital region; that she was semi-conscious when brought to the hospital, that she had various marks on her body, and a swelling in the spine of the scapula; that she complained of headache and dizziness, vomiting everything she took for four days; that she was in the hospital for approximately three weeks and was then discharged improved; that during all the time she was in the hospital she complained of headache and dizziness, and lack of memory, and this last complaint became progressively greater; that she no longer sought social relations but preferred to be alone; that she was confused when with others or when in a crowd; that she lost her way when coming to the office of the witness; that the week before the trial she said she felt better, but she looked very much worse, that she had become thin and yellow; that she could not carry on a conversation without stopping and making an heroic effort to call up her mental forces to supply the proper thing in her conversation and not succeeding; that when he first saw her she had a cerebral concussion and he would not be surprised to find that she had a cerebral hemorrhage at the time of the accident; that in his opinion the plaintiff would get worse and would not get better and that she would very ‘shortly’ go to bed probably not to get up again.
Dr. Myerson testified for the plaintiff at great length, describing her condition when he examined her on October 7, 1931, and again on October 13, 1933. More specifically he testified that she showed a marked hardening of the arteries; that he made certain tests as to her mentality, such as knowing where she was and what date it was, and in matters of that kind she ‘did fairly well’; but when given a series of numbers beyond six to remember, she would fail and become confused and after repeated efforts made by him she would get the answer correct; that this was not a marked failure of memory, but difficulty in concentrating, and that she was easily confused; that his diagnosis at the time was that the patient had marked cerebral hardening of the arteries with increased tenderness and was losing mentally; that the accident was probably ‘an aggravating factor, in that an...
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