Dodge v. State

Decision Date24 March 1977
Docket NumberNo. 4671,4671
Citation562 P.2d 303
PartiesTheresa DODGE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Kim D. Cannon and Charles R. Hart, Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, signed the brief and Kim D. Cannon appeared in oral argument on behalf of the appellant.

V. Frank Mendicino, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Criminal Div. and Allen C. Johnson, Legal Intern., Cheyenne, signed the brief and Allen C. Johnson and James N. Wolfe, County and Prosecuting Atty., Sheridan County, appeared in oral argument on behalf of the appellee.

Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, RAPER, THOMAS and ROSE, JJ.

RAPER, Justice.

The appellant-defendant was found guilty of manslaughter and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, following jury trial, and regularly sentenced. She appeals, raising issues involving:

1. Denial of discovery of oral statements of defendant to police.

2. A ruling on voluntariness of statements by defendant.

3. A drunkenness instruction given by the trial judge to the jury.

4. Refusal of the court to instruct on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.

5. Substantial evidence to support the verdict.

We will affirm.

The defendant, following some drinking and after downing a tumbler of vodka, without any apparent provocation, stabbed and cut Lorraine Oldman-a three-inch gash over the eye with a knife. When the deceased Royce Brown, tried to help Lorraine, the defendant fatally stabbed him through the heart. Despite Miranda warnings given immediately before and following her being taken into custody, defendant stated in the first person and according to witnesses, 'I killed him, I killed him'; 'she was sorry that she had killed him, sorry that she'd stabbed him'; 'I'm evil;' 'Knives are meant to kill.'

At arraignment, the defendant entered pleas of 'not guilty,' 'not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency at the time of the alleged offenses,' and 'not triable by reason of present mental illness or deficiency' to a court of assault and battery while armed with a dangerous weapon in violation of § 6-70B, W.S.1957, Cum.Supp., and a count of manslaughter in violation of § 6-58, W.S.1957. Just prior to trial, the defendant personally advised the court on the record that she did not contest her doing of the acts. She then stood on the defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency. 1 Section 7-242.4, W.S.1957, Cum.Supp., in pertinent part, defines mental illness or deficiency excluding criminal responsibility:

'(a) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of the criminal conduct, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law:

'(i) As used in this section, the terms 'mental illness or deficiency' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.

* * *'

Following a preliminary hearing at which the defendant was bound over to the district court, she moved for the right of inspection of the reports of the Sheridan County sheriff's department and the City of Sheridan police department which pertained to any oral statements made by her bearing on her guilt or innocence. The motion was denied by the trial judge, a ruling defendant claims as error. Defendant's position is in complete conflict with Rule 18(b), W.R.Cr.P.:

'Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the prosecuting attorney to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the State, upon a showing of the materiality to the preparation of his defense, and that the request is reasonable. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2) this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda or other internal governmental documents made by governmental agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by State witnesses of prospective State witnesses (other than the defendant) to governmental agents except as provided in subdivision (c) of this rule.' (Emphasis added.)

No statement was taken from the defendant failling within Rule 18(a), W.R.Cr.P.:

'Upon motion of a defendant, the court may order the attorney for the State to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant (1) written or recorded statements or confessions made by the defendant or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to the prosecuting attorney, (2) results of reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the prosecuting attorney, by the exercise of due diligence may become before a grand jury.' 2

The only papers in possession of the sheriff and the police department were their own reports, as contemplated by the rule.

Additionally, the defendant, as a result of the preliminary examination, had access to every statement made by the defendant. At the preliminary, police officers testified to statements volunteered by the defendant without and before any interrogation by any law enforcement official. At the scene of the killing, she spontaneously stated, 'I stabbed him.' An officer attempted to interrupt her from speaking out in order to read the Miranda warning to her but she persisted in saying and repeating, 'I did it, I stabbed him,' 'I stabbed the son-of-a- bitch.' En route to the police station in a police car, the news came over the police radio that her victim had died on the way to the hospital. She yelled that, 'I killed him, I stabbed him, I'm sorry I killed him.' None of these statements were made in response to any question by any law enforcement officer. At the preliminary, it was also testified that at the police station, the sheriff proceeded to a formal questioning. After reading the Miranda rights to her and being satisfied that she understood them, he asked her what happened. She advised, 'I killed him, I killed the son-of-a-bitch, I'm evil, knives are made to kill.'

All of this testimony was repeated at the trial, with nothing added nor deleted. An in camera examination of the police reports, incorporated in the record, discloses no additional statements made by the defendant to law enforcement officials. There must be some abuse of discretion by the trial judge in refusing discovery, before we can hold the denial, error. State v. Hill, 1973, 211 Kan. 287, 507 P.2d 342; State v. Bailey, 1971, 94 Idaho 285, 486 P.2d 998. We see no abuse here. The police reports have been made a part of the record and the defendant was eventually accorded an opportunity to see them. She has failed to point out to this court in her brief argument any reference to statements made by her and contained in those reports which would have aided her cause which had not been previously disclosed at the preliminary hearing.

There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case. Weatherford v. Bursey, 1977, -- U.S. --, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30; Wardius v. Oregon, 1973, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82. This does not mean that the prosecution can suppress evidence favorable to the defendant. Suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt. Brady v. State of Maryland, 1963, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. The police and sheriff's reports are not evidence but the State would be required to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant had that was never refused-only access to the reports; the work product of county and city law enforcement personnel was refused and properly so.

We also must wonder at defendant's great concern with her statements, of which she already had knowledge, in light of the fact that she admitted the killing and the assault and battery by stabbing to the court before trial. All her statements went to an admission of killing Royce Brown and stabbing Lorraine Oldman. This will be discussed further in our dealing with defendant's next claim of error. We hold that defendant was not deprived of any discovery to which she was entitled.

Prior to trial, a hearing was held in which the defendant sought to suppress statements made by her in the presence of and to the police, on the ground that they were not voluntary. Defendant urges that the trial judge in his ruling denying suppression should have found specially that they were voluntary 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' The court's ruling was as follows: '* * *

The Court's going to deny the motion to suppress the oral statements made by the defendant.' Following that ruling, defendant admitted she had killed Brown and stabbed Lorraine Oldman and the trial proceeded on the issue of mental responsibility. Defendant's admission of the acts eliminated the statutory procedual step that, '* * * First, evidence shall be heard and a special verdict taken on whether the defendant in fact committed the acts charged in the alleged criminal offense. * * *' Section 7-242.5(a).

The order of evidence then presented did not proceed as contemplated by statute. Section 7-242.5(b) provides that the 'defendant is presumed to be mentally responsible and the burden of first going forward and entering evidence on the issue of mental responsibility is upon the defendant.' But the State and the defendant agreed upon a different order of evidence and the State went forward...

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