Dodson v. McGauley, 43460

• Decision Date: 29 September 1981
• Docket Number: No. 43460,43460
• Citation: 629 S.W.2d 414
• Parties: Derwin D. DODSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James J. McGAULEY, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 414

629 S.W.2d 414

Derwin D. DODSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James J. McGAULEY, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 43460.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

Sept. 29, 1981.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied

Nov. 20, 1981.

Application to Transfer Denied Jan. 18, 1982.

Eugene P. Freeman, Deputy City Counselor, St. Louis, for defendants-appellants.

Lawrence J. Fleming, London, Greenberg & Fleming, St. Louis, for plaintiff-respondent.

GUNN, Judge.

Defendants, members of the Board of Trustees of the Alternative Police Retirement System of St. Louis (the Board), appeal from a circuit court judgment reversing their decision to give plaintiff, a St. Louis policeman, ordinary disability retirement benefits (§ 86.257, RSMo 1978) instead of accidental disability retirement benefits (§ 86.263, RSMo 1978). The Board first contends that its decision should have survived judicial review as it was not clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence and was supported by competent and substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Second, the Board maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that the Board exceeded and violated its statutory authority and denied plaintiff due process of law in placing him on ordinary disability retirement. We reverse.

Our review of the evidence on the record focuses on the disability to plaintiff's back that incapacitates him.

Prior to becoming a member of the St. Louis Police Department in 1968 at the age of 30, plaintiff was a St. Louis fireman for about eight years. During this period, he fell from a fire truck ladder, injuring his back. He subsequently suffered several episodes of low back pain, and during a 1971 hospitalization for unrelated problems, a physician described plaintiff's backache as "moderately severe."

The next injury to plaintiff's back occurred in April, 1973 when, en route to court in response to a subpoena, he was involved in an automobile accident. He was hospitalized that summer for acute lumbar strain and was diagnosed as having sustained soft tissue trauma which was moderately severe at the low back and mild at the neck. Subsequently, plaintiff began seeing a chiropractor, who noted a congenital deformity in his fifth lumbar vertebra. He was placed on light duty at the police department for a period of time before resuming full duty.

In April, 1976, plaintiff slipped and fell while chasing a burglary suspect, which aggravated his back injuries but did not necessitate further hospitalization.

Plaintiff last injured his back in January, 1977 when he stepped from his police car and slipped on snow-covered ice, falling on his service revolver which was holstered on his left hip. Since this accident he has been on full leave from duty, with an extended line of duty disability status.

In April, 1978 plaintiff submitted an application for disability retirement, specifying that he desired accidental disability retirement benefits. Three doctors on the Medical Board of the police retirement system examined him and independently concluded that, although he presented no objective evidence of a specific neuromuscular or orthopedic disease, he was unfit to perform the duties of an active police officer. The defendant Board denied plaintiff service connected accidental disability retirement benefits but granted him an ordinary disability retirement allowance. The circuit court reversed the Board's decision and found that the Board exceeded its statutory authority and denied plaintiff due process of law in placing him on ordinary disability retirement when he did not apply for it.

The Board asserts first that the trial court erred in concluding that the Board's denial to plaintiff of service connected accidental disability retirement benefits is unsupported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record and is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

The scope of a court's review of an administrative decision is well established as follows:

The reviewing court may only determine whether the board ... could reasonably have made its findings and reached its result or whether the decision was clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. * * * The court may not substitute its judgment on the evidence and may not set aside the board's ... decision unless it is not supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. In addition the evidence must be considered in a light most favorable to the board's ... decision, together with all reasonable inferences which support it. * * * If evidence before an administrative body would warrant either of two opposed findings, the reviewing court is bound by the administrative determination, and it is irrelevant that there is supportive evidence for the contrary finding....

City of Kennett v. Labor Industrial Relations Commission, 610 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Mo. banc 1981) (quoting Board of Education v. Shank, 542 S.W.2d 779, 781-82 (Mo. banc 1976) ); Bland v. City of Trenton, 618 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Mo.App.1981); see also § 536.140, RSMo 1978.

In denying plaintiff service connected accidental disability retirement benefits, the Board found that his permanent incapacitation for duty was not the "result of an accident occurring ... at some definite time and place through no negligence on his part," as required by § 86.263, RSMo 1978. Rather, the Board concluded that plaintiff's incapacitation was caused by a combination of several injuries, an existing deformity of the spine, and his psychological attitude toward his physical condition. There was ample evidence to support this conclusion under the applicable law.

The term "accident" as used in § 86.263 refers to a single event and does not include a series of traumatic episodes. Chapman v. Sanders, 528 S.W.2d 462, 464-66 (Mo.App.1975). Nor does § 86.263 apply where a police officer has a condition which has impaired the performance of his duties through the years and is suddenly exacerbated by an episode...