Doe v. Bell
| Decision Date | 05 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:15 CV 6 RWS |
| Citation | 367 F.Supp.3d 966 |
| Parties | Grand Juror DOE, Plaintiff, v. Wesely J. C. BELL, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Anthony E. Rothert, Andrew J. McNulty, Jessie M. Steffan, American Civil Liberties Union Of Missouri Foundation, D. Eric Sowers, Ferne P. Wolf, Joshua Michael Pierson, Sowers and Wolf, LLC, St. Louis, MO, Gillian R. Wilcox, American Civil Liberties Union Of Missouri, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff.
Andrew D. Kinghorn, Attorney General Of Missouri, St. Louis, MO, David J. Hansen Attorney General Of Missouri Jefferson City, MO, Peter J. Krane, St. Louis County Counselor's Office, Clayton, MO, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Grand Juror Doe (Juror)2 seeks a declaratory judgment that Missouri laws criminalizing Juror's disclosure of information about her experience as a juror on a State of Missouri grand jury are unconstitutional as applied. Juror alleges that if these Missouri statutes are enforced it will violate her free speech rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney has moved to dismiss the complaint on numerous grounds. Because the complaint fails to state a claim I will grant the motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff Juror began serving as a grand juror for the Circuit Court of St. Louis County on May 7, 2014. That grand jury's term of service was originally set to expire on September 10, 2014. On August 9, 2014, while on duty as a police officer for the City of Ferguson, Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown. Robert McCulloch, the Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County at the time, presented the matter to the grand jury to decide whether there was probable cause to believe Officer Wilson violated any Missouri state criminal laws in the death of Mr. Brown. The St. Louis County Circuit Court extended the term of the grand jury from September 10, 2014 to January 7, 2015 to allow the grand jury to consider the Wilson matter.
The Prosecuting Attorney's staff presented evidence regarding the case to the grand jury over a several week period. On November 24, 2014, upon completion of their investigation of the Wilson matter, the grand jury returned a "no true bill" declining to indict Officer Wilson. During his announcement of the grand jury's decision, McCulloch made public statements at a press conference about the jury's investigation and its decision not to issue an indictment. McCulloch also released evidence presented to the grand jury, including transcripts, reports, interviews, and forensic evidence. However, the transcripts and documents were redacted in a manner to keep secret the identities of the grand jurors, witnesses, and other persons connected to the investigation. In addition, McCulloch did not release the votes or deliberations of the grand jury.
Plaintiff Juror's complaint alleges that, from her perspective, the Prosecuting Attorney's presentation of the evidence in the Wilson matter to the grand jury was markedly different from "hundreds of matters presented to the grand jury earlier in its term." Juror alleges that the to the grand jury "differed markedly and in significant ways from the State's counsel" in hundreds of previous matters; the investigation had a stronger emphasis on the victim than in other cases; and, the "presentation of the law to which the grand jurors were to apply the facts was made in a muddled and untimely manner."
Juror alleges that McCulloch's statements at the press conference "characterizes the views of the grand jury collectively toward the evidence, witnesses, and the law, in a manner that does not comport with [Juror's] own opinions."
Juror now wants to speak out about her experience as a grand juror and to express opinions about the evidence and the investigation in the Wilson matter in particular, and about other grand jury cases generally for the purpose of comparison. Juror wants to comment on whether McCulloch's release of records and statements at the press conference accurately reflected the grand jurors' views of the evidence and witnesses in the Wilson matter. Juror also wants to express the view that the evidence and law were presented differently in the Wilson matter than Juror had experienced in other cases presented to the grand jury. Juror asserts that her motivation behind these proposed disclosures is to "aid in educating the public about how grand juries function" and to use Juror's "own experiences to advocate for legislative change to the way grand juries are conducted in Missouri."
Juror alleges that four State of Missouri statutes have a "chilling effect" which imposes a limitation on her speech. The statutes cited by Juror are Missouri Revised Statutes sections 540.080, 540.120, 540.310, and 540.320. Juror seeks a declaratory judgment that "Missouri laws criminalizing speech by [Juror], about [Juror's] experiences as a state grand juror for the investigation of the [Wilson matter], are unconstitutional as applied." Juror asserts that her free speech rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution override the oath of secrecy she took as a grand juror, and, as a result, void any Missouri state statute which would criminalize Juror's proposed speech regarding the grand jury's proceedings.
The Prosecuting Attorney moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including the doctrine of abstention. I granted the motion to abstain to allow Juror to seek relief in state court on state law grounds to avoid the necessity of ruling her federal First Amendment claim.3 This case was stayed until Juror resolved her state law claims.
Juror subsequently filed a lawsuit in the St. Louis County Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief which the circuit court denied. [Doc. # 8, Ex. A, Grand Juror Doe v. McCulloch, No. 15SL-CC01891, 2016 WL 9000971 (Mo. Cir. Ct. December 13, 2016) ] Juror's state court petition alleged three counts. In Count I, she alleged a claim under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the same cause of action she asserted in this Court. In Count II, Juror sought a declaration that § 540.320 R.S.Mo.,4 (a statute that bars grand jurors from revealing evidence presented to the grand jury or the name of any witness who appeared before them), was no longer applicable or valid as applied to Juror. In Count III, Juror sought a court order declaring that Juror is relieved from the oath she took, under § 540.080 R.S.Mo., to keep the grand jury proceedings secret. Juror expressly stated in the petition that she did not want the state court to rule her First Amendment claim and that she was reserving that claim in the event she returned to federal court. Juror reserved her First Amendment claim under an England reservation. England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421-422, 84 S.Ct. 461, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964) ().
In her state court petition Juror asserted that her speech regarding her experiences and opinions about her grand jury service was chilled by three Missouri statutes.5 She alleged that the three statutes, sections 540.080, 540.310 and 540.320 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, are statutes that the Prosecuting Attorney enforced. The circuit court ruled that a declaratory judgment forbidding the Prosecuting Attorney from enforcing § 540.080 ()6 and § 540.310 ()7 would be have no practical effect because the Prosecuting Attorney cannot bring criminal charges for a violation of those statutes. The circuit court concluded that any claim for relief under those statutes must be addressed to the St. Louis County Circuit Court which has the inherent power to punish for contempt and to try contempt-of-court cases. [Doc. # 8, Ex. A, Grand Juror Doe v. McCulloch, No. 15SL-CC01891 at 6.] Moreover, the circuit court found that Juror's desire to reveal her experiences as a grand juror, including how she voted or what she said or discussed during jury deliberations, did not fall within any exception to the long tradition of grand jury secrecy.8 Juror contended that the Prosecuting Attorney's disclosure of some grand jury information freed from her oath of secrecy. The circuit court found that the release of some grand jury information did not "necessarily require the release of everything." [Id. at 10] The circuit court stated that ‘[c]omplete transparency is an anathema to the very nature of a grand jury, which depends upon secrecy and anonymity for its proper functioning." [ Id. ] The circuit court concluded that Juror was not entitled to a declaratory judgment that § 540.320 was no longer applicable or valid as applied to Juror.
Because the basis of Juror's claims in her petition was the "chilling effect" on her speech imposed by Missouri law, the circuit court addressed her claim as a violation of the free speech guarantee of Article I, § 8 of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court also considered this claim in light of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because Article 1, § 8 has been found to be comparable to the First Amendment. [Id. at 11] In its free speech analysis, the circuit court stated that the grand jury system was "deeply rooted in federal and state courts [ ] and that the First Amendment has never been found to permit grand jurors to disclose information learned in the course of their grand jury service." [Id. at 12]....
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Doe v. Bell
...540.120 because the statute applies only to witnesses that appear before a grand jury and thus did not apply to Doe. Doe v. Bell , 367 F. Supp. 3d 966, 973 (E.D. Mo. 2019). The district court also held that Doe lacked standing to challenge sections 540.080 and 540.310 because neither sectio......
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