Doe v. McCulloch
| Decision Date | 12 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 105181,ED 105181 |
| Citation | 542 S.W.3d 354 |
| Parties | Grand Juror DOE, Appellant, v. Robert P. MCCULLOCH, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Anthony E. Rothert, Jessica M. Steffan, 454 Whittier St., St. Louis, MO 63108, Ferne P. Wolf, David E. Sowers, Joshua M. Pierson, 530 Maryville Centre Dr. Ste. 460, St. Louis, MO 63141, Gillian R. Wilcox, 3601 Main St., Kansas City, MO 64111, For Plaintiff/Appellant.
D. John Sauer, David J. Hansen, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, For Defendant/Respondent.
Grand Juror Doe ("Doe") was a member of the St. Louis County grand jury that declined to indict former police officer Darren Wilson for actions related to the August 9, 2014 shooting of Michael Brown. Doe began serving on the grand jury on May 7, 2014, at which time she was administered her oath of secrecy. Doe has brought federal and state law claims against the respondent, Robert P. McCulloch ("McCulloch"), who is the elected prosecutor of St. Louis County. Doe alleges that McCulloch’s handling of the case, such as how evidence was presented, "differed significantly from how evidence was presented in the hundreds of other matters presented to her and the other empaneled grand jurors earlier that same term." More specifically, amongst other things, Doe alleges that "the evidence was presented in a way that implied Brown was the wrongdoer and not Wilson[.]"
Doe seeks an exception to the secrecy obligations imposed by various Missouri Revised Statutes, including §§ 540.080, 540.310, and 540.320, as she wishes to "speak publicly about her experience on the grand jury" and "contribute to the current dialogue concerning race relations."1 Initially, Doe filed a complaint in federal district court on January 5, 2015, "alleging only that her First Amendment rights were being violated by §§ 540.080, 540.120, 540.310, and 540.320, as well as any other provision of Missouri law prohibiting Doe from discussing or expressing an[y] opinions related to her grand jury service."2 Doe v. McCulloch , 106 F.Supp.3d 1007 (E.D. Mo. 2015), vacated , 835 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2016). The federal district court decided to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Doe’s claims and dismissed her complaint. However, even though the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit found "[t]he district court did not err in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction," it held that the district court should have retained jurisdiction and stayed the proceedings while the parties litigated state-law issues in Missouri state courts instead of dismissing the case. Id. at 788–89. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 789. The Eighth Circuit ordered the district court to stay Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims pending resolution as it pertains to state law issues in Missouri’s state courts, including whether Doe’s suit was brought against the wrong party or filed in the wrong venue. Id. at 788–89 n.2.
Doe then filed her petition in St. Louis County Circuit Court on June 2, 2015. Her petition contained three counts:
On July 16, 2015, McCulloch filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 55.27(a)(6), arguing Doe failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion and all of Doe’s claims were dismissed with prejudice. This appeal follows.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has explained the appropriate standard of review for this type of case:
A judgment sustaining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is reviewed de novo. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is solely a test of "the adequacy of a plaintiff's petition." Exhibits attached to the petition are reviewed as part of the petition. The facts alleged in the petition are assumed to be true, and all reasonable inferences are liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. The petition is reviewed in an almost academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.
Smith v. Humane Soc'y of United States , 519 S.W.3d 789, 797–98 (Mo. banc 2017) (internal citations omitted). We will affirm the trial court’s dismissal if it is justified on any grounds alleged in the motion. Anderson v. Union Elec. Co. , 463 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Mo. banc 2015).
"In Missouri, grand jury proceedings are conducted in secret." State ex rel. Roe v. Goldman , 471 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (citing §§ 540.320, 540.080, and 540.110). The secrecy requirement was adopted to "protect and promote the public welfare." Id. More specifically, "[t]he proceedings are conducted in secret to protect the jurors themselves, to promote a complete freedom of disclosure, to prevent the escape of a person to be indicted before he may be arrested, to prevent the subornation of perjury in an effort to disprove facts testified to, and to protect the reputations of persons against whom no indictment may be found." Id. The Supreme Court of the United States has echoed this sentiment:
We consistently have recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. In particular, we have noted several distinct interests served by safeguarding the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.
Butterworth v. Smith , 494 U.S. 624, 630, 110 S.Ct. 1376, 1380, 108 L.Ed.2d 572 (1990) (quoting Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Nw. , 441 U.S. 211, 218–19, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 1672–73, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979) ).
The three Missouri grand jury secrecy statutes identified as relevant in Doe’s petition read as follows:
§ 540.080. Oath of grand jurors
§ 540.110. Foreperson—powers and duties—oath
§ 540.320. Grand juror not to disclose evidence—penalty
No grand juror shall disclose any evidence given before the grand jury, nor the name of any witness who appeared before them, except when lawfully required to testify as a witness in relation thereto; nor shall he disclose the fact of any indictment having been found against any person for a felony, not in actual confinement, until the defendant shall have been arrested thereon. Any juror violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
In the trial court’s Judgment, it aptly identified and articulated some of the issues now before us:
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