Evans v. Fenty
| Decision Date | 07 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 76-0293 (ESH). |
| Citation | 701 F.Supp.2d 126 |
| Parties | Joy EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs,United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor,v.Adrian FENTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Cathy E. Costanzo, Northampton, MA, Stephen Forney Hanlon, Paul J. Kiernan, Holland & Knight, LLP, Laura A. Fernandez, Sanford Wittels & Heisler, LLP, Sandra J. Bernstein, University Legal Services, Inc., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
John A. Henderson, William G. Maddox, Cathleen Siobhan Trainor, U.S. Department of Justice, Samuel Robert Bagenstos, U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Intervenor.
Ellen A. Efros, Office of the Attorney General, Maria-Claudia T. Amato, Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, Martha J. Mullen, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Robert C. Utiger, DC Attorney General, Sarah Ann Sulkowski, Office of the Attorney General, DC, Grace Graham, Office of the Attorney General, John D. Dodge, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, Peter J. Nickles, DC Government, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
In 1976, residents of Forest Haven, then the District of Columbia's institution for persons with developmental disabilities, filed this class action alleging that they were receiving constitutionally-deficient care, treatment, education, and training. In 1978, the Court entered a consent decree pursuant to which defendants agreed that plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been violated and that they would take certain actions to remedy those violations.1 A series of consent orders and remedial plans followed in which defendants admitted that they were still violating class members' constitutional rights and agreed to take additional actions to remedy those constitutional violations. The last such consent order and remedial plan was entered into in 2001, when the parties jointly agreed to a Plan for Compliance, pursuant to which defendants could demonstrate compliance with the Court's orders and terminate the litigation.
In 2006, plaintiffs filed a motion to find defendants in noncompliance and to appoint a receiver. On March 30, 2007, the Court granted that motion in part, concluding, based on extensive factual findings, that there had been “systemic, continuous, and serious noncompliance with many of the Court's Orders.” Evans v. Fenty, 480 F.Supp.2d 280, 325 (D.D.C.2007) (“March 2007 Liability Opinion”). With respect to remedy, the Court asked the Special Masters to assist by making findings and recommendations to the Court that address inter alia, “the current status of defendants' compliance, what are the available options for curing the identified deficiencies, and whether a receivership is the most effective and efficient remedy available to the Court.” Id. at 326.
Now before the Court is the Special Masters' Report and Recommendation, which concludes that, as of December 2008, defendants were still in noncompliance with the Court's orders and recommends the appointment of an “Independent Compliance Administrator” to bring defendants into compliance and to end to this litigation. (Special Masters' Report and Recommendation Regarding A Remedy For Defendants' Noncompliance With Court Orders at 128, Aug. 14, 2009 [“2009 Special Masters' Report”].) Defendants have filed limited objections to the report and oppose the imposition of the proposed remedy; 2 plaintiffs have no objections to the report and ask that the Court adopt the findings of the Special Masters and their recommended remedy. Also before the Court is a motion the District filed, after the Special Masters concluded their proceedings in January 2009, to vacate all consent orders and to dismiss the entire case. For the reasons stated herein, defendants' motion to vacate and dismiss will be denied. The Court will address, in a future memorandum opinion and order, defendants' objections to the Special Masters' Report and Recommendations.
The lengthy procedural history of this litigation prior to March 30, 2007, will not be repeated here, as it was fully summarized in the Memorandum Opinion filed on that date. See Evans, 480 F.Supp.2d at 281. Certain events, however, are relevant to defendants' pending motions and will be briefly noted below, followed by a more detailed summary of the facts and procedural history that post-date that decision.3
I. KEY EVENTS PRIOR TO THE MARCH 30, 2007 LIABILITY OPINIONA. 1978 Final Judgment and Order
On June 14, 1978, the Court 4 entered a “Final Judgment and Order” providing for permanent injunctive relief. Evans v. Washington, 459 F.Supp. 483 (D.D.C.1978) (“1978 Consent Order”). The 1978 Consent Order was premised on the recognition, which was consented to by the parties, that plaintiffs had federal constitutional rights under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment “to be kept free from harm” and “to receive habilitative care and treatment in the alternative least restrictive of individual liberty” and that “violations of [those] federal constitutional rights ... have occurred.” Id. at 484. To remedy those violations, the 1978 Consent Order required defendants and their successors to take a number of specific actions see id. at 484-90, that, loosely classified, fell into three categories: health care, safety, and welfare/habilitation. Defendants “consented to the entry of [the 1978 Consent Order] so as to assure protection of the rights of plaintiffs.” Id. at 484.
B. 1981 Consent Order
In 1981, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor filed motions for contempt, based on defendants' noncompliance with the 1978 Consent Order. Those motions led to the entry of a second Consent Order, which supplemented defendants' obligations under the 1978 Consent Order with a list of agreed-upon “measures necessary to the implementation of this Court's Order of June 14, 1978.” (Consent Order at 1, June 25, 1981 [“1981 Consent Order”].) The 1981 Consent Order did not revisit the legal conclusions of the 1978 Consent Order nor did it “release defendants from their obligations” thereunder. ( Id. at 10.) Rather, the parties came to an agreement that defendants needed to take additional measures to assure protection of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The agreed-upon measures supplemented defendants' obligations in each area addressed by the 1978 Consent Order-health, safety and welfare/habilitation. ( Id. at 1-10.)
C. 1982 Supreme Court Decision ( Youngberg v. Romeo )
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), addressing for the first time the constitutional rights of an individual who had been involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded. As discussed infra, defendants' motion to vacate is based in part on the Youngberg decision and defendants' contention, made for the first time in the 28 years since Youngberg was decided, that Youngberg changed the law and established that the 1978 Consent Order rested on “extraconstitutional” rights.
D. 1983 Consent Order
In 1982, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor again filed motions for contempt, which led to the entry of a third Consent Order. (Consent Order, Feb. 8, 1983 [“1983 Consent Order”] ). The 1983 Consent Order similarly did not revisit the legal conclusions of the 1978 Consent Order nor did it release defendants from their obligations under prior orders; it merely added to those obligations “to assist in the implementation of those orders.” ( Id. at 14-15.) Again, the agreed-upon measures supplemented defendants' obligations in each area addressed by the 1978 Consent Order-health, safety and welfare/habilitation. ( Id. at 2-14.)
E. 1990 Contempt Order
In 1989, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor again filed motions for contempt. In 1990, the Court issued an Order holding the District in civil contempt based on its “consistent and continuing violation of the three Consent Orders [of 1978, 1981 and 1983].” Evans, 480 F.Supp.2d at 284 (quoting Order, Jan. 30, 1990 [“Jan.1990 Contempt Order”].) After a sanctions hearing, the Court issued an Order that inter alia, required defendants to complete the outplacement of the 233 plaintiffs remaining at Forest Haven by September 30, 1991. Id. (citing Order, Apr. 9, 1990 [“Apr.1990 Contempt Order”] ). By October 1991, all plaintiffs had been moved from Forest Haven and the institution was closed.
F. 1995 Contempt Order, Appointment of Special Master, 1996 Remedial Plan
In 1995, four years after the closure of Forest Haven, plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor filed motions for contempt, for remedial sanctions and for appointment of a Special Master. After two hearings, the Court again found the District to be in contempt based on “clear and convincing evidence, including defendants' conceded violations, that the District is not in compliance with the consent orders in this case....” (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 7, Oct. 11, 1995 [“1995 Contempt Order”].) In its decision, the Court 5 observed that as of 1995, it had “entered numerous orders, including consent orders between the parties, to safeguard the rights of class members and ensure their adequate and appropriate habilitation.” ( Id. at 1.) The Court further noted that “[d]efendants admit that the District has a continuing responsibility to provide the class members with habilitation in accordance with their needs” and “ admit that they also are required to provide adequate medical care, psychological care, day programming, community residential placements and other support systems as set forth in the class members' [individual habilitation plans].” ( Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).) The Court proceeded to find the District in contempt because it (1) was delinquent in ensuring timely payment of providers, in violation of the 1983 Consent Order; (2) permitted inadequate...
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