Doe v. CATHOLIC BISHOP FOR MEMPHIS
| Decision Date | 16 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. W2007-01575-COA-R9-CV,W2007-01575-COA-R9-CV |
| Parties | John DOE v. CATHOLIC BISHOP FOR the DIOCESE OF MEMPHIS. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
John H. Dotson, Michael Casey Shannon, and J. Martin Regan, Memphis, Tennessee for the appellant Catholic Bishop, for the Diocese of Memphis.
Gary K. Smith, Karen M. Campbell, Memphis, Tennessee, and Adam D. Horowitz, Miami, Florida, for the appellee John Doe.
This appeal involves the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The plaintiff, a thirty-seven year old man, filed a lawsuit against the defendant Catholic diocese. His complaint alleged that, as an adolescent, he was sexually abused by a Catholic priest employed by the defendant diocese. The lawsuit alleged that the diocese was negligent in hiring, retaining, and supervising the priest, and that the diocese breached its fiduciary duty to the plaintiff by failing to disclose to him its knowledge that the priest had abused other young boys. The diocese filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. In response, the plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations was tolled under the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The diocese was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. On appeal, we reverse, finding that the plaintiff's complaint is time-barred, and cannot be saved by the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, or the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
This case is another in the onslaught of lawsuits nationwide against the Catholic Church arising out of alleged sexual abuse of a minor by a member of the clergy.1 The facts alleged in the complaint are disturbingly similar to the facts alleged in many of these lawsuits. For purposes of this appeal, we accept them as true.
Plaintiff/Appellee John Doe ("Doe") was born in February 1969, and was raised in the Roman Catholic faith. Father Daniel DuPree ("Father DuPree") was a Catholic priest; during the 1980's, Father DuPree served Catholic parishes in the Memphis, Tennessee area. These parishes were overseen by the Defendant/Appellant Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis ("Diocese"), a religious organization associated with the Roman Catholic Church.
Doe met Father DuPree in 1983, when Doe was approximately 14 years old. At the time, Father DuPree was a young new priest, and Doe was a congregant of the Church of the Resurrection in Memphis. Father DuPree promised to revive Doe's youth group at the Church, and regularly invited Doe to have lunch with him and the other priests at the Church rectory. In doing so, Father DuPree became close friends with Doe. He also became a friend of Doe's family, and on occasion was invited to their home for dinner and to preside over family events. Doe's parents were pleased that Father DuPree took an interest in their son because they hoped that Doe would one day enter the priesthood.
In December 1985, Doe's family permitted Doe to accompany Father DuPree on a trip to Texas to visit Father DuPree's family. Father DuPree's sexual abuse of Doe began on this trip to Texas. The first instance occurred in a hotel room that Doe and Father DuPree shared on the way to Texas. It continued during the stay at the home of Father DuPree's parents, where Doe and Father DuPree shared a bed.
Not long after that, Father DuPree began working as a chaplain and guidance counselor at Christian Brothers High School in Memphis. Doe was a student at the school. Father DuPree's sexual abuse of Doe continued through their contacts at school and church. During this time, Father DuPree remained in the employ of the Diocese. Doe turned eighteen years old in February 1987.
On September 14, 2006, Doe filed a lawsuit against the Diocese in the Circuit Court for Shelby County, Tennessee. At the time the lawsuit was filed, Doe was thirty-seven years old.
The complaint alleges that Doe looked to the Diocese and its representatives for counseling, guidance, and spiritual growth, putting the Diocese in a position of trust and creating a fiduciary relationship between the Diocese and Doe. In addition, the complaint alleges that, prior to Doe's abuse, the Diocese knew or should have known that Father DuPree was a pedophile and a sexual predator. As a fiduciary, Doe asserts, the Diocese had a duty to disclose to Doe its knowledge that Father DuPree posed a danger to children and to protect Doe from Father DuPree's sexual abuse. Instead, the Diocese intentionally and fraudulently concealed its knowledge of Father DuPree's propensities and its own negligent supervision of him.
The basis of Doe's claim for relief against the Diocese is negligence; he asserts that the Diocese owed him a duty of reasonable care in the hiring, retention, and supervision of Father DuPree. Doe avers in his complaint that, "despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, Doe only recently learned of the Diocese's negligent conduct."2 Doe also asserts that, as a result of the sexual abuse he endured at the hands of Father DuPree, he experienced severe psychological injuries, including loss of faith, mood swings, intimacy problems, emotional disconnection, anxiety, rage, and loss of enjoyment of life. He alleges that the Diocese's actions were a direct and proximate cause of his injuries. For these injuries, Doe seeks damages in excess of $10,000,000.
The Diocese responded to Doe's complaint by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The Diocese asserts that Doe's complaint is barred by the one-year statute of limitations, set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104,3 and that, accordingly, Doe fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
In its motion to dismiss, the Diocese acknowledges that, because the alleged abuse began while Doe was a minor, the statute of limitations was tolled under Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-1-1064 until Doe turned eighteen in February 1987. At that point, the Diocese asserts, the statute of limitations began to run. Because the applicable limitations period is one year, any action filed after February 1988 would be time-barred. As Doe did not file his complaint until 2006, the Diocese argues, it should be dismissed as untimely.
In response to the Diocese's motion to dismiss, Doe argued that the Diocese was in a fiduciary relationship with him and that, as such, its silence about Father DuPree's pedophilic propensities and actions constituted fraudulent concealment, which would toll the statute of limitations. Doe also maintained that the Diocese was equitably estopped from relying on the statute of limitations because it had remained silent when it knew or should have known about Father DuPree's conduct. Finally, Doe asserted that the discovery rule applied to prevent his complaint from being time-barred because he neither knew nor had reason to know that the Diocese had been negligent in hiring and supervising Father DuPree. Doe maintained that his knowledge of Father DuPree's sexual abuse of him was not tantamount to knowledge that the Diocese had acted negligently.
In reply to Doe's argument, the Diocese contended that, under all of the theories relied on by Doe, the statute of limitations is only tolled until a plaintiff learns or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have learned about his right of action. The Diocese noted that, at the time Doe reached majority, Doe knew he had been abused, knew that Father DuPree was employed by the Diocese, and knew that he (Doe) relied on the Diocese for guidance, counseling and spiritual growth. Accordingly, the Diocese argued, Doe could not rely on the discovery rule, fraudulent concealment, or equitable estoppel to toll the statute of limitations.
On April 4, 2007, the trial court issued an order denying the Diocese's motion to dismiss. The trial court did not set forth its reasoning in the order.
The Diocese then filed a motion under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, seeking permission for interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order. This motion was not opposed, and permission to appeal was granted by both the trial court and the appellate court.
The conduct alleged in Doe's complaint constitutes an "invidious breach" of the relationship of a parishioner with his priest and his church, which "warrants the severest possible condemnation by all right thinking persons of compassion." Doe v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993). We are obligated, however, to examine dispassionately the timeliness of Doe's claims, respecting the important function of statutes of limitation in ensuring the prompt prosecution of claims and fairness to all parties.
On appeal, the Diocese argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss. It argues that none of the theories relied on by Doe, namely, the discovery doctrine, fraudulent concealment, and equitable estoppel, apply to toll the statute of limitations.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted "tests only the legal sufficiency of the complaint. . . ." Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn.1997). Our review of an appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim is "limited to the allegations in the complaint. . . ." Randolph v. Dominion Bank of Middle Tenn., 826 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991). Therefore, "we must construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, taking all of the...
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