Doe v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 22 September 2016
• Docket Number: 2015-SC-000408-MR
• Parties: John Doe, No. 1; and John Doe, No. 2, Appellants v. Honorable Eddy Coleman, Judge, Pike Circuit Court, Appellee and William Hickman, III, Real Party in Interest
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

497 S.W.3d 740

John Doe, No. 1; and John Doe, No. 2, Appellants

v. Honorable Eddy Coleman, Judge, Pike Circuit Court, AppelleeandWilliam Hickman, III, Real Party in Interest

2015-SC-000408-MR

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

SEPTEMBER 22, 2016

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: Lawrence R. Webster, Webster Law Offices, PO Drawer 712, Pikeville, Kentucky 41502

APPELLEE: Honorable Eddy Coleman, Judge, Pike Circuit Court, Pike County Judicial Center, 175 Main Street, Pikeville, Kentucky 41501

COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST: Richard A. Getty, Danielle Brown, The Getty Law Group, PLLC, 1900 Lexington Financial Center, 250 West Main Street, Lexington, Kentucky 40507

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NOBLE

This case presents the question what must a public-figure prove to obtain the identities of anonymous speakers alleged to have defamed him.

I. Background

Appellee William Hickman filed an action in Pike Circuit Court on October 18, 2013 against several anonymous users of the website Topix (hereafter the John Does) claiming that the John Does had posted defamatory statements about him on the website. Hickman claimed that the various statements, which he attached in a transcript, were recklessly published by the John Does. Specifically, his complaint stated that the statements “perpetuated substantial errors and omissions that wrongfully and erroneously imputed fraud, dishonesty, criminal activity and conduct incompatible with his business, trade, profession and office” about him and thereby damaged his reputation.

Because he did not know the identity of the John Does, Hickman issued subpoenas to Topix and another internet provider seeking the identity and address of John Doe 1 and John Doe 2. The providers did not respond, but the two John Does filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. The trial court, Appellee Judge Coleman, denied the motion to quash, which led to the filing of a petition for a writ of prohibition with the Court of Appeals.

In an attempt to balance the John Does' First Amendment right to anonymous speech and Hickman's right to seek redress for defamatory speech, the Court of Appeals purported to apply Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 342 N.J.Super. 134, 775 A.2d 756 (Ct.App.Div.2001)

, as modified by Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del.2005). To some extent, this description of the relationship between the two cases is not accurate: Dendrite

cannot have been modified by Cahill, as they are from different court systems. In reality, the Court of Appeals applied Cahill, which applied a modified version of the rule announced in Dendrite.

Dendrite

required that in order to compel the identity of a John Doe, a plaintiff must (1) take reasonable steps to notify the John Doe of the subpoena and allow the John Doe opportunity to respond; (2) identify and set forth the exact statements alleged to be actionable speech; and (3) establish that the plaintiff's case can withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and produce sufficient evidence on each element of the claim on a prima facie basis. Finally, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for defamation, then (4) the court must balance the First Amendment right of free speech against the prima facie evidence and the necessity for disclosure in order to proceed.

However, the Court of Appeals actually followed the holding in Cahill,

which concluded that under Delaware law, two of the specifics of the Dendrite holding were subsumed under that state's summary judgment standard. Instead of the four-step Dendrite approach, Cahill outlined a two-step process of (1) giving notice and opportunity to be heard and (2) making a prima facie showing sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.

And because of the additional factor of anonymous public speakers, the Court of Appeals also adopted Cahill'

s reasoning that the final element of public-official defamation—actual malice—did not have to be a part of a prima

facie showing. The exclusion of establishing the knowledge or reckless-disregard portion of a defamation claim against a public figure, the Court of Appeals held, was appropriate at that time because that element could only be proved after the identities were revealed, which was the point of the subpoena.

Thus, in order to obtain the identities of the John Does, the Court of Appeals required Hickman to attempt to notify the John Does that he was seeking their identity and give them opportunity to respond, and then make a prima facie showing that defamation had occurred under Cahill.

On that note, the Court of Appeals granted a writ of prohibition as to the existing discovery order and sent the case back to circuit court to apply this new rule. Although that decision was appealable to this Court as a matter of right, no appeal was taken.

Back at the circuit court, Hickman sought to prove his prima facie case since the first prong of the Court of Appeals ruling had obviously been met: the John Does had entered an anonymous appearance in the court, and had had time to respond to the subpoenas. Hickman offered an affidavit claiming falsity and attaching 14 pages of individual Topix posts. The affidavit did not address individual posts, but instead claimed that the posts collectively accused him of “a pre-planned conspiracy to violate Federal and State Statutes to illegally take property and money from the Pikeville/Pike County Airport Board for personal gain and for the personal gain of other individuals.” Without refuting any of the specific statements, Hickman merely summarized “this is not true and is totally baseless.” He further characterized the statements as saying he was “dishonest, a thief, an embezzler and otherwise a criminal,” which he also said was “not true” and “totally baseless.” He repeated several times in his affidavit that all the statements were “not true” and facially defamatory. Finally, he asserted that audits had confirmed that “no accounting crimes” had been committed regarding the airport funds.

The John Does argued that the specific language in the statements simply did not contain facially defamatory statements and that there had been inadequate proof that any of the statements alleged to be defamatory were false.

The Pike Circuit Court ordered each side to submit a proposed order reflecting the view each had argued. Hickman did so, but also included relief that had not been previously requested or argued: that counsel for the John Does be required to disclose their identity. The John Does proposed a counter-order addressing their arguments, and raising SCR 3.130

(1.6) as authority that a lawyer could not reveal confidential client information absent consent of the client without court order, and without informing the client of the right to appeal such order.

The court accepted Hickman's order as proposed, ordered subpoenas to be served, and ordered counsel for the John Does to disclose their identities and to specify which of the posts had been made by each of them. The John Does filed another writ petition in the Court of Appeals. The court denied the petition this time, concluding that Hickman had satisfied the standard articulated in its previous opinion by making a prima facie case, including providing evidence that the statements were false.

This time, the John Does filed their matter of right appeal to this Court.

II. Analysis

Generally speaking, cases in which a writ of prohibition or mandamus is sought proceed in two steps. Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Ky.2012)

. First, the court must look at whether such an extraordinary remedy is even available, before deciding the merits of the claimed legal error. Id. Second, if the court finds that the remedy is available, it may then look at the merits of the claimed error. Id. If the trial court has erred or is about to err, the court may issue the writ.

A. The remedy of a writ of prohibition is available to the John Does.

The first question is whether the John Does have “established that remedy by way of an extraordinary writ is even available to [them].” Id.

Under this approach, there are essentially “two classes of writs, one addressing claims that the lower court is proceeding without subject matter jurisdiction and one addressing claims of mere legal error.” Id. at 158. The John Does have not made a claim under the first class, and thus we address only the second.

Under the second class, a writ may be granted—that is, the remedy is available—if “there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted.” Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky.2004)

. Of the two prerequisites for this class of writ, the first is mandatory, and thus the John Does are required to prove that they have no adequate remedy by appeal. Marcum v. Scorsone, 457 S.W.3d 710, 716 (Ky.2015). The second prerequisite, however, is more flexible. Though it usually requires proof of “something of a ruinous nature,” it “may be put aside in ‘certain special cases.’ ”

Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 808 (Ky.2004) (quoting Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky.1961) ). That limited sub-class of cases consists of those in which “a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration.” Id. (quoting Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801 ). This includes those cases in which a privilege will be breached. Id.

Whether there is a privilege is at issue in two ways in this case. First, because anonymous speech is protected under the First Amendment, Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197–99, 119 S.Ct. 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999)

; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995), the speaker's identity is generally protected and not subject to forced revelation in court. Second, the trial court ordered the John Does' attorney...